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Abstract  
 
This thesis investigates Arthur Balfour’s policy towards Japan and the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance from 1894 to 1923. Although Balfour was involved in the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance from its signing to termination, no comprehensive analysis of his role in the 
alliance has been carried out. Utilising unpublished materials and academic books, this 
thesis reveals that Balfour’s policy on the Anglo-Japanese alliance revolved around two 
vital principles, namely imperial defence and Anglo-American cooperation. From the 
viewpoint of imperial defence, Balfour emphasised the defence of India and Australasia 
more than that of China. He opposed the signing of the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 
because it was not useful in the defence of India. The Russo-Japanese War raised the 
concern of Indian security. Changing his lukewarm attitude, Balfour took the initiative 
in extending the alliance into India to employ Japanese troops for the defence of India. 
Moreover, as an advocate of Anglo-American cooperation, Balfour made every effort to 
maintain good Anglo-American-Japanese relations. However, imperial defence and 
Anglo-American cooperation began to clash within the alliance during the Great War. 
Although the Siberian intervention was useful Japanese military assistance in the 
defence of India, America, who was not interested in India, hesitated to support it due to 
her suspicion against Japan. After the war, the alliance was still instrumental in 
defending India and Australasia, but its existence damaged the relations with America. 
Balfour tried to achieve both imperial defence and Anglo-American cooperation by 
developing the alliance into an Anglo-American-Japanese trilateral agreement with a 
military clause to revive a bilateral defensive alliance. But America and Japan did not 
support Balfour’s plan at the Washington Conference, and he had to accept the 
Four-Power Treaty without any military commitment.  
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Introduction 
 
                               I. 
 
At the end of the nineteenth century Britain was paying a great deal of attention to the 
defence of her Empire. While she still possessed enough economic, military and naval 
might to safeguard her global interests, her growing rivalry with European powers such 
as Russia, France and Germany had spread from Europe into Africa and Asia. The rise 
of newcomers such as America and Japan complicated political alignments among the 
great powers. British statesmen had to consider how Britain should protect her interests 
across the world in this complex and uncertain situation. As one of their solutions, 
British global diplomacy fastened on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was signed in 
1902 and continued until 1923. British policymakers, both those who supported it and 
those who did not, discussed its management for more than twenty years.  
Arthur Balfour played an important role in British policy on the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance. In 1921 he boasted that ‘for 20 years I had been an advocate of close relations 
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between Great Britain and Japan’.1 There is room for examining whether he was really 
a proponent of cordial Anglo-Japanese relations. However, it is clear that he was 
involved in British foreign policy towards Japan for about twenty years. He dealt with 
the signing of the alliance as a senior member of the Cabinet, and undertook its revision 
and renewal in 1905 as Prime Minister. He tackled the problem of Japanese naval and 
military assistance to Britain as Foreign Secretary during the Great War, and coped with 
the end of the alliance as head of the British delegation to the 1921-1922 Washington 
Conference. Only Balfour was involved in each of these significant turning points in the 
alliance as the pivot of British government. Therefore, he provides a unique prism 
through which to investigate how senior British politicians regarded the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance in its entirety. 
Arthur Balfour (1848-1930), 1st Earl of Balfour from 1922, was born into a wealthy 
landowning family at Whittingehame House in Scotland. His father, James Balfour, died 
when he was seven years old and thereafter the 3rd Marquis of Salisbury, his maternal 
uncle and a prominent Conservative statesman, assumed his care. He was educated at 
Eton College and then at Cambridge University, where he studied philosophy and moral 
science.
2
 Supported by Salisbury, he became a Conservative Member of Parliament in 
                                                   
1 Balfour to Lloyd George, 19 Dec. 1921, CAB 30/6/W.D.C.87. 
2 Balfour wrote many books on philosophy in his life. For example, A.J. Balfour, The Foundations 
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1874. Soon after entering the House of Commons Balfour embarked upon a world tour, 
visiting Canada, America, New Zealand and Australia.
3
 Japan was not included in his 
travels, although he landed at Singapore and Ceylon on the way from Australia to 
Britain. This indicated that Balfour was not yet interested in Japan.                       
Balfour’s involvement in British foreign policy began in 1878. Salisbury, who 
became Foreign Secretary at that year, appointed him Parliamentary Private Secretary. 
Balfour made his debut in European diplomacy at the Congress of Berlin, which aimed 
to resolve the Eastern Question caused by the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878.
4
 
Accompanying Salisbury, Balfour had an opportunity to socialise with European 
statesmen, including the German Chancellor Prince Bismarck. As Balfour confessed 
later, this position brought him into ‘close contact with public affairs, and with those by 
whom public affairs were then directed’.5  
   When Salisbury formed his first Cabinet in 1885, Balfour was supposed to 
                                                                                                                                                     
of Belief: Being Notes Introductory to the Study of Theology (London, 4th edn.1895); A.J. Balfour, 
Decadence: Henry Sidgwick Memorial Lecture (Cambridge, 1908); A.J. Balfour, Theism and 
Thought: A Study in Familiar Beliefs, Being the Second Course of Gifford Lectures Delivered at the 
University of Glasgow, 1922-23 (London, 1923).    
3 M. Egremont, Balfour: A Life of Arthur James Balfour (London, 1980), p. 43. 
4 For details of the Eastern Question, see R.W. Seton-Watson, Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern 
Question: A Study in Diplomacy and Party Politics (London, 1962); R. Millman, Britain and the 
Eastern Question, 1875-1878 (Oxford, 1979); M. Ković, Disraeli and the Eastern Question (Oxford, 
2011). For different views, see J. Charmley, Splendid Isolation?: Britain, the Balance of Power and 
the Origins of the First World War (London, 1999); B. Grosvenor, ‘Britain’s “most isolationist 
Foreign Secretary”: The Fifteenth Earl and the Eastern Crisis, 1876-1878’ in G. Hicks, (ed.) 
Conservatism and British Foreign Policy, 1820-1920: The Derbys and their World (Farnham, 2011), 
pp. 129-168.     
5 A.J. Balfour, Chapters of Autobiography (London, 1930), p. 103.  
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contribute to foreign policymaking. The Prime Minister also headed the Foreign Office 
and considered making Balfour Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. 
Indeed, Balfour was in favour of taking this post, informing Salisbury that ‘I would do 
anything that most conduced to the smooth working of your arrangements’.6 However, 
in the end, Salisbury gave Conservative Member of Parliament Robert Bourke the 
under-secretaryship and Balfour served as President of the Local Government Board, 
with no seat in the Cabinet. Balfour finally joined the Cabinet during Salisbury’s second 
administration from 1886-1892 and was consecutively appointed Secretary for Scotland, 
Chief Secretary for Ireland and First Lord of the Treasury. Although he was not 
involved in British diplomacy, he succeeded in strengthening his position in the 
Conservative party.     
In 1895 Salisbury’s third administration was established after the Conservatives 
cooperated with Liberal Imperialists who had seceded from the Liberal Party. Salisbury 
again also served as Foreign Secretary. Balfour returned to the post of First Lord of the 
Treasury and as Leader of the House of Commons, making him a leading figure in 
government without departmental responsibilities. However, unlike in Salisbury’s 
second Cabinet, Balfour sometimes managed British foreign policy on behalf of his 
                                                   
6 Balfour to Salisbury, 15 Jun. 1885 in R.H. Williams, (ed.) Salisbury-Balfour Correspondence: 
Letters exchanged between the Third Marquess of Salisbury and his nephew Arthur James Balfour 
1869-1892 (Cambridge, 1988), p. 121. 
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ailing uncle. During March, April and August 1898, when Salisbury was ill and 
recuperating in the south of France, Balfour became Acting Foreign Secretary and 
tackled many international problems such as the great powers’ disputes over China and 
Anglo-German negotiations over the Portuguese colonies. Facing the heavy burden of 
the departmental work involved, Balfour complained that ‘whenever Lord Salisbury left 
him [Balfour] in charge of the Foreign Office, he found himself dealing with a crisis’.7 
This demonstrated that his influence in British diplomacy was strengthened even though 
he did not occupy a formal post at the Foreign Office.                  
Salisbury’s diplomacy in the face of many international crises intensified British 
policymakers’ dissatisfaction with him, raising Balfour as heir apparent. Indeed, St John 
Brodrick, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, hoped that Balfour 
would replace Salisbury and ‘do some real big work for the Empire’.8 Although 
Balfour did not express his discontent publicly, he was not a loyal follower of 
Salisbury’s diplomacy either. In particular, unlike Salisbury, Balfour believed that 
Britain needed a reliable ally to survive the growing rivalry between the world’s great 
powers. Given his strong faith in Anglo-Saxon solidarity, it was not surprising that his 
first choice was America. Even though the new Foreign Secretary Lord Lansdowne 
                                                   
7 B.E.C. Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour vol 1 (London, 1936), p. 250. 
8 Brodrick to Selborne, 16 Aug. 1898, Selborne MSS, MS. Selborne 2. 
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undertook negotiations with Japan, Balfour preferred an Anglo-German to an 
Anglo-Japanese alliance because he considered that, unlike the latter, the former would 
be useful in the defence of India. In the end, he accepted the Anglo-Japanese alliance, 
which was signed on 30 January 1902.        
Balfour became Prime Minister in July 1902 and asked Lansdowne to stay on at the 
Foreign Office. Although he saw Lansdowne as ‘better than competent’, he continued to 
interfere in the making of foreign policy during his premiership.
9
 According to Austen 
Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lansdowne ‘took no important step and 
sent no important despatch without first consulting’ Balfour. 10  Despite some 
disagreements, Balfour and Lansdowne coped with the defence of India, the 
Russo-Japanese War, the signing of the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale and the revision 
of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. In particular, despite being unwilling to renew the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance at first, Balfour changed his mind and took the initiative in its 
renewal and extension into India. Furthermore, he established the Committee of 
Imperial Defence (CID) in December 1902 to improve coordination between military 
and foreign policy. The establishment of the CID contributed to break the indifference 
                                                   
9 Egremont, Balfour, pp. 162-163.  
10 A. Chamberlain, Down the Years (London, 1935), p. 209. See also S.H. Zebel, Balfour: A 
Political Biography (Cambridge, 1973), p. 105. 
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to defence matters.
11
   
   Although it achieved many diplomatic successes, the Balfour administration 
suffered from internal division over tariff reform and collapsed in December 1905. After 
a serious electoral defeat in 1906, Balfour continued as Leader of the Opposition. 
However, it was unlikely that he and his party would soon return to power. Balfour 
relinquished the party’s leadership after the constitutional crisis that reduced the power 
of the House of Lords in 1911. Even with such a setback in his political career, however, 
he was not willing to withdraw from British politics, seeing it as ‘not the end of my 
interest in politics, or of my work for political causes’.12 Indeed, he maintained his 
influence within the party, and many colleagues, including the new party leader Andrew 
Bonar Law, could not ignore him.
13
 He had no intention of becoming Prime Minister 
again, but expressed a desire to serve as Foreign Secretary if the Conservatives returned 
to power.
14
            
The outbreak of the Great War brought him back to the centre of the British politics 
and diplomacy. Not only Herbert Asquith, the Prime Minister, but also King George V 
valued Balfour’s expertise in politics, in particular in foreign and defence policy, and 
                                                   
11 ‘Mr. Balfour and Imperial Defence’, The Times, Wednesday 13 Sep. 1905, p. 6. 
12 Balfour to Brodrick, 8 Nov. 1911, Balfour MSS, British Library, Additional Manuscripts 
(hereafter Add. MSS.) 49721. 
13 For cool relations between Balfour and Bonar Law, see R. Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister: 
The Life and Times of Andrew Bonar Law 1858-1923 (London, 1955), pp. 91-93. 
14 Lord Riddell, More Pages from My Diary 1908-1914 (London, 1934), pp. 101-102. 
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invited him to join the government as a member of the Prince of Wales’s Committee for 
the administrative fund on 17 August 1914.
15
 Even though he had not yet entered the 
Cabinet, Balfour began to consider the possibility of deploying Japanese troops in 
Europe. When Asquith established a Coalition Government on 19 May 1915, Balfour 
was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty, the most important post among the 
Conservative statesmen. He had absolutely no desire to take on a heavy burden of 
ministerial work, but the Admiralty was an exception.
16
 As head of the Admiralty he 
faced many arduous tasks, including securing Japanese naval assistance for Britain. 
By the autumn of 1916, the coalition government was facing intensifying 
dissatisfaction with Asquith’s management of the war. The fierce struggle between 
Asquith and Lloyd George, then Secretary of State for War, led to the collapse of the 
government in December 1916.
17
 Balfour, who could have become ‘a “neutral” Prime 
Minister’, supported Lloyd George and served as his Foreign Secretary.18 As ‘an ideal 
man for the Foreign Office’, Balfour made every effort to maintain calm 
Anglo-American-Japanese relations.
19
 Realising the growing significance of Japan’s 
                                                   
15 Asquith to Balfour, 17 Aug. 1914, Balfour MSS, Add. MSS. 49692. 
16 Balfour to Asquith, 19 May 1915, Balfour MSS, Add. MSS. 49692. 
17 For details of the political crisis of December 1916, see J. Turner, British Politics and the Great 
War: Coalition and Conflict 1915-1918 (New Haven, 1992), pp. 124-151.    
18 Memo. by Bonar Law, 30 Dec. 1916, Bonar Law MSS BL/85/A/1; Blake, The Unknown Prime 
Minister, p.337. 
19 D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs, vol.2 (London, 1933), p.1017. 
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naval and military assistance due to Britain’s severe shortage of soldiers and munitions, 
he ‘had more conversations with the Japanese on this subject than anyone else’.20 To 
him, the Siberian intervention meant accepting Japanese military aid not in Europe but 
in Asia. Although Lloyd George often interfered in British diplomacy, Balfour 
maintained his influence over Britain’s foreign policy regarding Japan and the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance.       
Balfour had continued to occupy significant positions in the British government 
after the end of the Great War. He attended the Paris Peace Conference as one of the 
British delegates and took the initiative in resolving the Anglo-American-Japanese 
dispute over China. Although he resigned as Foreign Secretary after completing this 
work in Paris, he remained in the Cabinet as Lord President of the Council, which he 
saw as ‘a lighter Office’ without heavy administrative work.21 This post enabled him to 
direct much of his energy into important negotiations with other great powers. He 
became the British delegate to the League of Nations from 1920 to 1923 and joined the 
Washington Conference of 1921-1922 as Britain’s chief representative to deal with the 
end of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Granted a peerage after the Washington Conference, 
Balfour sometimes stood in at Foreign Office for the newly-appointed Foreign Secretary 
                                                   
20 Notes of a Conversation held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, on November 30, 1917, at 
4 P.M., FO 371/2955/229961. 
21 Balfour to Stamfordham, 24 Oct. 1919, Balfour MSS GD 433/2/21. 
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George Curzon, who occasionally suffered from back pain.
22
               
Balfour continued his involvement in British diplomacy until just before his death. 
He did not occupy a Cabinet post after the formation of Bonar Law’s administration of 
October 1922. However, Stanley Baldwin, the Conservative Prime Minister, invited him 
into the Cabinet, where he resumed his work as Lord President of the Council in March 
1925. At the 1926 Imperial Conference Balfour played a significant role in creating the 
‘Balfour Definition’, which defined relations between Britain and the Dominions as 
‘autonomous Communities within the British Empire’.23 When the Conservatives lost 
the general election in May 1929, Balfour finally resigned from political life.
24
 He died 
on 19 March 1930 at the age of 81.        
Realising his importance, many scholars have studied Balfour and the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance from various viewpoints. Among them, Ian Nish’s two books 
about the alliance are invaluable and are the most important in the historiography.
25
 As 
his second book’s title, Alliance in Decline, indicates, Nish establishes a framework for 
                                                   
22 J. Tomes, Balfour and Foreign Policy: The International Thoughts of a Conservative Statesman 
(Cambridge, 1997), p. 18. 
23 D. Judd, Balfour and the British Empire: A Study in Imperial Evolution, 1874-1932 (London, 
1968), p. 335. 
24 While his premiership was just three years, Balfour held cabinet rank for twenty-seven years 
which was the longest in British history. See R. Mackay, Balfour: Intellectual Statesman (Oxford, 
1985), p. 354; D. Leonard, A Century of Premiers: Salisbury to Blair (Basingstoke, 2005), pp. 23-24.     
25 I. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907 
(London, 1966); I. Nish, Alliance in Decline: A study in Anglo-Japanese relations 1908-23 (London, 
1972). 
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the rise and fall of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Indeed, he states that the alliance 
reached ‘its highest point’ in 1902-1905 due to the necessity of dealing with a common 
threat, namely Russia’s expansion in Asia.26 After the Russo-Japanese War, however, 
this common interest was lost and new concerns such as Japan’s ambitions in China and 
America’s hostility to Japan gradually weakened the alliance. Nish concludes that the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance was an ‘alliance in decline’ after the 1911 revision, and was 
‘really dead before its termination’.27  His analysis is very convincing and many 
historians accept his framework.   
   However, Nish’s books contain three significant problems regarding Balfour’s role 
in the Anglo-Japanese alliance. First, Nish does not answer why Balfour changed his 
unenthusiastic attitude towards the alliance and took the initiative in its revision. 
Although he refers to Balfour’s initial unwillingness to revise the alliance before its 
expiration, Nish does not pay attention to the fact that Balfour suddenly came round to 
supporting its extension.
28
 Balfour’s change of mind was important, because he could 
have declined the revision of the alliance even if the Foreign Secretary supported it. In 
fact, immediately before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, Balfour did not 
approve Britain’s mediation between Russia and Japan, which Lansdowne favoured, 
                                                   
26 Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 377. 
27 Nish, Alliance in Decline, p. 392. 
28 Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, pp. 300-302. 
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pushing through his own opinion that strict neutrality was required. Given the necessity 
of Balfour’s support for the revision, it is vital to clarify the reasons for his change of 
mind about the Anglo-Japanese alliance. 
Second, Nish rarely mentions Balfour’s role during the Great War. As Foreign 
Secretary, Balfour played a significant part in negotiations about Japan’s military 
assistance and the Siberian intervention, which were linked to the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance. Contrary to his analysis of Japanese naval aid, however, Nish scarcely 
discusses Balfour and the British government’s reaction to her military assistance. 
Moreover, even though he concisely outlines the Siberian intervention, he does not 
mention its effect on Balfour’s policy towards the alliance beyond saying ‘[t]he alliance 
was not at stake’.29 Japan did not send her troops to the European front and the Siberian 
intervention was finally carried out just before the end of the war. Therefore, it is 
reasonable that Nish concludes that Japan’s contribution to the war was ‘largely a naval 
one’.30 But this does not mean that these issues were so minor that Balfour rarely 
considered them. His discussions of Japan’s military help and the Siberian intervention 
demonstrated important aspects of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.             
Third, there is still room for reconstructing the negotiations between Britain, 
                                                   
29 Nish, Alliance in Decline, pp. 237-241. 
30 Ibid., p. 256. 
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America and Japan at the Washington Conference concerning the fate of the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance. When he explains Balfour’s reaction to his American and 
Japanese counterparts, Nish uses only published materials and the autobiography of 
Kijuro Shidehara, who served as Japan’s chief delegate at the conference.31 As a result, 
it is not clear what Balfour’s considerations were during the conference. Yet, many 
unpublished documents, in particular Cabinet Papers in The National Archives, are now 
available. In addition, it is necessary to investigate whether the account in Shidehara’s 
autobiography, written about thirty years after the conference, is correct.
32
 This 
reinvestigation will offer more details on Balfour’s thinking about the final stage of the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance.             
Other scholars’ works on Anglo-Japanese relations do not throw light on these three 
questions. Peter Lowe has produced a detailed book about the alliance but his research 
is confined to the period from 1911 to 1915, at which point Balfour was out of power, 
so Lowe does not comment on his part in the alliance.
33
 Antony Best deals with 
Anglo-Japanese relations after 1914, introducing the factors of intelligence into the 
debate. But, although he investigates the Siberian intervention and the Washington 
                                                   
31 Ibid., pp. 368-382. 
32 The first edition of Shidehara’s autobiography, whose title was Gaikou Gojunen (Fifty Years 
Diplomacy) was published in 1951.  
33 P. Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, 1911-1915: A Study of British Far Eastern Policy (London, 
1969). 
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Conference, Balfour scarcely appears in his research.
34
 Best’s thesis on the history of 
the Anglo-Japanese alliance from 1902 to 1923 is based on the influence on the alliance 
of the Open Door principle in East Asia and pays little attention to Balfour.
35
       
Although many scholars have studied Anglo-Japanese relations during the Great 
War, they have not turned their full attention to Balfour’s role in negotiations over 
Japan’s naval and military assistance.36 Timothy Saxon and Victor Rothwell tackle 
Japanese naval and military aid respectively.
37
 Rothwell’s analysis of British policy on 
Japan’s military help is particularly detailed and points out that the discussion about 
Japanese military assistance is ‘essential to an understanding of the Siberian 
intervention’.38 However, neither Saxon nor Rothwell fully investigate Balfour’s role. 
Their studies concentrate on either naval or military help, so it is not possible to 
compare the difference between Balfour’s attitudes to Japan’s naval and military 
assistance. In addition, although David Woodward investigates how British government 
dealt with the Siberian intervention, he makes only a few references to Balfour.
39
  
                                                   
34 A. Best, British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge in Asia, 1914-1941 (Basingstoke, 2002). 
35 A. Best, ‘The Anglo-Japanese alliance and international politics in Asia, 1902-1923’ in A. Best, 
(ed.) The International History of East Asia, 1900-1968: Trade, ideology and the quest for order 
(Abingdon, 2010), pp. 21-34. 
36 For example, R.P. Dua, Anglo-Japanese Relations during the First World War (New Delhi, 1972). 
37 T. Saxon, ‘Anglo-Japanese Naval Cooperation, 1914-1918’ in Naval War College Review, LIII,1, 
(2000), pp.62-92; V.H. Rothwell, ‘The British Government and Japanese Military Assistance 
1914-1918’ in History, LVI, 186, (1971), pp.35-45. 
38 Ibid., p. 44. 
39 D.R. Woodward, ‘The British Government and Japanese Intervention in Russia during World War 
I’ in Journal of Modern History XLVI, 4, (1974), pp. 663-685. 
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Some scholars have investigated Balfour’s role in the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 
contexts other than that of Anglo-Japanese relations. Thomas Otte examines Balfour’s 
thoughts and policy regarding the alliance in the context of British foreign and strategic 
policy from 1894 to 1905.
40
 His research is essential to understanding the global nature 
of Britain’s so-called isolation and the continuity of British diplomacy at the turn of the 
century. Nevertheless, although he analyses Balfour’s reluctance to sign the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance from the viewpoint of imperial defence, he does not mention 
Balfour’s thoughts about the revision of the alliance in 1905.41  
Keith Neilson has produced a detailed book on Britain’s foreign policy towards 
Russia from 1894 to 1917.
42
 However, mention of the Anglo-Japanese alliance is brief 
and ends before the Siberian intervention.
43
 His article on the Anglo-Japanese alliance 
is succinct and reveals Balfour’s role in and thoughts about the signing of the alliance. 
But again there is no mention of Balfour’s involvement in its revision, even though 
Neilson points out the importance of Japan’s military commitment to the defence of 
India.
44
     
                                                   
40 T.G. Otte, The China Question: Great Power Rivalry and British Isolation, 1894-1905 (Oxford, 
2007). 
41 Ibid., pp. 300-302, 322-324. 
42 K. Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia 1894-1917 (Oxford, 1995) 
43 Ibid., pp. 221-223, 261-264. 
44 K. Neilson, ‘The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and British strategic foreign policy, 1902-1914’ in P.P. 
O’Brien, (ed.) The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1922 (London, 2004), pp. 48-63. 
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Erik Goldstein explores how Britain dealt with the alliance after the war in his 
research on the Washington Conference.
45
 While he argues that Balfour was in favour 
of the renewal of the alliance ‘from a purely strategic point of view’, he insists that 
Balfour’s idea of a tripartite agreement must have been based on a Foreign Office 
memorandum which required the replacement of the Anglo-Japanese alliance with a 
mere declaration of policy.
46
 If this was the case, Balfour changed his mind and was 
strongly influenced by the Foreign Office just before the conference. However, 
Goldstein does not investigate the reason for this important change.  
Phillips Payson O’Brien also examines Britain’s policy toward the end of the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance.
47
 He reveals that Balfour wanted to preserve the military 
clause to revive a bilateral defensive alliance in a new Anglo-American-Japanese 
tripartite agreement. Even so, he states that the Four-Power Treaty, which omitted 
military clauses and included France, was ‘extremely close to what the British 
delegation had hoped to achieve’. Although he argues that France’s participation in the 
treaty was the ‘one real concession’ which was aimed not at the United States but at 
                                                   
45 E. Goldstein, ‘The Evolution of British Diplomatic Strategy for the Washington Conference’ in E. 
Goldstein and J. Maurer, (eds.) The Washington Conference, 1921-1922: Naval Rivalry, East Asian 
Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor (London, 1994), pp. 4-34.  
46 Ibid., pp.7, 26. 
47 P.P. O’Brien, ‘Britain and the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance’ in O’Brien, The 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1922, pp. 267-284. 
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France, he does not offer any evidence for this.
48
 In addition, there is no reference to 
the elimination of the military clauses in the treaty.         
On the other hand, there are many studies focusing on Balfour. He wrote a short 
autobiography, which only covers the period from 1848 to 1886 and his visit to America 
in 1917. Thus, it does not contain any reference to the Anglo-Japanese alliance.
49
 
Among many biographers, his niece Blanche Dugdale produced detailed biographies 
which contained his valuable remarks.
50
 Moreover, Ruddock Mackay allowed a chapter 
for CID and imperial defence during the Balfour administration in his biography.
51
 In 
general, however, most of the biographies about Balfour pay little attention to his role in 
Britain’s diplomacy towards Japan and the Anglo-Japanese alliance.52 Denis Judd’s 
book meticulously surveys Balfour’s policy on the defence of the British Empire, but 
although he refers to the Indian defence and Anglo-American cooperation, he seldom 
discusses the Anglo-Japanese alliance. As a result, it is difficult for readers to 
understand the connections between the alliance and the imperial defence.
53
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Jason Tomes’ detailed examination of Balfour’s foreign policy is an exception.54 
Although his research on the Japanese aspect is not as detailed as that on Europe, he 
includes a chapter on the Far East in which he discusses Balfour’s role in British 
diplomacy regarding Japan, China and the Pacific. In the conclusion of the chapter he 
points out that Balfour saw Britain’s interests in China as ‘relatively unimportant’ and 
rated her role in the Far Eastern politics ‘low on his list of strategic priorities’.55 This is 
a significant point that many books regarding the Anglo-Japanese alliance tend to miss. 
It is important to investigate Balfour’s policy towards Japan and the alliance in the 
global context beyond the Far East. Tomes deals with Balfour’s policy on Japan and 
China from 1894 to 1905 in a chapter on the Franco-Russian challenge, on the Siberian 
intervention in the Russian Revolution chapter.
56
 These indicate the global nature of 
Balfour’s foreign policy, which was not restricted to the Far East.     
However, Tomes does not fully address the three problems that Nish leaves 
unresolved in the historiography, the first being Balfour’s change of attitude towards the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance. Like Nish, Tomes writes that Balfour did not support the 
signing of the alliance and opposed supporting Japan during the Russo-Japanese War. 
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After January 1905, according to Tomes, Balfour changed his mind and wanted Japan in 
a strong position because Germany might prompt Russia to repeat the Triple 
Intervention of 1894. As a result, Balfour decided to strengthen Britain’s ties with Japan 
by renewing the Anglo-Japanese alliance.
57
 However, this argument is not convincing: 
there are no details of the Triple Intervention, of Germany’s motivation and of the 
reason Balfour wanted to prevent such a Russo-German act.
58
 Tomes offers no 
evidence for his argument.               
Secondly, Tomes’ analysis of Japan’s assistance during the Great War falls short of 
understanding Balfour’s role in this issue. He does not distinguish between naval and 
military aid and argues that Balfour did not ‘share the widespread disgust at Japanese 
reluctance to assist the wider Allied war efforts’. The conclusion is that Balfour was not 
disappointed by Japan because his ‘expectations are low’.59 However, Tomes does not 
address Balfour’s change of mind during the war. It is clear that Balfour changed his 
attitude towards Japan’s assistance after being appointed Foreign Secretary in December 
1916. Tomes refers to some documents that show that Balfour accepted Japan’s 
unwillingness to send her troops to Europe in 1914 and 1915. But this does not prove 
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that Balfour maintained his low expectations for Japan until the end of the war. 
Furthermore, Tomes analyses the Siberian intervention in his chapter ‘The Russian 
Revolution’ and makes no connection between Japanese military assistance and the 
Siberian intervention.              
Thirdly, there is no reference to Balfour’s negotiations over the future of the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance with his American and Japanese counterparts at the 
Washington Conference. Tomes realises that Balfour was in favour of the renewal of the 
alliance after the Great War despite complaining about its signing in 1902.
60
 Moreover, 
Tomes fully shows Balfour’s willingness to preserve a military clause in an 
Anglo-American-Japanese tripartite agreement just before the Washington Conference. 
Nevertheless, his analysis moves to Balfour’s speech at the final session, in which he 
declared the end of the alliance, not mentioning why and when Balfour had accepted its 
termination.
61
 Therefore, it still remains unclear about Balfour’s role in British 
diplomacy at the end of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.        
In short, although Balfour was involved in the Anglo-Japanese alliance for its entire 
duration, no comprehensive analysis of his role in the alliance has been carried out. In 
particular, three questions remain unanswered: why Balfour’s lukewarm attitude 
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towards the Anglo-Japanese alliance changed and he took the initiative in revising it in 
1905; how he dealt with Japan’s assistance and the Siberian intervention during the 
Great War and how these issues influenced the alliance; and what he did at the 
Washington Conference and how he accepted the termination of the alliance. This is a 
significant gap in the historiography of Balfour and the Anglo-Japanese alliance. 
This thesis aims to fill this gap and to offer new viewpoints on Balfour and the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance. The alliance was originally applied only to the Far East, and 
even after its revision in 1905 it covered the Far East and India at best. However, 
Balfour always considered the Japanese alliance in the context of Britain’s global 
interests, in particular the imperial defence and Anglo-American cooperation. Therefore, 
his policy and thoughts on the alliance inevitably went beyond the Anglo-Japanese 
bilateral relationship over the Far East. Furthermore, he was the only British statesman 
who was involved in the alliance before, during and after the Great War. Detailed 
research into his role in the alliance will put it into the global perspective and provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the alliance that is not interrupted by the Great War.   
In this research project the approach is fundamentally empirical. The pragmatic 
approach, based on examination of many records of political transactions, is the key to 
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revealing Balfour’s perceptions of and policy towards the Anglo-Japanese alliance.62 
The examination of British private papers forms the main part of this research project. 
The Balfour Papers at the British Library are an essential primary source. Official 
records, for example Foreign Office records and British Cabinet papers, are also vital to 
the project. Most of the official records are kept in The National Archives in London. In 
addition, Japanese diplomatic documents are examined because some of them record 
Balfour’s comments, which do not appear in British documents. Japanese published 
sources, in particular the series Nihon Gaikou Bunsho (Japanese Diplomatic 
Documents) serve this purpose. 
This thesis consists of an introduction, three chapters and a conclusion. The 
introduction deals with Balfour’s attitude to imperial defence and Anglo-American 
cooperation. His policy on Japan and the Anglo-Japanese alliance revolved around these 
two principles from the 1890s to the 1920s. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate his 
thinking about them in this period before examining his policy regarding the alliance. 
The introduction addresses his constant involvement with the CID, which clearly 
represented his idea of and interest in imperial defence. This research reveals that 
Balfour not only played a crucial role in establishing the CID but also took the initiative 
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in its discussion, preferring a flexible and advisory organisation that could effectively 
adapt to the changing international situation. With regard to Anglo-American 
cooperation, the introduction demonstrates that Balfour regarded America as the best 
possible alliance partner with which Britain could aim to share global naval supremacy. 
However, Balfour’s desire for close collaboration with America always faced her 
isolationism.       
   Chapter 1 analyses the period from 1894 to 1905 and examines why Balfour’s 
lukewarm attitude towards the Anglo-Japanese alliance changed when he took the lead 
in its first revision in 1905. As Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury, he 
presided over the signing and revision of the alliance. Not valuing Japan’s increasing 
capability, Balfour preferred an Anglo-American alliance to a regional agreement with 
Japan which applied only to the Far East because such a limited arrangement was not 
useful in the imperial defence, and in particular in the defence of India. Even Japan’s 
unexpected victories in the Russo-Japanese War did not change his mind. However, the 
Russo-Japanese War had an effect not only on the Far East but also on India and its 
adjacent region. This chapter reveals that Balfour came to support the revision of the 
alliance not because he was impressed by Japan’s growing capability in the Far East but 
because he sought to take advantage of her military assistance in the defence of India.            
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Chapter 2 deals with the period from 1905 to 1918 and investigates how Balfour 
coped with Japan’s assistance and the Siberian intervention during the Great War, and 
their impact on the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Although he was out of office from 1906 to 
1915, he considered the 1911 revision of the Anglo-Japanese alliance from the 
viewpoint of imperial defence and Anglo-American cooperation. Balfour made every 
effort to maintain calm Anglo-American-Japanese relations in order to extract more 
Japanese naval aid during the Great War, although he had to abandon the idea of 
employing Japan’s troops in Europe due to its adverse effect on imperial defence. 
Furthermore, while Balfour considered that the Siberian intervention was necessary for 
the defence of the British Empire, he had trouble securing America’s consent to Japan’s 
military campaign in Siberia. It became more difficult to maintain both imperial defence 
and Anglo-American cooperation within the Anglo-Japanese alliance         
Chapter 3 addresses the period from 1919 to 1923, reconstructing Balfour’s 
negotiations at the Washington Conference and revealing how he accepted the final 
termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Balfour attended the Paris Peace 
Conference, where he tried to ease the tension between America and Japan without 
damaging Anglo-American relations. At the Imperial Conference he supported the 
renewal of the alliance from the viewpoint of the CID. This chapter demonstrates that 
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Balfour realised that Britain could not rely on cooperation with America for the defence 
of India and Australasia, although he avoided the deterioration of Anglo-American 
relations. He sought to develop the Japanese alliance into an Anglo-American-Japanese 
tripartite agreement to maintain Anglo-American cooperation, but also wanted to insert 
a military clause to revive the bilateral defensive alliance in the tripartite arrangement 
due to its usefulness to imperial defence. This was Balfour’s attempt to combine 
imperial defence with Anglo-American cooperation in the alliance. However, he had to 
abandon this bid in the face of America and Japan’s opposition, and had no choice but to 
approve the Four-Power Treaty at the Washington Conference.        
The conclusion discusses the nature of Balfour’s policy towards the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance and its meaning within British diplomacy.  
 
                                II. 
 
One of the principles of Balfour’s foreign policy was imperial defence. 63  His 
continuous involvement in the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) following its 
establishment in 1902 demonstrated his strong interest in the defence of the British 
Empire. The establishment of the committee was one of the significant achievements of 
                                                   
63 For various factors of imperial defence, see G. Kennedy, (ed.) Imperial Defence: The old world 
order 1856-1956 (Abingdon, 2008).  
31 
 
his premiership and he was proud to be its founder. Addressing the House of Commons 
on 5 March 1903, he emphasised the novelty of the CID and explained the difference 
between it and previous committees.
64
 The CID not only contributed to improving 
coordination between military and civilian authorities but also enabled Balfour to 
maintain his influence in British foreign policy. When he went out of office, the flexible 
and bipartisan structure of the CID secured Balfour’s link to the policymaking process. 
As a result his engagement with the CID continued from the 1890s to the 1920s.             
The Russian threat to the British Empire was a catalyst for the establishment of the 
CID. Its origin was the Colonial Defence Committee set up by the Disraeli 
administration in 1878, when many British policymakers estimated that war with Russia 
might be imminent due to Britain’s support for Turkey during the Russo-Turkish War. 
The Admiralty, the War Office, the Treasury and the Colonial Office supplied officials 
to the Colonial Defence Committee to discuss the security of the British colonies from 
Russian naval attack.
65
 This was an attempt to overcome the barriers between the 
various departments. However, the committee had little influence on British foreign and 
strategic policy due to the lack of any connection with the Cabinet.
66
 In the end it 
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ceased to exist in the following year as the war scare subsided and the next Liberal 
Prime Minister, William Gladstone, was not much interested in an inter-departmental 
organisation for the imperial defence. 
   The Colonial Defence Committee was resumed in 1885 when the Conservatives 
returned to power, led by Salisbury. The Russian threat once more provided the British 
government with a motive; Britain was concerned about being dragged into conflict 
with Russia because of the Penjdeh Incident in Afghanistan.
67
 Realising that this crisis 
was too serious to leave to the Colonial Office alone, the Cabinet decided to gather 
representatives of not only that office but also the Admiralty, the War Office and the 
Treasury in order to bring together various bits of information and reports on the 
imperial defence. This joint committee was equipped with a secretary: George Clarke, 
who later became the first secretary of the CID, performed this duty from 1885 to 1892. 
The secretaryship gave Clarke access to many papers from these departments and 
enabled him to write memorandums for the Committee.
68
 Unlike that of 1878, the 
Colonial Defence Committee of 1885 was given permanent status and served as ‘a 
forum of discussion and a channel of communication and advice’.69 However, like its 
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predecessor, this committee failed to include Cabinet ministers and suffered from a lack 
of authority.    
   Coordination between naval and military services was another important issue to be 
tackled at the time. Joint Naval and Military Committee was established on 20 January 
1891 to discuss coastal defence, about which both the Admiralty and the War Office 
were concerned. This committee, whose president was the Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State for War, consisted of naval and military service members and 
tackled inter-service problems. Although its aim was farsighted, the committee did not 
work as well as expected for two reasons: first, unlike the Colonial Defence Committee, 
it did not have a permanent secretary; and second, like the Colonial Defence Committee, 
Cabinet members did not attend it and rarely received its reports.
70
        
Balfour was apprehensive about the lack of coordination between the civil 
departments and military services over imperial defence in the increasingly challenging 
international environment. While he was out of office during the Gladstone and 
Rosebery administrations from 1892-1895, he thought deeply about a desirable 
organisation to resolve this security problem. In his understanding, neither Parliament 
nor the ministries could effectively manage imperial defence as ‘the machinery of 
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national defence ... has been allowed to rust in our armoury’.71 In 1893 Balfour 
exchanged letters with Charles Dilke, a Liberal Member of Parliament, and Henry 
Spenser Wilkinson, a writer and later an Oxford professor, who had co-authored 
Imperial Defence, which advocated drastic government reform and the establishment of 
a Ministry of Defence.
72
 While not always agreeing with them, Balfour was ‘in favour 
of a Defence Committee of the Cabinet with expert advisers and permanent records 
carrying on the work from Government to Government’73 This showed his preference 
for a consulting committee over an executive organisation. Moreover, it was clear that 
he was paying attention to securing the continuity of the policy on imperial defence 
under a change of administration.         
The formation of the Salisbury Cabinet in 1895 gave Balfour, who returned to 
government as First Lord of the Treasury, an opportunity to deal with the defence of the 
British Empire from within government. On 24 August 1895, he wrote a detailed 
memorandum on the establishment of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. Fully 
realising the complex and interdepartmental nature of imperial defence, Balfour wanted 
the Defence Committee to consider ‘all questions of importance connected with 
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Imperial Defence, which involve the co-operation of Army and Navy’.74 He had not 
forgotten the failure of the preceding committees and proposed that the Secretary for 
War and the First Lord of the Admiralty should attend the Defence Committee as 
permanent members. Other cabinet colleagues, for example the Foreign Secretary and 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, would attend depending on the issue. Following 
Balfour’s proposal, Salisbury set up the Defence Committee and appointed the Duke of 
Devonshire, Lord President of the Council, as its chairman. The attendance of these 
powerful cabinet members, including Balfour himself, added to it the political authority 
that the previous committees had not had. Even so, Balfour emphasised that the Defence 
Committee could not ‘intervene in the departmental work, either of the War Office or of 
the Admiralty’.75 This meant that it remained an advisory organisation for the ministries, 
in accordance with Balfour’s concept of 1893.        
   However, the Defence Committee of the Cabinet did not conform to Balfour’s 
expectations, even though it lasted for seven years from 1895. The Treasury, which had 
a powerful influence on the Committee through the Chancellor of the Exchequer, turned 
the Committee’s discussion towards financial disputes between the departments. No 
Cabinet minister could change this situation: Salisbury did not show any interest in the 
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Committee and Balfour could not pursue the matter owing to his heavy workload as 
Leader of the House of Commons. The difficulties of the Boer War of 1899-1902 
revealed the inadequacy of Britain’s strategic planning, and the Defence Committee 
could not escape the criticism that it had not utilised sufficient naval and military 
intelligence in preparation for the war.
76
 The malfunction of the Defence Committee 
became clear and its reform was inevitable.          
   After being appointed Prime Minister in July 1902 Balfour decided to establish a 
new organisation to deal with the defence of the British Empire. In November 1902, 
Lord Selborne, First Lord of the Admiralty, and St John Brodrick, Secretary of State for 
War, jointly submitted a powerful memorandum to Balfour, asking for improvement of 
the Defence Committee. In this memorandum they insisted that the Committee had not 
tackled ‘the most difficult and important problems of all’, which were ‘neither purely 
naval not purely military, nor purely naval and military combined, but which may be 
described as naval, military, and political’.77 This showed the complexity of imperial 
defence that Britain had to cope with. On receiving this memorandum Balfour abolished 
the defunct Defence Committee and, in December 1902, set up the Committee of 
Imperial Defence (CID) to improve coordination between foreign and military policy.  
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   The structure of the CID was different from that of previous committees. The Duke 
of Devonshire continued to serve as chairman at first. However, Balfour replaced him in 
November 1903 and ‘took a leading part’ in its discussions.78 He needed to collect a 
wide range of information to smooth the policy making and meet the requirements of 
the changed international situation. To do this, he invited to the CID not only civilians, 
namely the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for War, but also 
military personnel, for example the First Sea Lord and the Commander-in-Chief. In 
addition, the Director of Naval Intelligence and the Director General of Military 
Intelligence also attended the committee. Balfour treated these military advisors as 
equals with the senior politicians.
79
  
There were two essential elements to the CID: the Prime Minister’s leadership and 
the elasticity of the organisation. In a long report on 4 December 1903 Balfour 
explained to the King these two aspects and the importance of the CID. With regard to 
the leadership, the Prime Minister possessed the power of ‘selecting the person to be 
summoned to each meeting’.80 The CID personnel depended on the Prime Minister’s 
present interest in foreign and defence policy. Realising that the absence of the Prime 
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Minister had led to the failure of the previous committees, Balfour emphasised the 
necessity of the Prime Minister’s strong leadership. According to him, the CID should 
be ‘an advisory body summoned by the Prime Minister of the day to aid him in the 
consideration of the wider problems of Imperial defence’.81 However, this contained 
the danger that the CID might not work if the Prime Minister himself was not much 
interested in diplomacy.  
As for the elasticity, no member except the Prime Minister ‘has a right to come’ and 
there were no fixed personnel to the CID. This flexibility of membership enabled the 
CID to adapt to varying circumstances, preventing a particular department, for instance 
the Treasury, from gaining considerable influence over the organisation.
82
 Moreover, on 
some occasions it could ‘include representatives of the Colonies’. Therefore, it was not 
limited to the government in London, but contained ‘the potentiality of being an 
“Imperial Council” dealing with Imperial questions’.83 Balfour’s clear intention was 
that the CID should play a crucial role in improving coordination not only between 
foreign and military policy but also between Britain and her colonies.               
During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, the structure of the CID underwent 
an important change with the addition of a permanent secretary. Lord Esher, who had 
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close connections with the Royal family, took a strong interest in army reform and 
defence policy.
84
 He became a chairman of the War Office Reconstitution Committee, 
and considered the reform of the War Office and the CID. Seeing the rapidly-developing 
scope of the work of the CID, he proposed the appointment of a ‘“Permanent Secretary,” 
with a trained strategical mind, and ... who has given attention to the great historical and 
practical problem of Inperial [sic] Defence’.85 Esher’s aim was not only to increase the 
number of staff but also the creation of ‘a “permanent nucleus”’ in the CID. There was 
no guarantee that successive administrations, in particular Liberal ones, would maintain 
the CID.
86
 Even if the next Prime Minister preserved it, he might not have a strong 
interest in diplomatic and military matters. To secure the continuity of Britain’s foreign 
and defence policy Esher sought to install a permanent secretary, paid for by Parliament, 
to protect the existence of the CID from a change of government.
87
  
Balfour shared Esher’s opinion and sanctioned the creation of the permanent 
secretariat. While Balfour admitted that discontinuity occurred in many fields at a 
change of government, he argued that ‘there is one point on which there ought to be no 
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discontinuity, and that is the military and naval policy of the Empire’.88 Although the 
CID had employed a part-time clerk from the Foreign Office, this was not sufficient to 
record the CID’s various meetings.89 Balfour expected that ‘the conclusions of the 
Defence Committee will be embodied not merely in resolutions, but in reasoned 
documents’.90 In addition, its records would be handed over to successive governments 
to secure the continuity of British foreign and defence policy. Balfour fully understood 
that the CID should be equipped with a permanent secretariat.     
Balfour’s favourite candidate for CID secretary was George Clarke, the former 
secretary of Colonial Defence Committee.
91
 After resigning from that post, he had 
served as Governor of Victoria from 1901 to 1903. He had also become a member of the 
War Office Reconstitution Committee and formed a ‘triumvirate’ with Esher and John 
Fisher, the then Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth.
92
 Balfour valued Clarke’s ability 
and knowledge of foreign and defence policy. Although some Cabinet colleagues, for 
example St John Brodrick, then the Secretary of State for India, agreed to the necessity 
for a permanent staff, they objected to Clarke’s appointment due to his constant 
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connection with the press.
93
 Balfour had to persuade these opponents by requiring 
Clarke to cut off his direct and indirect communication with the press.
94
 Nevertheless, 
as Balfour had forecast, Clarke was not satisfied with carrying out ordinary paper 
work.
95
 Soon he became a virtual member of the CID, playing a significant role in 
policymaking as ‘the Prime Minister’s permanent secretary for Imperial Defence’.96           
The Unionist Party had been in power for about ten years. It was inevitable that a 
protracted term under the same ruling party would make it unpopular by the end of its 
term of government. Balfour resigned as Prime Minister in December 1905 and the 
Unionist Party suffered a heavy loss of seats in the general election of January 1906. 
Balfour also handed over his position as Leader of the Opposition to Andrew Bonar 
Law in 1911. Even with such a setback in his political carrier, Balfour maintained his 
involvement in the policymaking process of British diplomacy. The CID enabled him to 
secure a link to the British Cabinet from outside government. As the founder of the CID, 
Balfour occupied ‘a very special position vis a vis the Gov[ernmen]t on questions 
concerning the Defence Committee’.97 
   The CID’s permanent secretariat, which was not affected by the change of 
                                                   
93 Brodrick to Balfour, 29 Feb. 1904, Balfour MSS, Add. MSS. 49721. 
94 Balfour to the King, 14 Apr. 1904, CAB 41/29/11. 
95 Balfour to Sandars, 26 Feb. 1904, Balfour MSS, Add. MSS. 49762. 
96 Fisher to Sandars, 10 Nov. 1903, Balfour MSS, Add. MSS. 49710. 
97 Sandars to Balfour, 11 Jan. 1912, Balfour MSS, Add. MSS. 49768. 
42 
 
government, mediated between Balfour and the British government. All three CID 
secretaries from 1906 to 1914, namely George Clarke, Charles Ottley and Maurice 
Hankey, maintained close relations with Balfour and were involved in the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance. It was Balfour who appointed Clarke as the first secretary of 
the CID in 1904. Sharing his interest in imperial defence, Clarke supported Balfour in 
extending the Japanese alliance into India to obtain Japan’s military assistance in 
dealing with the Russian threat to India and its adjacent regions, including Afghanistan 
and Persia.
98
 The defence of India was crucial to Clarke, who was concerned about 
whether the incoming administration, led by the Liberal Party’s Sir Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman, would pay serious attention to India.
99
 Even after Balfour 
resigned as Prime Minister, Clarke sent him the contents of CID discussions and 
updated him on the Russian threat to India and Afghanistan.
100
               
The weakening of Russia after the Russo-Japanese War changed Clarke’s perception 
of her threat. Russia was no longer able to maintain her naval forces in the Far East, so 
Britain did not have to be concerned about her as a menace to the Royal Navy and the 
Anglo-Japanese military cooperation would deter her aggression against India. Clarke 
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calculated that Russia was more likely to attack Manchuria than India, and thus, Britain 
could ‘render the Russian menace to India negligible’ at this point.101 Nevertheless, 
reckoning that Russia’s weakness, caused by the war, was only temporary, Clarke did 
not completely rule her out as a threat to India. In 1907 he was posted to Bombay as 
Governor, which ended his participation in the CID. Yet, he predicted to Balfour: ‘The 
question of India will in good years be the most difficult of all our many problems’.102 
   Clarke’s successor was Charles Ottley, whom Balfour had invited to the CID. Ottley 
was originally a naval officer, but Selborne had recommended to Balfour that he be 
added to the staff of the CID in May 1904.
103
 Cooperating with Clarke, Ottley also 
advocated the advantages of the renewal and extension of the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance.
104
 Balfour valued Ottley’s work in the CID, praising him as ‘a very 
hard-worked official’.105 Ottley did not forget that Afghanistan was key to the defence 
of India. After his appointment as CID secretary, therefore, he kept in contact with 
Balfour and often informed him of the latest news on Afghanistan.
106
 ‘As the creator of 
the modernised C.I.D.’, Ottley observed, ‘he [Balfour] is the greatest living authority on 
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its functions’. In January 1912, even after Balfour had resigned as Leader of the 
Opposition, Ottley asked him to write a memorandum on the CID and ‘the broad 
problem of Imperial Defence’.107 While Balfour declined in order to avoid giving the 
pledge upon these important issues, he agreed to discuss them with Ottley.
108
 Balfour’s 
reputation for foreign and defence policy was still strong.  
   The last CID secretary in the period before the Great War was Maurice Hankey. 
Before replacing Ottley in 1912, he had been a naval officer and was on the staff of the 
CID.
109
 Unlike Clarke and Ottley, he was not familiar with Balfour, but revealed his 
talent to Balfour during a review of the home defence in 1913. Although Balfour was 
absent from some meetings, Hankey kept him informed of the discussion in the CID, 
sending him all the necessary documents.
110
 Balfour acknowledged Hankey’s ability 
and wished that ‘Hankey had confined himself to Defence Committee work, which he 
does excellently, and did not mix himself up with higher politics of which, naturally, he 
knows but little’.111 As Balfour hoped, Hankey served as CID secretary for about 26 
years. Balfour would maintain close cooperation with him even during and after the 
Great War; more importantly, both Balfour and Hankey would attend the Washington 
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Conference from 1921 to 1922 and play a significant role in deciding the future of the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance.                        
   Apart from the secretaries, Balfour also had connections with the statesmen 
attending the CID after 1906. It was forecast that Campbell-Bannerman, who seemed 
hostile to the CID, would not accept its chairmanship.
112
 On the other hand, many 
Liberal Imperialists, in particular Herbert Asquith, Sir Edward Grey and Richard 
Burdon Haldane, were in favour of the CID and shared Balfour’s keen interest in 
imperial defence.
113
 It was imperative that these statesmen occupied the major Cabinet 
posts in order to prevent Campbell-Bannerman from letting the CID ‘die of inertia’114 
To Balfour’s relief, Asquith served as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Grey as Foreign 
Secretary and Haldane  as Secretary of State for War in the Campbell-Bannerman 
administration. All of them were supposed to attend the CID regularly, so Balfour often 
exchanged opinions with them and tried to influence their policy.  
Among the Liberal Imperialists Haldane cooperated very closely with Balfour. Even 
before Balfour resigned from his post as Prime Minister, Haldane made contact with 
him through Esher and Clarke. Balfour explained his military policy to Haldane and 
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indicated ‘the direction in which he had wished to move’. Clarke predicted that Haldane 
would not only stop the intervention of Liberals who were against the CID but would 
also work as Balfour wished.
115
 Haldane also sought to make progress with army 
reform, taking advantage of Balfour’s authority regarding military policy by showing 
the latter’s approval of his reform.116 When Asquith succeeded Campbell-Bannerman 
as Prime Minister in 1908, Grey and Haldane remained in office during his 
administration. Asquith sometimes invited Balfour to attend the CID, appreciating how 
Balfour’s ‘expert knowledge and judgement have proved to be of great value’.117 
Therefore, Balfour was able to remain involved in the CID even as a member of the 
Opposition. 
Balfour had one more important link to a statesman inside the CID: Lord Esher. He 
became a permanent member of the CID as a courtier of the Royal Household 
immediately before Balfour’s resignation as Prime Minister. The public reason for Esher 
taking part in the CID was his involvement in the reform of the army and the War Office 
during the Balfour administration. However, there was also a secret reason: Esher 
revealed that he always remembered that Balfour ‘put me on to the C[ommi]ttee to 
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“hold the fort” for you [Balfour]’.118 It was not surprising that Esher kept in contact 
with Balfour and discussed many of the problems presented in the CID. Some Cabinet 
ministers, for example Haldane, allowed Esher to do this.
119
 More importantly, as 
America’s suspicion of Japan gradually grew after 1906, Esher advocated the need for 
the CID to consider the possibility of a US-Japanese war and Britain’s policy on such a 
war.
120
 Balfour supported Esher’s proposal and impressed on him the importance of 
Anglo-Saxon solidarity.
121
 Although Balfour could not return to power, Esher acted on 
his behalf in the CID.           
On occasion Balfour himself attended the CID, despite being a member of the 
Opposition. After 1906 he tackled the home defence, which was ‘a part of the greater 
problem of Imperial Defence’.122 He had already examined it in November 1903, when 
the main potential threat to the British Isles was France. Britain had to consider the 
possibility that when she sent reinforcements to India to fight Russia, France might 
attack the British Isles, which would be left with weak defences due to the shortage of 
manpower. Balfour concluded that France’s serious invasion of these islands was 
impossible as long as Britain maintained her naval supremacy in the Channel and kept 
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70,000 soldiers at home.
123
 However, the Russo-Japanese War changed not only the 
international situation in the Far East but also the balance of power in Europe. The 
weakening of Russia enabled Germany to free herself from the wedge of the 
Franco-Russian Dual Alliance and apply a more aggressive foreign policy. Realising 
this profound change, army experts such as Lord Roberts advocated the need to revise 
the home defence policy and asked Balfour to cooperate in putting pressure on the 
government.
124
               
   Balfour did not hesitate to review home defence matters in the face of changing 
circumstances. He replied to Roberts that ‘no conclusions upon a subject of such vital 
national interest could ever be considered final, and that, if new circumstances had 
arisen, it would be the height of folly to rest contented with conclusions, however 
cautiously arrived at, which related to a bygone condition of affairs’.125 Balfour took 
the initiative in the discussion of the home defence in a newly established CID 
Sub-Committee. On 29 May 1908 he submitted a detailed memorandum to the 
Sub-Committee. In the first place, he admitted that Germany had replaced France as the 
main threat to the British Isles since the Russo-Japanese War. Although Britain had 
already reached Entente Cordiale with France in 1904, Balfour insisted that the CID 
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should not suppose that ‘the safety of the country could depend upon some paper 
instrument or a mere entente, however cordiale it might be’.126 Given the growing 
German naval forces, the present German threat was more acute than that of France 
before 1905. However, Balfour concluded that a German invasion of Britain was still 
impossible at this point.             
The Sub-Committee approved Balfour’s memorandum on the home defence. Esher 
wrote:  ‘Not a question was put to him [Balfour], and no higher tribute could be paid to 
him. Asquith, Grey, Haldane, Crewe, Lloyd George. All were equally dumbfounded’.127 
The Sub-Committee also referred to the necessity of guaranteeing 70,000 men, even 
though Britain might engage in ‘a war on the frontier of India which required 100,000 
regular troops to be sent from the United Kingdom during the first year’.128 In 1907 
Britain and Russia concluded the Anglo-Russian convention and their rivalry over India 
and Central Asia was mitigated. However, the CID continued to ponder the defence of 
India in the event of a war. Balfour also took part in the CID again in 1913 and signed a 
detailed memorandum in cooperation with Esher and Liberal statesmen, calculating ‘the 
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event of the despatch of an Expeditionary Force oversea’ on 15 April 1914.129 About 
four months later Britain entered the Great War and had to send her expeditionary forces 
to the European continent. Given his continuous involvement in the CID from 1906 to 
1914, it was not surprising that Balfour was invited to attend it just after the outbreak of 
the Great War.                    
When the Great War broke out in the summer of 1914, Balfour was officially no 
more than a Conservative elder statesman. After resigning as leader of the Unionist 
Party he did not occupy any major office. However, the Liberal government needed 
Balfour’s expertise in foreign and defence policy. Prime Minister Asquith urged Balfour 
to attend the CID because he wanted to secure Balfour’s experience and advice in the 
national interest.
130
 Balfour accepted Asquith’s request and became a member of the 
CID on 7 October. Although he had already privately contributed to the government, his 
acceptance of the CID membership marked the resumption of his official involvement 
in policy-making. 
In November 1914, the CID developed into a smaller but more responsible 
organisation, the War Council, which decided on war plans and national strategy. 
Balfour was the only Opposition participant. His attendance at the War Council enabled 
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him to be involved in Britain’s policymaking despite the fact that he did not have a 
Cabinet post. However, he became uneasy about his position due to ‘an accidental 
growth’ of the War Council. As the founder of the CID he argued that it had originally 
had ‘no Executive power whatever’, while the War Council could directly decide war 
plans and national strategy. Balfour considered that his presence on the War Council put 
him ‘in a position so delicate and difficult’ that he was reluctant to continue providing 
his services. Nevertheless, he did not withdraw from his involvement in the War 
Council because of his belief. He wrote: ‘I am too old to fight, and this is all I can do for 
the general cause. I do not like to shelter myself behind objections which seem rather 
parliamentary than national’.131  
   As Balfour feared, the War Council did not work well. Its nucleus was the same as 
that of the CID: the Prime Minister was its chairman, and the First Lord of the 
Admiralty, the Secretary of State for War and the chief servicemen of the Navy and the 
Army were members. But the number of its members continuously grew and more than 
ten Cabinet ministers often attended its meetings. This expansion stiffened the 
organisation, making it more difficult to make a decision swiftly.
132
 The former CID 
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secretary George Clarke pointed out its inefficiency: ‘A fluctuating Committee of eleven 
or twelve members, largely preoccupied with other work, for the most part 
unaccustomed to study naval and military questions, and depending ultimately on the 
acquiescence of the whole Cabinet, is necessarily incapable of directing the greatest of 
wars’133 Asquith was disaffected with the performance of the War Council and kept it 
in abeyance after the formation of his coalition government in May 1915.  
The CID did not work well even after Lloyd George replaced Asquith as the Prime 
Minister in December 1916. Lloyd George, who wanted to strengthen the Prime 
Minister’s power to command the war, set up the small War Cabinet, ignoring the CID. 
Although Balfour was excluded from the original membership of the War Cabinet, he 
was given the right to attend it ‘whenever he thought fit’, and often exercised this 
privilege.
134
 Moreover, Lloyd George realised ‘the advisability of strengthening the 
Secretariat’ of the War Cabinet and decided to utilise the CID’s secretary, appointing 
Hankey as Cabinet Secretary.
135
 Hankey’s attendance in the War Cabinet contributed to 
securing the continuity of British foreign and defence policy after the change of 
government. While the CID did not meet until the end of the war, its secretariat 
achieved one of its main purposes in the War Cabinet.           
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The CID resumed its defence planning on 29 June 1920. Although he was not the 
Prime Minister, Balfour served as its chairman. Originally, he had insisted that the 
Prime Minister ‘ought to be chairman of any Committee considering big questions of 
naval and military policy’.136 But Lloyd George asked Balfour to take the chair of the 
standing sub-committee regarding the naval problem in the Far East.
137
 As Prime 
Minister, Lloyd George had to deal with many domestic problems. Moreover, he was 
not much interested in foreign and defence matters in Asia. He prioritised financial and 
welfare issues and sometimes failed to attend conferences about diplomatic and 
strategic policy.
138
 Thus, he decided to leave the CID to ‘the most suitable 
Chairman’.139 Being chairman of this small committee served Balfour’s purpose well. 
Although he was in favour of a return to the pre-war organisation, Balfour commented 
that the CID had become ‘too big’ just before the war.140 Small ad-hoc committees, by 
contrast, allowed the CID to regain its original flexibility when dealing with problems 
of imperial defence. Indeed, the standing sub-committee was soon regarded as the de 
facto CID, and its minutes were treated as those of the whole CID until July 1923.
141
 
Balfour thus became de facto chairman of the CID and presided over discussions on 
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British naval policy in the Far East.        
   Balfour’s attendance in the CID continued until he retired from the politics. During 
Stanley Baldwin’s Conservative administration from 1924 to 1929, Balfour often 
participated in CID meetings. His interest in India’s security had not waned and he 
expressed concern about Soviet Russia’s infiltration into Afghanistan, reiterating that 
‘the integrity of Afghanistan was vital to the defence of India’.142 Moreover, he 
defended the CID even though a trend to create a single ministry that would deal with 
defence matters had grown since the Great War. In June 1926 he addressed the House of 
Lords: 
 
      ... The Committee of Imperial Defence does that work which no Minister of 
Defence could do. It can do the work, and is doing the work, of coordinating the 
civil resources of the country as well as what I call the military resources. ... It is 
an institution which never, from its character, can become rigid. It is an 
institution which can never become bureaucratic. It is capable, as no other 
institution can be, of covering the whole ground by its Committees, dealing with 
questions the most disparate and the most complicated, and belonging to the 
most different spheres of activity. ... Co-ordination is being given us, may more 
and more be given us, by the Committee of Imperial Defence. ...
143
 
    
This address presented the features of the CID that Balfour valued: coordination, 
flexibility and political leadership. He had maintained his preference for the CID as an 
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advisory body over an executive Ministry of Defence for more than thirty years. 
Immediately before the general election of 1929, Baldwin wanted Balfour to continue 
his membership of the CID, which ‘is your [Balfour’s] own child and would indeed feel 
an orphan without you’.144 However, the Conservatives’ defeat in the election and the 
decline of Balfour’s health ended his appearance in the CID, marking the formal end of 
his political career.              
 
                                  III. 
 
Another principle that Balfour held throughout the whole of his political life was 
Anglo-American cooperation. The concept of Anglo-Saxon solidarity which was 
brought by the English colonists was not a new phenomenon in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century.
145
 However, the Anglo-American relationship had experienced 
so many crises that engendered mutual enmity and mistrust since America’s 
independence.
146
 It was not until the last years of the nineteenth century that 
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Anglo-American rapprochement was over the horizon.
147
 Although Balfour was one of 
the British statesmen who took the initiative in improving the bilateral relations, it was 
not easy to pinpoint when he started to entertain the idea of close collaboration with 
America. According to his memory, he was already convinced of the existence of the 
Anglo-Saxon solidarity ‘before I entered Parliament and was a student, and not an actor, 
in the sphere of politics’.148 He chose America and the English-speaking world as the 
destination of his first trip outside Europe on beginning his long political career. Given 
the fact that most of the British statesmen had not gone to America, this highlighted 
Balfour’s foresightedness over the importance of the Anglo-American relations.         
The Venezuelan crisis of 1895 publicly revealed Balfour’s strong faith in 
Anglo-American cooperation for the first time. Immediately after the Salisbury 
administration took office in July 1895, Britain had to tackle a dispute with America 
which originated in a boundary problem between British Guiana and Venezuela. Fearing 
an infringement of the Monroe Doctrine, America sided with Venezuela and required 
Britain to accept arbitration on 20 July 1895.
149
 Salisbury refused America’s demand 
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due to his doubts about America’s intentions and capability.150 America’s reaction was 
fierce, threatening war to force Britain to agree to arbitration and to defend the 
principles of the Monroe Doctrine. As one of the influential statesmen in Salisbury’s 
Cabinet, Balfour had to deal with these strained relations with America.          
   Unlike Salisbury, Balfour was a proponent of close Anglo-American collaboration. 
According to him, Britain and America shared not only their race but also many cultural 
connections. In November 1895, before the Venezuelan crisis intensified, he emphasised 
the importance of Anglo-Saxon solidarity:  
 
a deeper consciousness has begun to penetrate the convictions of the whole of the 
Anglo-Saxon race, whether subjects of the Queen or not, that they are all of one 
stock, that they speak one language, that they own one literature, that they live 
under institutions having a common origin, and that their mission throughout the 
world should be the same.
151
 
 
Not even the Venezuelan crisis shook his belief in the essential harmony between 
Britain and America. He worked to ease Anglo-American tensions in the Cabinet.
152
 In 
addition, he was willing to express his belief in public: 
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[T]he idea of war with the United States of America carries with it something of 
the unnatural horror of a civil war. ... [W]ar with the United States appears to 
have an additional horror of its own born of the fact that those whom we should 
be fighting are our own flesh and blood, speaking our own language, sharing our 
own civilization. ... We may be taxed with being idealists and dreamers in this 
matter. I look forward with confidence to the time when our ideals will have 
become real and our dreams will be embodied in actual political fact. It cannot 
but be that those whose national roots go down into the same past as our own, 
who share our language; our literature, our laws, our religion – everything that 
makes a nation great – and who share in substance our institutions – it cannot but 
be that the time will come, the time must come, when someone, some statesman 
of authority, more fortunate even than President Monroe, will lay down the 
doctrine that between the English-speaking peoples war is impossible. ...
153
 
    
This speech was praised by the Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who 
maintained a diplomatic channel with Balfour. Yet, as Lodge insisted, America linked 
the Venezuelan controversy to the legitimacy of the Monroe Doctrine whose principles 
were regarded as vital to her security.
154
 There was little possibility that America would 
withdraw her demand for arbitration. 
   In the end, Salisbury agreed to arbitration over the boundary dispute and Britain 
succeeded in avoiding an Anglo-American war. Given the deterioration of 
Anglo-German relations over South Africa, Britain could not afford to quarrel with 
America. She concluded an arbitration agreement with Venezuela in September 1896, 
the verdict of which in October 1899, was that British Guiana should possess most of 
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the disputed territories. Balfour was satisfied with this result and later insisted that 
‘[h]ad the negotiations on the subject [the Venezuelan crisis] taken a different turn, the 
history of the world would have been changed’. He feared that, regardless of its military 
result, a war between Britain and America would revive America’s old animosity 
against Britain, which was based on the American War of Independence.
155
 This would 
make Anglo-American cooperation impossible, and so he could not allow a hard-line 
attitude towards America that might escalate into war.      
   The Spanish-American War of 1898 marked a moment of Anglo-American 
rapprochement. Just before the outbreak of the war, many European powers sided with 
Spain and tried to mediate to prevent war, but Britain maintained strict neutrality 
regarding the conflict between America and Spain. Balfour played an important role in 
Britain’s neutrality. In April 1898, Salisbury was in southern France recuperating from 
illness, and Balfour was acting as Foreign Secretary.
156
 When he heard of the European 
powers’ proposal to mediate, he considered that they were trying ‘to give the United 
States a lecture on international morality’. While emphasising the importance of peace, 
Balfour was doubtful about Britain making ‘a judgement adverse to the U.S.’.157 His 
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decision to maintain Britain’s neutrality towards the Anglo-Spanish War was virtually 
tacit support for America. However, he did not think he should hide his sympathy for 
America, admitting that the Americans did not dislike an announcement favouring close 
ties with America because ‘they were rather coarse fibred’.158        
Britain’s favourable neutrality during the Spanish-American War was rewarded in 
the Boer War, which broke out in October 1899. Britain’s unexpectedly difficult fight 
revealed the inefficiency of the British army and attracted severe criticism from many 
European powers. America, however, remained neutral during the war. She was not 
wholly in favour of Britain, as the American public and many Congressmen supported 
the Boers. However, John Hay, Secretary of State, and Theodore Roosevelt, the Vice 
President, who both embraced Anglo-Saxon solidarity, led America into adopting a 
neutral, but de facto pro-British stance.
159
 Balfour reckoned that America’s favourable 
attitude towards Britain was ‘eminently satisfactory’ and showed ‘the sharpest and 
brightest contrast’ to that of continental Europe.160 Two wars outside Europe at the end 
of the nineteenth century – the Spanish-American and the Boer Wars – improved 
Anglo-American governmental relations and assisted in laying the foundations of the 
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‘special relationship’ of the twentieth century. This was also a sign of the expansion of 
great power politics from Europe to the entire globe. Realising this new state of affairs, 
Balfour emphasised the growing importance of Britain in global diplomacy beyond 
Europe: 
 
It is alleged that London is not a convenient centre for European diplomacy. It is, 
I venture to think, at least as convenient as Vienna or Verona; and now that 
America is ... becoming part of the European system, London is far more central 
than it used to be.
161
 
    
Faced with the intensification of rivalry among the great powers all over the world, 
close Anglo-American cooperation became increasingly valuable to Balfour. In 
particular, the Far East was the most competitive theatre at the turn of the century, and 
collaboration with America there was a matter for urgent consideration. Although 
Balfour did not completely agree with Alfred Thayer Mahan, an American naval officer 
and strategist, the concept of ‘Sea Power’ was compatible with Balfour’s idea of 
Anglo-American cooperation.
162
 ‘England and America – both Sea Powers –’, Balfour 
stated, ‘may find themselves in the Far East engaged in a contest, as allies, with Russia 
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– a Land Power’.163 In the Far East, Britain and America agreed to adhere to the Open 
Door principle.
164
 Hay had already sent Open Door notes to European powers and 
Japan in September 1899, requiring them to issue a formal declaration that they would 
preserve the territorial integrity of China and guarantee free access to treaty ports in 
China. In a letter to Mahan of 20 December 1899, therefore, Balfour concluded: 
 
It becomes more and more obvious – to me at least, as it is I think to you – that 
our interests, both in the narrow and in the wide use of that term, are identical. 
We have not only the same ideas of progress, freedom, civilisation, religion, 
morality, but we have the same interests in peace and in the ‘open door’. – The 
latter we may conceivably have to fight for, ...
165
    
 
Britain and America shared not only various cultural factors but also an interest in 
maintaining the Open Door in the Far East.  
It was not surprising that Balfour regarded America as the best potential alliance 
partner in the Far East. On 12 December 1900 he wrote to Henry White, the American 
Chargé d’Affaires in London. Describing himself as ‘a most earnest advocate of a 
harmonious cooperation between the two great Anglo-Saxon States’, Balfour insisted 
that:     
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the fact that its laws, its its [sic] language, its literature, and its religion, to say 
nothing of its constitution are essentially the same as those of English speaking 
peoples elsewhere, ought surely to produce a fundamental harmony, – a 
permanent sympathy – compared to which all merely political alliances with 
other States should prove to be the evanescent result of temporary diplomatic 
convenience.
166
 
 
This should be considered in the context of Balfour’s search for an alliance with 
Germany or Japan in the Far East at the time. Britain failed to secure a political 
arrangement with America regarding China due to her isolationism and instead 
concluded the Anglo-German agreement over the Yangtze Valley, which Japan later 
joined in October 1900. However, to Balfour’s mind, such an agreement was only a 
temporary arrangement of convenience, while cooperation with America would be a 
permanent collaboration. It was clear that he still preferred Anglo-American cooperation 
to an alliance with other powers, including Japan.         
The Panama Canal question accelerated the Anglo-American rapprochement. 
America wanted to build an isthmian canal across Central America to bring together her 
eastern and western parts. However, the 1850 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty between Britain 
and America prohibited them from building and controlling the isthmian canal 
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unilaterally. America keenly wanted this treaty nullified and launched negotiations with 
Britain after the Spanish-American War.
167
 Although unhappy at such demands, Britain 
sought a compromise with America. In the end, the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, signed on 
18 November 1901, gave America the exclusive right to build the Panama Canal and 
abrogated the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. Balfour was not dissatisfied with the result: 
 
It is indeed a matter of great satisfaction to me to think that this long and anxious 
controversy over the Inter oceanic Canal has found a solution which ought to be 
satisfactory to all the parties concerned. That the new Treaty will lead to the 
construction of a work of world-wide advantage is no small thing. It is an even 
greater thing that it should have been agreed to under circumstances which will 
diminish any petty jealousies or misunderstandings which may hinder the 
development of that affection and mutual understanding which ought to bind 
together all English-speaking peoples.
168
 
 
The above looked like Balfour’s usual praise for Anglo-Saxon solidarity; however, 
Balfour understood the strategic implications of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. Once 
America built the Panama Canal, ‘with England at Suez and the US at Panama we 
should hold the world in a pretty strong grip’.169 The Suez and Panama Canals were 
essential strategic points. Balfour’s rhetoric about Anglo-American cooperation was 
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based on an assumption of Anglo-American global naval supremacy.  
Anglo-American cooperation, however, was confined to the western hemisphere and 
did not extend to the Far East. In obtaining the Philippines as a result of the 
Spanish-American War, America had already expanded from the western hemisphere 
and secured a strongpoint in the Far East.
170
 Furthermore, America’s interest in the Far 
East was identical to that of Britain, namely maintaining the Open Door principle. This 
indicated that both Britain and America had a common interest in preserving China’s 
territorial integrity against encroachment by other powers, in particular Russia, upon 
China. However, most Americans were not ready to accept a binding agreement with 
foreign powers, including Britain. Realising that Anglo-Saxon solidarity was not strong 
enough to overcome America’s isolationism, Balfour nevertheless continued to seek 
close Anglo-American ties during his premiership.       
Balfour’s faith in Anglo-American cooperation remained strong after the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance was signed in January 1902. The Russo-Japanese War provided 
him with an opportunity to consider an alliance with America. Immediately after the 
outbreak of the war, he discussed the course of the war and the future of the Far East 
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with Foreign Secretary Lansdowne. Balfour forecast that Russia would beat Japan due 
to her overwhelming manpower, and as a result, Russia’s position in the Far East would 
be consolidated and she would annex Manchuria, the northern part of China. This would 
violate the Open Door principle and exclude foreign commerce from Manchuria. 
Balfour’s favoured measure for tackling this situation was not the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance but an alliance with America. On 11 February 1904, he wrote that ‘[i]f the 
Americans would so far violate their traditions as to make any suggestion of an alliance 
for the purpose of preserving by arms, if necessary, the integrity of China, it would open 
a new era in the history of the world’. However, he pointed out that Britain should not 
propose such an alliance to America but induce her to make the first move because ‘if 
we start it, the Senate are sure to upset the scheme’.171 Balfour realised that the Senate 
would oppose a binding political arrangement with Britain that required America’s 
commitment to the international order. His understanding soon proved to be correct.       
While Balfour was serving as Prime Minister, the need to defend Canada became 
more acute. With the rise of America’s power, according to a War Office memorandum, 
the Canadian defence was ‘the most difficult military problem of Imperial defence – a 
problem far more difficult of solution than that of the protection of India, although war 
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in North America is less likely than war in Central Asia’. In addition, the defence of the 
Canadian frontier was ‘a naval as well as a military question’, so Britain also had to 
consider this matter from the naval point of view.
172
 As Lord Selborne, First Lord of the 
Admiralty noted, Britain no longer maintained the two-power standard which required 
her to possess the ships of the two next greatest naval powers, ‘if the United States were 
to use all their resources to develop their naval strength’.173 A war with America over 
Canada was not practical and Britain had to placate America in order to avoid it. 
   Balfour took the initiative in improving Anglo-American relations. Bearing in mind 
a ‘hypothetical War’ with America, he argued that the Britain should examine the 
defence of Canada ‘whatever view we may take of the probability, or, (as I should prefer 
to put it,) the improbability of war’.174 In fact, he decided to make some concessions to 
America to maintain her cooperation. Although Canada was disaffected by the result, 
Britain sided with America in the 1903 Alaskan boundary dispute between Canada and 
America.
175
 The CID supported the transfer of the Halifax and Esquimalt garrisons to 
Canada, reducing Britain’s military presence in the western hemisphere.176 Balfour did 
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not complain that Britain would have to rely on Anglo-American cooperation for the 
defence of Canada.
177
 This was not incompatible with his assumption of sharing global 
naval supremacy with America.        
This attitude towards America did not change even after Balfour left office after 
1905. Despite his strong faith in Anglo-Saxon solidarity, he neither ruled out the 
possibility of an Anglo-American war nor ignored its potentially disastrous effect on the 
imperial defence. When he attended a CID meeting in 1908, he added the worst 
hypothesis to his memorandum on home defence. As long as Germany acted alone, 
Britain would not have to worry about this threat. But if America attacked Canada, the 
situation would change completely. Balfour insisted that: 
 
though the difficulties between them [the United States] and Canada have been, 
and are still, diminishing, I suppose that we must admit the possibility of some 
deplorable accident bringing us into collision with the United States, and of our 
having therefore to send every available man at once across the Atlantic, in face 
of a fleet which will probably be only second to our own in strength.
178
            
   
Balfour thought that an Anglo-American war would offer the chance Germany was 
waiting for, as she would not hesitate to take advantage of Britain’s problem. Britain 
could not simultaneously protect Canada from an American attack and herself from a 
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German raid. Therefore, Balfour concluded that war with America would be more 
formidable to home defence than war with any other power such as Germany or France. 
The fact that she could not afford to wage war with America would have influenced 
Balfour’s decision when he considered British policy in the case of a war between 
America and Japan.   
On the other hand, Balfour promoted Anglo-American cooperation. An 
Anglo-American arbitration treaty offered an opportunity to improve relations with 
America. On 5 August 1910, President William Taft explained to James Bryce, British 
Ambassador to the United States, that America and Britain should conclude a universal 
arbitration treaty to show a good example to the rest of the world.
179
 This treaty would 
bind ‘each nation not to go to war with the other about any question without first having 
offered to settle the question by arbitration’.180 American elites seemed to regard the 
arbitration treaty as the realisation of Anglo-Saxon solidarity. Sceptical about 
continental European powers, they pushed the arbitration treaty forward as ‘a method of 
settling without the intervention of foreigners disputes between two peoples of the same 
origin, with the same traditions, the same language, the same law’.181 As America had 
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seldom responded favourably to the idea of Anglo-Saxon solidarity in the past, British 
policymakers found this change of mind on the part of the American ruling class 
remarkable.                  
   As a proponent of closer Anglo-American cooperation Balfour did not hesitate to 
show his support for the arbitration treaty. He insisted that with such a universal 
arbitration treaty ‘the very fact that this seems the natural culmination of a natural 
progress is the greatest proof that all I have said with regard to the impossibility of 
dividing the destinies of the great nations is absolutely true and based upon literal 
fact’.182 His strong belief in Anglo-Saxon solidarity was not affected by America’s 
previous rejection of collaboration with Britain. On 18 March 1911, he wrote: 
 
I am, and always have been, a Pan-Anglican; - that is I have always held that the 
English-speaking peoples have traditions, interests, and ideals which should unite 
them in common sentiments, and, in not inconceivable eventualities, in common 
action. I am the very last man living who would desire to offend the 
susceptibilities of the U.S.A.
183
 
 
Although he was Leader of the Opposition, he recommended that the Liberal 
government should accept the arbitration treaty and contributed to creating bi-partisan 
support for it. However, the Senate’s fierce opposition emasculated the Anglo-American 
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arbitration treaty and in the end Taft had no choice but to withdraw it.
184
 As Balfour 
had rightly understood during his premiership, the Senate was the main obstacle to 
closer Anglo-American cooperation.         
After the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, Balfour desired America to enter the 
conflict to ensure victory. Although relations between America and Germany had 
deteriorated due to Germany’s submarine campaign, America still hesitated to make the 
decision to revoke neutrality and take the Allies’ side. Britain had succeeded in 
intercepting a telegram dated 19 January 1917 from Arthur Zimmermann, German 
Foreign Minister, to the German Ambassador in Mexico, in which Germany proposed to 
Mexico an alliance against America and recommended that Japan join them. This was 
clear evidence of Germany’s hostility to America, but Balfour had to be careful in 
dealing with it because it would deepen American suspicions about Japan’s intentions. 
Even before the date of this telegram, Cecil Spring-Rice, the British Ambassador to the 
United States, had reported rumours that Japan might form a hostile alliance with 
Mexico in the United States.
185
 Balfour enquired of Sutemi Chinda, the Japanese 
Ambassador at London, about the telegram and confirmed that Japan had no intention 
of making an alliance with Mexico. Then he handed the telegram over to Walter Hines 
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Page, the American Ambassador to Britain.
186
 The ‘Zimmermann telegram’ affair 
caused fury among American politicians and in public opinion. America declared war 
on Germany on 6 April.                
Once America had entered the war, Balfour realised the necessity for improving 
Anglo-American relations and close coordination of their war planning. Britain was 
unpopular with the American public even in 1917, and Page suggested that this was 
because ‘official people on both sides steadfastly refused to visit one another and 
become acquainted’.187 Therefore the British Cabinet considered it important that 
‘someone of the highest status in this country, who was known to the American people, 
and who would have the entrée to all circles’ should go to Washington.188 With his 
aristocratic background and status as a former Prime Minister, Balfour was suitable for 
this duty and led the British delegation to America. He arrived on 20 April and was 
warmly received by the American public, as well as by many statesmen. Seeing 
President Woodrow Wilson the next day, Balfour launched several discussions on 
British and American policy on the war. Spring-Rice praised Balfour’s mission as ‘a 
most unqualified success’ and insisted that it had ‘created an entirely new atmosphere in 
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Anglo-American relations’.189 He played a crucial role in promoting Anglo-American 
cooperation during the war.  
Anglo-American cooperation was essential not only for winning the war but also for 
maintaining post-war international order. Balfour had realised this fact and published 
his views in a pamphlet entitled ‘The Freedom of the Seas’ in 1916. He advocated that 
various legal settlements, for instance arbitration, should be encouraged to preserve 
future international order. ‘Behind law’, however, ‘there must be power’, because ‘all 
the precautions are mere scraps of paper unless they can be enforced’. Balfour insisted 
that ‘the potential use of sea-power’ by Britain and America could guarantee their 
enforcement. Both nations were ‘the two branches of the English-speaking peoples’, 
which, he concluded, should organise their own naval power in the interests of their 
common ideal.
190
 The pamphlet expressed Balfour’s balanced attitude to power and 
ideals. His emphasis on Anglo-American cooperation was based not only on cultural 
bonds, such as race, custom and language, but also on strategic calculations of Britain’s 
and America’s power. In addition, his emphasis on naval collaboration with America 
was reminiscent of his preference for Anglo-American global naval supremacy before 
the war.   
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After being appointed Foreign Secretary in December 1916, Balfour became deeply 
involved in discussions about the League of Nations. Sir Walter Phillimore, a prominent 
jurist and the chairman of the Phillimore Committee, submitted a draft Convention to 
Balfour on 20 March 1918.
191
 Balfour wanted to reach ‘some amicable mutual 
arrangement’ with America before consulting with other Allied powers. 192  He 
considered that the Phillimore report should be the basis of this arrangement and 
despatched it to President Woodrow Wilson. However Wilson’s reaction was lukewarm. 
In his Fourteen Points of 8 January 1918 he advocated the necessity of establishing an 
association of nations to maintain international peace and order after the Great War. 
However, he took a sceptical view of Anglo-American cooperation to hammer out the 
details of the League of Nations before the Peace Conference.
193
 In the end Britain had 
to face the creation of the League of Nations at the Paris Peace Conference without any 
common understanding with America. This was an ill omen for Balfour, who attached 
importance to America’s participation in this international peace machinery. 
At the Paris Peace Conference Balfour was busy with negotiations over other peace 
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settlements, but made every effort towards the establishment of the League of Nations. 
In February 1919, he insisted that the League of Nations ‘would work if administered 
by Americans and English – not otherwise’. 194  When the lack of funds for its 
organisation became serious, Balfour asked Austen Chamberlain, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, to assist financially, even if America and France would not pay.
195
 Although 
Chamberlain, who was strongly dissatisfied with America’s uncooperative attitude 
towards the League, finally decided to contribute 24,000 pounds, he revealed his 
displeasure to Balfour, saying that ‘the President should not leave his offspring on our 
doorstep!’196           
America’s participation in the League of Nations was not clear even after the Paris 
Peace Conference. Although the President had proposed the establishment of the 
League, not all the senators supported it. In particular the Republicans, for example 
Henry Lodge and Philander Knox, had reservations about America’s participation in the 
League. But Wilson showed no intention of reaching a compromise with his opponents. 
British policymakers, including Balfour, paid much attention to the growing hostility 
between the President and the Senate, many realising that this row would inevitably 
affect the future of the League of Nations. On 4 November 1919, Balfour agreed with 
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Hankey and Philip Kerr, Lloyd George’s secretary, that the League would not work 
unless America became a member.
197
  
Balfour did not hesitate to express Britain’s concern publicly. On 11 November 1919 
he delivered an address at a League of Nations rally. Keeping America’s debate in mind, 
he warned that if the reservation was granted to one power it would be impossible for 
other powers to resist the temptation to obtain the same reservation. In that case the 
prospects of the League’s success would be ‘dark indeed’. His address concluded:  
 
I ventured to say to any friends of mine in any country who are considering their 
responsibility at this great moment of the world’s history that they ought clearly 
to understand that, unless they are prepared to bear an equal share in an equal 
task, they are threatening with ultimate dissolution the whole of that new system 
which all of us, in common with the great nations, most sincerely desire to see 
work effectively.
198
 
 
There was no doubt that ‘any friends’ meant American politicians, and ‘that new system’ 
referred to the League of Nations. Balfour required America not only to preach the ideal 
of peace to the world but also to accept responsibility for maintaining international 
order.   
   However, Balfour’s warning did not have the effect he had hoped for. Wilson did not 
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acknowledge the reservation proposed by the Republicans, and the Republicans did not 
authorise the passage of the treaty without reservation. In the end the Senate rejected the 
ratification of the Treaty of Versailles and America decided not to enter the League of 
Nations. Contrary to Balfour’s scheme, the League of Nations was established without 
America’s participation. Like the arbitration treaty of 1911, the Senate had once again 
hindered America’s close collaboration with Britain. 
   Even after America rejected membership of the League of Nations, Balfour’s desire 
for Anglo-American cooperation did not change at all. Although he anticipated that 
America would not take part in the League for the time being, he did not give up on 
promoting sympathy between Britain and America. ‘[I]n addition to the direct and 
indirect effects of a common language, a common literature, common laws, and 
institutions springing from a common source’, Balfour wrote in April 1923, Britain and 
America had ‘deep lying identities of character which no political or military conflicts, 
nor any differences of external conditions, nor any admixture of alien blood, have been 
able to destroy’. While he did not forget the difficulty in achieving close cooperation 
with America, he admitted that an ‘English-speaking patriotism’ always prescribed his 
action.
199
 This demonstrated that Anglo-American cooperation still remained the main 
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factor to decide his foreign policy.    
Balfour’s strong interest in Anglo-American cooperation continued until the end of 
his life. He was not optimistic about the unity of ‘the English-speaking world’. Facing 
America’s unwillingness to collaborate with Britain, he said to his niece, Blanche 
Dugdale, ‘I don’t know that the Americans are faithful to the ideal.’200 However, as ‘a 
life-long and very ardent advocate of a full and friendly understanding between the two 
English-speaking peoples’, Balfour did not abandon hope of close Anglo-American 
relations.
201
 In January 1929 he wrote to Winston Churchill, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer: ‘Friendly co-operation with America has always taken the first place in my 
scale of international values. But it is not easy to attain, and it is not always best attained 
by too obviously striving for it’.202 This summed up Balfour’s consistent attitude 
towards Anglo-American cooperation throughout his political life. As a result, the 
Anglo-American relations formed a significant backdrop to Balfour’s policy towards 
Japan and the Anglo-Japanese alliance.         
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1 
    Emergence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1894-1905 
 
              I. 
 
When Balfour was appointed First Lord of the Treasury by Salisbury in July 1895, 
circumstances in the Far East had become more volatile than ever. Japan’s victory in the 
Sino-Japanese War of 1894 had revealed China’s weakness, causing Europe to scramble 
for Chinese concessions.
203
 Among the great powers Russia was most active in 
expanding her sphere of influence in the Far East. Although Japan had obtained 
Formosa, the Pescadores and the Liaotung peninsula from China as the result of 
winning the war, Russia, in cooperation with France and Germany, forced her to return 
the Liaotung peninsula.
204
 After this three-power intervention Russia began to construct 
a railway in Manchuria in return for a large financial loan to China. In addition, Korea 
requested her support against Japan. Seeking an ice-free port, Russia did not hesitate to 
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take this opportunity to consolidate her position in Korea. Japan, which was concerned 
by Russia’s move, tried to find a way to check it. Britain had to deal with this unstable 
situation in the Far East.  
Although Japan was gradually acquiring importance in international politics, 
Balfour had no particular interest in this country. Some members of the British elite 
recognised Japan’s potential power and considered her role in British diplomacy. For 
example, George Curzon travelled to the Far East and published a book entitled 
Problems of the Far East in 1894 in which, even before knowing the result of the 
Sino-Japanese War, he argued that Japan could become ‘the Britain of the Far East’ and 
urged Britain to strengthen her ties with Japan.
205
 But Balfour scolded Curzon for 
becoming ‘a mere student of effete civilisation’ and studying ‘their [oriental 
civilisations’] decaying splendour’ on his tour to the Far East.206 Balfour had not been 
to the Far East since his visit to Singapore on the way to Britain from Australia in 1875. 
Unlike Curzon, Balfour never did land in China, Korea and Japan in his whole life. As 
this demonstrated, Balfour regarded Asian countries as declining powers and paid little 
attention to Japan.   
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Balfour shared this negative attitude towards Japan with Salisbury. Regarding Japan 
as ‘the mushroom civilization’, Salisbury cast doubt on the sustainability of her rapid 
growth.
207
 Even though Japan had showed her growing power in the Sino-Japanese War, 
he did not recognise the value of an anti-Russian alignment with Japan. ‘My impression 
is that’, Salisbury told Sir Ernest Satow, the British Minister to Japan, ‘our strategic or 
military interest in Japan can easily be overestimated’. Salisbury did not believe that 
Japan was capable of preventing Russia’s expansion and expected that she would rather 
‘join with Russia in & perhaps with France in cutting up China than to exchange 
platonic assurances of affection with us’.208 His distrust of Japan’s ability was so deep 
that the idea of cooperating with her against Russia seemed impractical.
209
               
Salisbury favoured engaging with Russia via a direct arrangement. Given her 
confrontations with Russia in the Near East, Central Asia and India, it was not wise for 
Britain to create a new front with Russia in the Far East. In a public speech on 9 
November 1895, he stated that ‘in Asia there is room for us all’.210 Balfour followed the 
basic line of Salisbury’s policy; on 3 February 1896, he intentionally repeated 
Salisbury’s phrase: ‘[S]urely Asia and Africa are large enough for all of us’. In addition, 
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he revealed that he would tolerate Russia’s bid to establish an ice-free port in Korea, 
noting that British commerce and enterprise would benefit from ‘a commercial outlet 
for Russia in the Pacific Ocean’.211 This was confirmation of Salisbury’s preference for 
a modus vivendi with Russia over the Far East. Like Salisbury, Balfour did not see an 
alignment with Japan as a practical choice in the Far East.      
Rivalry amongst the great powers in China caused a serious crisis at the end of 1897. 
In November 1897 Germany seized the port of Kiaochow, taking advantage of the 
murder of two German Christian missionaries on Shantung peninsula.
212
 The 
establishment of a German foothold in northern China sparked a countermove on the 
part of Russia. In December Russia sent a squadron to Port Arthur on the pretext of its 
over-wintering there, revealing her intention to capture the lease of Port Arthur and 
Talienwan. Japan was offended by Russia’s bid to obtain Chinese territories which she 
herself had been forced to return to China by the three-power intervention after the 
Sino-Japanese War. Russia’s move threw cold water on Britain’s desire to reach a 
friendly arrangement with her over the Far East. Britain needed to review her policy 
towards Russia, and the British Cabinet was divided about how to respond to this crisis. 
   The main division was between Salisbury and the Colonial Secretary, Joseph 
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Chamberlain. Salisbury favoured a policy of ‘intelligent inaction’, namely avoiding 
hasty action and seeing the international process through.
213
 The Foreign Secretary did 
not take countermeasures against the German move to avoid intensifying the ‘scramble 
for China’.214 Moreover, he continued to try to reach an understanding between Britain 
and Russia by suggesting a joint Anglo-Russian loan to China.
215
 On the other hand, 
Chamberlain preferred to ‘go on without, which means against, her [Russia]’.216 
Pessimistic about Britain’s supremacy over Russia, he warned that Britain could not 
afford to try to deter Russia alone and sought a reliable ally. He saw Japan as a 
potentially useful partner in the Far East. Furthermore, Chamberlain suggested to 
Balfour that he should approach the United States and Germany to protect China’s Open 
Door. If Russia refused the principle of the Open Door, Chamberlain would not hesitate 
to use force to expel her fleet from Port Arthur.
217
 
   Balfour faced a dilemma, caught between Salisbury and Chamberlain’s policies. 
With his strong interest in foreign and defence policy, he understood Britain’s 
weaknesses and realised the need for an ally, which made him incline towards 
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Chamberlain. However, he saw Salisbury not only as an uncle but also as a political 
patron. Many people regarded Balfour as Salisbury’s heir and the next Prime Minister, 
so he was keen not to risk his political future by disobeying his uncle. As a result, he 
sought a compromise that would satisfy both Salisbury and Chamberlain. 
His solution to this crisis was that Britain should combine ‘the policy of a friendly 
understanding with Russia with that of a defensive arrangement with the U.S.’. 
Germany’s and Russia’s leasing of Chinese ports would urge China to open more ports 
and encourage free trade. This would be beneficial to British trade, so Balfour did not 
oppose their acquisitions from the economic viewpoint. This was the confirmation of 
his above-mentioned address of 3 February 1896. At the same time it was necessary for 
Britain to maintain China’s territorial integrity. Balfour proposed to enquire of America 
whether she would join in a treaty to ‘prevent the littoral of China being ceded 
piece-meal to other Powers’.218 His Anglo-American bilateral treaty was compatible 
with Chamberlain’s suggestion of Anglo-American-German cooperation in China. 
Nevertheless, unlike Chamberlain, Balfour did not refer to an anti-Russian alignment 
with Japan at all, continuing to leave Japan out of his calculations.       
   However, it was not easy to carry out this policy. Russia intended to secure the lease 
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of Port Arthur and Talienwan ‘at any cost’.219 Her hard-line attitude made it unlikely 
that an arrangement over the Far East could be reached with Britain. On the other hand, 
Britain sounded America out about the possibility of her cooperation ‘in opposing any 
action by foreign Powers which would tend to restrict the opening of China to the 
commerce of all nations’.220 But President William McKinley’s reaction was lukewarm. 
Although in favour of the Open Door policy, he did not want America to interfere in the 
Far East.
221
 Given the impending Spanish-American War, it was natural for America to 
follow her traditional policy of isolationism. Balfour’s scheme for Anglo-American 
cooperation ended in failure.          
   The alternative policy was to seek a naval base in China that would check both 
Russian and German expansion. At the end of February 1898 China proposed that 
Britain should lease the small port of Wei-hai-Wei on the Shantung peninsula as 
compensation for the German and Russian occupations.
222
 Although Japan had 
occupied Wei-hai-Wei since the end of the Sino-Japanese War, it was forecast that she 
would withdrew from the port when she obtained the full amount of war indemnity 
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imposed by the Shimonoseki Treaty.
223
 China’s offer of this northern port aimed to 
prevent Britain from occupying places in the Yangtze Valley and to use Britain as a 
counterbalance to Russia and Germany.
224
 Considering the German and Russian 
occupations in China, Balfour argued that their influence on the Chinese government 
would ‘be so increased to the detriment of [Britain] that it seems desirable for us to 
make some countermove’.225 British policy-makers gradually attracted their attention to 
the acquisition of Wei-hai-Wei. 
The lease of Wei-hai-Wei affected British policy towards Japan. The Cabinet 
gathered on 14 March 1898, but could not make any decisions on Wei-hai-Wei due to 
Salisbury’s absence.226 After this meeting, Curzon, then Parliamentary Under-Secretary 
for Foreign Affairs, advanced the pro-Wei-hai-Wei argument, emphasising the necessity 
of the port for the purpose of strengthening Britain’s presence in North China. In 
addition, Britain’s firm attitude towards Russia and Germany, Curzon advocated, would 
give ‘a continued lien upon the confidence and, when required, upon the alliance of 
Japan’.227 Sharing Curzon’s sense of crisis, Francis Bertie, the Chief of the Far Eastern 
Department of the Foreign Office, advised British statesmen to get a foothold in 
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northern China to provide ‘some counterpoise to the preponderance of Russian and 
German influence at Peking’, otherwise Germany would cooperate with Russia and 
France to put pressure on Japan and exclude British trade from North and South 
China.
228
 Curzon and Bertie valued Japan’s ability and expected that the acquisition of 
Wei-hai-Wei would lead to further cooperation with Japan.   
Balfour also understood the importance of the wider impact of Wei-hai-Wei on 
British diplomacy. The lease of this port presented him with many important 
considerations, which he listed as follows:  
 
What will be the effect of the new policy [the lease of Wei-hai-Wei] on Germany? 
Will it provoke a Triple Alliance against us in the Far East? Could we resist the 
power of such a combination (a) without Japan (b) with Japan? Could the contest 
be confined to the Far East? or would it mean a general war? ... What will be the 
cost and what the military value of Weihaiwei to us?
229
 
 
This indicated where Balfour’s attention lay in the policymaking process. It was 
significant that he eventually considered the possibility of Britain’s cooperation with 
Japan to deal with the triple combination of anti-British European continental powers. 
Japan had emerged as an option for tackling Russian and German ambition in Balfour’s 
mind. Furthermore, he was concerned that a quarrel with the three European powers 
                                                   
228 Memo. by Bertie, 14 Mar. 1898, BD Vol.1, No. 24. 
229 Memo. by Balfour, 14 Mar. 1898, Balfour MSS, Add. MSS. 49746. 
88 
 
might go beyond the Far East and result in a global war. Given Britain’s confrontations 
with the Franco-Russian alliance in Africa, India and Central Asia, his concern was not 
without grounds. Clearly Balfour pondered over Far Eastern politics in the context of 
the global balance of power.  
However, although he saw cooperation with Japan as an option for British foreign 
policy, Balfour was not as keen on this idea as Curzon and Bertie. First, he wanted to 
know whether Japan would support Britain’s lease of Wei-hai-Wei.230 But while both 
Prime Minister Marquis Itō and Foreign Minister Baron Nishi confirmed Japan’s 
evacuation of Wei-hai-Wei, they only mentioned that their government would not object 
to ‘its possession by a Power disposed to assist in maintaining the independence of 
China’.231 This vague answer and Japan’s silence on Russia’s demand for Chinese ports 
aroused Balfour’s suspicion about a Russo-Japanese collusion. Japan might, he noted, 
have already obtained ‘some undertaking as to Port Arthur not being used as a fortified 
place in return for acquiescence of Russian occupation of Wei-hai-wei’.232 Thus he 
instructed Bertie to find out whether the Japanese government would be ‘in hearty 
sympathy with our policy’.233 Indeed, Japan was ready to improve relations with Russia 
                                                   
230 Balfour to Satow, 15 Mar. 1898, FO 46/501. 
231 Satow to Salisbury, 15 Mar. 1898, FO 46/496; Satow to Salisbury, 17 Mar. 1898, FO 46/502. 
232 Balfour to Satow, 22 Mar. 1898, FO 46/501. 
233 Balfour to Bertie, 23 Mar. 1898, FO 46/501.  
89 
 
and would reach the Nishi-Rosen agreement over Korea in April 1898.
234
 Balfour’s 
doubt about Japan’s credibility was not necessarily off the mark, and the idea of an 
anti-Russian political arrangement with Japan was far from realistic.                 
In the end the British Cabinet decided to accept the lease of Wei-hai-Wei at 
Salisbury’s suggestion on 25 March. 235  Irrespective of the Tokyo government’s 
neutrality, Japan’s military and naval authorities at Wei-hai-Wei cooperated with their 
British counterparts due to their suspicion of Russia.
236
 Thanks to this ad hoc 
collaboration, Britain succeeded in transferring the port from Japan smoothly on 24 May. 
Her acquisition of Wei-hai-Wei defused the political crisis in China, restoring the 
equilibrium among the European powers there for the time being.   
   However, Balfour was not completely satisfied with this result. Although he had not 
publicly opposed Salisbury’s decision to use Wei-hai-Wei, he considered that Britain 
would need ‘too large a military force for its defence’ and that even if it were fortified it 
would provide ‘no counterpoise to Port Arthur’.237 Balfour concluded that Britain was 
compelled to secure such a useless port because ‘possession of Port Arthur by Russia 
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seriously disturbs the balance of Power in Gulf of Pechili’.238 To him, Salisbury’s 
diplomacy was passive and did not manage Far Eastern problems well.
239
 Balfour 
confessed to George Joachim Goschen, First Lord of the Admiralty, his concern that 
Britain might ‘fall between two stools’ in the event of a Russian countermove in 
response to the British lease of Wei-hai-Wei.
240
 Acting for Salisbury during his illness, 
Balfour quietly sought an alternative foreign policy in late March and April 1898.  
Balfour reverted to the idea of an anti-Russian alliance with other great powers. 
Russia desired not only to occupy Port Arthur and Talienwan but also to construct a 
railway connecting these two ports with the railway in Siberia. Britain’s policy in China 
was ‘to open China to the commerce of the world’. As long as other powers maintained 
the Open Door principle, it would be impossible for Britain to oppose their acquisition 
of Chinese ports or their construction of railways in China. However, Balfour worried 
that Russian expansion in northern China, and particularly in Manchuria, would change 
the status quo in the Far East:      
 
For good or for evil, the social, political, and economic state of this region 
[Manchuria] must inevitably be revolutionized when it is traversed by a railway 
under Russian management, connecting ports on the Pacific under Russian 
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control with the commercial and military system of the Russian Empire.
241
  
 
Given Peking’s proximity to Port Arthur, which was suitable for a naval base, Russia’s 
occupation of the port would increase her influence over the Chinese government and 
stimulate the partition of China. Balfour therefore decided to step up his effort to find a 
reliable ally with which to deter Russia’s encroachment on Chinese territory.              
   Balfour did not see Japan as a powerful candidate for such an alliance; instead, his 
first choice was Germany. He sanctioned Chamberlain’s informal negotiations with 
Germany over a bilateral alliance at the end of March 1898.
242
 Chamberlain was 
strongly concerned with Britain’s antagonism against Russia and France over China and 
West Africa respectively.
243
 It was not surprising that Chamberlain deemed an alliance 
with Germany the best measure for checking both France and Russia simultaneously. It 
would be beneficial for Balfour to support Chamberlain’s talks with Germany. He 
shared Chamberlain’s desire for cooperation with an ally with which to overcome the 
intensifying rivalry between Britain and other great powers. As he understood it, 
Germany had no choice but to side with Britain in the case of Britain’s confrontation 
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with France and Russia because if Britain were defeated Germany would be their next 
victim.
244
 Moreover, pushing Chamberlain to the forefront of the negotiation would 
hedge the risk of earning Salisbury’s displeasure.245 This precaution would pay off 
later.       
Although cautious, Balfour smoothed the way for Chamberlain’s alliance talks with 
Germany. He met Paul Count von Hatzfeldt, the German ambassador to Britain, 
immediately after Chamberlain began to negotiate with Hatzfeldt about an alliance on 
29 March 1898. Chamberlain proposed to Hatzfeldt that an Anglo-German alliance 
should ‘be of a defensive character based upon a mutual understanding as to policy in 
China & elsewhere’.246 Balfour tried to give a lead to realise Chamberlain’s proposal. 
Despite an informal suggestion, Balfour advocated that an agreement between Britain 
and Germany over China ‘should bind the two governments not to press for railway 
concessions in the areas in which one of them had special interests’.247 Under the 
pretext of the railway question, the aim of this suggestion was that Britain and Germany 
would recognise one another’s spheres of influence in China. This demonstrated 
Balfour’s active role in seeking an alliance with Germany.248               
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Germany’s reaction, however, was unenthusiastic. Hatzfeldt expressed the difficulty 
of reaching an alliance between Britain and Germany at a meeting with Balfour on 5 
April. Germany was concerned that the House of Commons might reject the ratification 
of the Anglo-German alliance even if the British government were to bring it to a 
conclusion. In addition, neither British nor German public opinion favoured the alliance. 
Hatzfeldt finally cancelled further discussions with Chamberlain and this series of talks 
over an Anglo-German alliance was relegated to ‘a curious episode, of which no record 
will be found at the F.O.’.249          
The stagnation of negotiations on an Anglo-German alliance did not raise 
expectations of cooperation with Japan. Balfour adhered to Britain and Germany’s 
mutual recognition of their spheres of influence. Railways in China could still provide a 
breakthrough in improving Anglo-German relations.
250
 Balfour pondered Germany’s 
desire to prevent Britain from building a railway from Chefoo, a port in Shantung. 
Although it was unlikely that Britain would undertake such a construction, he tried to 
take advantage of this German view. On 9 April 1898 he proposed to Sir Thomas 
Sanderson, Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that this question should be 
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dealt with ‘under the general arrangements ... governing railway concessions in the 
German and English areas of interest’.251 Acknowledging Germany’s special interests 
along the whole of Shantung’s coast line was acceptable because Britain would not seek 
any other lease in this region. It would also enable Britain to utilise Germany to check 
Russia in northern China. 
Balfour’s main emphasis regarding any Anglo-German agreement was reciprocity. It 
seemed to him ‘rather absurd’ that Britain should pledge to recognise special German 
interests in Shantung without Germany declaring that she would not violate the Yangtze 
Valley. While he realised that Germany had no intention of obtaining any new ports 
there, he concluded that an arrangement between the two countries ‘ought to be 
reciprocal’.252 As he saw it, the political arrangement with other great powers should 
serve two purposes simultaneously, namely stopping Russian expansion in northern 
China and safeguarding Britain’s position in the Yangtze Valley. This would apply to 
Britain’s cooperation not only with Germany but also with any other nation, including 
Japan.        
Balfour realised that it would not be easy to secure reciprocity in negotiations with 
Germany. Despite being a strong supporter of the lease of Wei-hai-Wei, Curzon argued 
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that Britain should come to ‘some definite understanding as to fiscal, industrial and 
commercial policy in China with Germany’.253 Balfour’s reply to Curzon expressed his 
cool-headed perception of the difficulty of achieving a reciprocal agreement with 
Germany:                
 
I do not see my way quite clearly about our arrangements with Germany in 
Shantung. It requires careful steering, because, on the one hand, it seems very 
desirable to mark out spheres in which we shall not interfere with each other’s 
concessions, and yet very difficult to do this without either going [sic] them too 
big a sphere or ourselves too small a one.
254
 
 
Balfour tried to continue negotiations with Hatzfeldt, persisting along the lines of an 
Anglo-German rapprochement through the delimitation of their spheres of influence in 
China, with little prospect of success.  
In the end, Balfour gave up his attempt at an Anglo-German alliance for two reasons. 
First, Germany’s negative attitude to his proposal had not changed. On 13 April 
Hatzfeldt stated that the German government objected to reciprocal assurances 
respecting spheres of interest in China.
255
 Second, Salisbury had recuperated at 
Beaulieu in southern France and was to return to Britain on 1 May. As Bertie recollected 
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later, Salisbury regarded Balfour’s attitude towards Germany as too positive, and was 
‘rather jealous of the nephew in his management of the Foreign Office during the 
uncle’s absence’.256 Balfour had to end his unofficial negotiations with Germany to 
avoid jeopardising his relationship with Salisbury. The best way of doing this was to lay 
the blame on Chamberlain. Informing Salisbury of the discussions with Hatzfeldt, 
Balfour criticised Chamberlain for being ‘very impulsive’ and said that he ‘went far in 
the expression of his own personal leaning towards a German alliance’.257 Thanks to 
this manoeuvre, he succeeded in maintaining his position in the British Cabinet and 
deflecting Salisbury’s wariness to Chamberlain. 
Even after Salisbury resumed his duties and the secret Anglo-German negotiations 
had failed, Balfour continued to seek a policy that would stabilise the situation in the 
Far East. A dispute over a railway in China flared up between Britain and Russia in June 
1898. A British bank and a British company announced a plan to extend the railway 
from Peking to Newchwang, a city in the Peninsula of Liaotung, to increase their 
commercial interests in northern China. Russia strongly objected to this project, which 
she regarded as a violation of her position in Manchuria. As the tension between Britain 
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and Russia was increased, Salisbury became unwell again and had to leave London to 
recuperate in the south of France. In August 1898 Balfour once more deputised for 
Salisbury at the Foreign Office and grappled with the Anglo-Russian quarrel.      
This time Balfour’s choice was not an anti-Russian collaboration with other great 
powers including Japan but a direct arrangement with Russia, as advocated by Salisbury. 
On 12 August, Balfour began to discuss this problem with the Russian Chargé 
d’Affaires Pavel Mikhailovich Lessar, who implied that Britain should approve Russia’s 
special interest in railways and mines in Manchuria in return for Russia’s recognition of 
Britain’s interests in Yangtze.258 Balfour reacted quickly, in a lengthy memorandum to 
the Cabinet discussing Britain’s policy towards Russia. On careful analysis Balfour 
concluded that Lessar’s proposal was most favourable to Britain. Although she would 
have to give up Manchuria, there was no doubt that the Yangtze Valley was more 
valuable. To begin with, not believing in the immense expected commercial benefit of 
the Newchwang railway, Balfour considered that ‘it was a mistake to have gone in for 
the Newchwang extension line’.259 The Anglo-Russian reciprocal agreement, he stated, 
would bring ‘a sphere of interest much larger than we could easily demand in cold 
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blood’.260      
   By contrast, anti-Russian cooperation with Japan did not appeal to Balfour. In a 
detailed memorandum he expressed concern about the strategic side-effects of the 
Newchwang railway line. If it were to be connected with the Manchuria Railway in the 
future, Russia would gain land access to Peking, ‘which is Russia’s great advantage, and 
which no Power except, perhaps, Japan and us in combination, can wrest from her’.261 
This comment revealed that an Anglo-Japanese collaboration against Russia was a 
possible policy option in Balfour’s mind. But it was still hypothetical: Balfour did not 
specify the meaning of ‘Japan and us in combination’. In addition, even though 
cooperation with Japan would enable Britain to check Russia’s expansion in the north of 
China, it would not strengthen Britain’s position in the Yangtze Valley. It was fatal that 
Japan did not have any sphere of influence in China which could have been used as a 
bargaining chip for Britain. Therefore, Balfour decided to pursue the Anglo-Russian 
rapprochement, hoping ‘to drive them [Russia] into making a distinct offer of spheres of 
interest (so far as concessions go) – i.e. Manchuria v. basin of Yangtse’.262 
   After discussion in the Cabinet, Balfour made every effort to reach an 
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Anglo-Russian arrangement over their spheres of influence in China. Although he 
stepped down from the diplomatic stage at the beginning of September on Salisbury’s 
return, his policy on Russia was passed to Salisbury. Britain suffered from Russia’s slow 
diplomacy, but eventually the Scott-Muravev agreement was signed in April 1899.
263
 
Its contents were weaker and vaguer than Lessar’s and Balfour’s proposals; even so, 
Salisbury praised this agreement between Britain and Russia for ‘preventing the 
possibility of collision between the two Governments’.264  The conclusion of this 
agreement brought a temporary stop of the great powers’ scramble for concessions in 
China initiated by the Sino-Japanese War. However, the Anglo-Russian agreement did 
not completely resolve the volatility of the situation in China, and Britain would soon 
face another crisis.           
 
II. 
    
The Boxer Uprising in 1900 plunged China into chaos once again.
265
 Salisbury’s 
reaction was slow, although their militiamen finally laid siege to foreign legations in 
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Peking in June 1900. He regarded the so-called Boxers as ‘a mere mob’ due to the fact 
that ‘the Austrian legation which is the weakest’ succeeded in repelling their attack.266 
Moreover, he did not consider that a firm and active stance was necessarily suitable on 
Britain’s part. As he realised, the danger of the north of China, which the Boxers mainly 
affected, was ‘the most urgent’.267 But this did not mean that Britain’s vital interest, 
namely the Yangtze Valley, was threatened. Britain’s intervention might cause other 
powers to scramble for concessions again and end in the partition of China.
268
 Aware of 
Britain’s limited military and financial resources due to the Boer War in South Africa, 
Salisbury wanted to ‘keep as much as possible in the background’ and tried to maintain 
the status quo in China.
269
        
   Balfour did not share Salisbury’s policy of non-intervention. Although serving just 
below the Prime Minister in the Cabinet, he had not emerged into the political spotlight 
since the outbreak of the Boxer Uprising. However, this did not mean that he was kept 
in the dark about the British policymaking process. As in the case of Wei-hai-Wei, he 
sought an alternative policy behind the scenes in order to maintain good relations with 
Salisbury. With Goschen’s support, Balfour approved the proposal of St. John Brodrick, 
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Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to send international reinforcements 
to China. Furthermore, he agreed that Brodrick should ‘go & try to frighten L[or]d 
S[alisbury] before Cabinet’. In return, Brodrick reported his discussion of this proposal 
with Salisbury to Balfour and Goschen. They were dissatisfied with Salisbury’s 
hesitation about despatching forces to Peking, saying ‘either L[or]d S[alisbury] must be 
upset wh[ich] none of us will do, or nothing will be done’.270 Balfour was ‘in despair at 
his [Salisbury’s] apathy’ and continued to try to persuade him, via Brodrick, to take 
more active steps in response to the Boxer Uprising.
271
 
Balfour also reviewed the situation in the Far East and turned his attention to British 
interests further north, in Manchuria. He admitted that ‘the grip of Russia upon 
Manchuria will become closer and stronger’ in post-Boxer China. Britain could not 
‘prevent this consummation, and if it is to be prevented at all, it must be by China 
herself, and perhaps Japan’. Even so, it was not wise for Britain to abandon all her 
interests in the north of China and withdraw to the Yangtze Valley to avoid conflict with 
Russia, as such impatient action would weaken her position in China and make the 
Yangtze region more vulnerable. However, he did not completely rule out the possibility 
of surrendering all British interests in northern China ‘in the last resort and as part of an 
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otherwise advantageous bargain’. 272  This highlighted two important points. First, 
Balfour realised the limits of British power in China and considered that not only China 
but also Japan might be capable of stopping Russian expansion in Manchuria. Second, 
he calculated that if necessary, British interests in the north of China could be utilised as 
a bargaining chip. Balfour had no intention of abandoning them easily, but saw their 
value not as absolute but as relative to other British interests all over the world. 
While he valued Japan’s power against Russia, Balfour did not seek cooperation 
with Japan in northern China. His favoured option was Anglo-German collaboration to 
preserve the status quo in the Yangtze Valley. Despite his failure to reach a binding 
political agreement with Germany in 1898, he had not lost hope of an alliance with 
Germany. After rescuing the besieged foreign legations in August 1900, Germany 
approached Britain about signing an Anglo-German agreement over China, and 
particularly the Yangtze region, which vaguely promised to maintain the Open Door 
principle and China’s territorial integrity.273 Salisbury was away in France; in his place 
an informal Cabinet committee established by Lord George Hamilton, Secretary of State 
for India, emerged to deal with Germany’s proposal. Balfour, who did not attend the 
committee, approved Hamilton’s policy of close cooperation with Germany in the vague 
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and implicit manner.
274
 In spite of Salisbury’s reluctance, the majority of the Cabinet 
supported Hamilton and forced the Prime Minister to conclude the Anglo-German 
agreement over the Yangtze region on 16 October 1900.
275
 Japan joined it on 29 
October, expecting it to be useful in stopping Russian expansion.
276
  
The conclusion of the Anglo-German agreement over China of 16 October 1900 
demonstrated the erosion of Salisbury’s authority in the Cabinet. Many Cabinet 
members, including Balfour, no longer accepted his diplomacy. Given his frequent 
absence from London due to illness, it was not satisfactory for Salisbury to serve as 
both Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary concurrently. With Aretas Akers-Douglas, 
the Chief Whip, and Balfour’s private secretary Jack Sandars, Balfour decided to 
persuade Salisbury to give up the Foreign Office voluntarily. Balfour then had to 
consider who should take over the Foreign Office. Joseph Chamberlain was not a 
suitable choice because the growth of his influence would cause a rift in the Unionist 
Cabinet and the doubt of other European powers. The best arrangement, Balfour told 
Akers-Douglas, was ‘an arrangement which left Lord Salisbury Prime Minister, and put 
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the conduct of Foreign Office details into the hands of Lord Lansdowne’.277 In the end, 
Salisbury had no choice but to tell Akers-Douglas that he would nominate Lansdowne 
as his successor.
278
 Lansdowne’s appointment in November 1900 achieved two 
purposes: it accelerated a transition from Salisbury’s policy to a more active one and 
prevented Chamberlain from rising in the Cabinet, both of which were desirable to 
Balfour. 
   The rivalry in China between the great powers soon tested the value of the 
Anglo-German agreement of October 1900. Ernest Morrison, a correspondent for The 
Times, revealed a secret Russo-Chinese arrangement over the southern part of 
Manchuria on 3 January 1901 which was a ploy on Russia’s part in order to gain control 
of the railways in northern China and make Manchuria her virtual protectorate.
279
 In 
fact, the arrangement had not yet been ratified and its terms were temporary, but 
Morrison’s article shocked the world and caused the so-called ‘Manchurian crisis’.280 
Britain’s reaction was relatively slow at first. Lansdowne, in favour of cooperation with 
Germany, approached her about how to deal with ‘the Russian landgrabbing’.281 
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Balfour did not hesitate to push the Anglo-German combination forward. Chamberlain 
and the Duke of Devonshire, Lord President of the Council, had some conversations 
with Hermann Baron von Eckardstein, First Secretary at the German Embassy in 
London, and told him that Britain would eventually join the German-led Triple Alliance 
in January 1901.
282
 According to William Tyrrell, Sanderson’s private secretary, the 
result of these talks was kept from Salisbury ‘as he was opposed to the policy of 
alliances, but A.J.B[alfour] & Lansdowne were privy to the deal’.283 As usual, Balfour 
promoted a different policy to Salisbury’s behind the scenes.     
Backed by Balfour, Lansdowne continued to pursue further cooperation with 
Germany rather than Japan, whose anxiety about Russia’s behaviour in China was so 
strong that she tried to offer China material support, namely naval assistance, to prevent 
Russia’s further acquisition of territory in Manchuria.284 Lansdowne could not agree to 
Tokyo’s stance, regarding it as the ‘much longer step’. The basis of his policy was the 
Anglo-German October agreement. Britain would only take such specific measures if 
Russia or any other powers acted ‘inconsistently with the principles of that agreement’; 
and even in such a case, Lansdowne observed, Britain should ‘carry her [Germany] with 
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us’.285 Lansdowne tried to remain sufficiently distant from Japan’s more energetic 
policy against Russia in order not to be dragged into a Russo-Japanese conflict. It was 
clear that the attention of Lansdowne and Balfour was on Germany more than Japan.                       
However, Germany’s reaction was not warm enough to meet Balfour’s expectation. 
On 6 March 1901 Richard von Mühlberg, the German Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
told Shinichiro Kurino, the Japanese Minister at Berlin, that Germany would maintain 
‘benevolent neutrality’ in a crisis over Manchuria. Furthermore, on 15 March 
Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow delivered a speech about the Anglo-German agreement 
of October 1900 in the Reichstag. He declared that this agreement applied only to 
commercial problems and ‘was in no sense concerned with Manchuria’. His conclusion 
was that ‘[T]here were no German interests of importance in Manchuria, and the fate of 
that province was a matter of absolute indifference to Germany’.286 Germany had no 
intention of acting with Britain in the case of a Russo-Japanese confrontation over 
Manchuria. Bülow’s statement destroyed the value of the Anglo-German October 
agreement and spoiled Lansdowne’s scheme for a common Anglo-German policy on 
Manchuria. Indeed, he regretted that Germany seemed to have ‘put an end to any idea 
which might have been entertained as to the possibility of England and Germany 
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combining for the purpose of “keeping a ring” for Russia and Japan’.287  
Britain now had to reconsider her policy on the Manchurian crisis. One option was 
to encourage China to resist concluding an agreement with Russia over Manchuria in 
cooperation with Japan. Backed by Britain and Japan, the Chinese government refused 
Russia’s demands.288 Although she did not give up her desire for a Russo-Chinese 
agreement easily, Russia realised the ‘failure to rush the Manchurian Agreement through’ 
by mid-April.
289
 In the end, she had to declare an end to her attempt to reach a political 
arrangement with China, promising reconciliation with other great powers. Britain had 
succeeded in defusing the Manchurian crisis and maintaining the status quo in China.     
Even after resolving the Manchurian crisis, Britain continued to seek an alternative 
policy on the Far East. Many British policymakers expected Russia to resume her 
encroachment of China sooner or later. As Sanderson admitted, a good understanding 
with Russia ‘would be much the best plan if it could be managed’.290 But, given the 
strained Anglo-Russian relations, it was not easy to secure an agreement with Russia.
291
 
Therefore even though the Anglo-German October agreement had lost its validity, 
Germany was still a strong candidate for cooperation for the purpose of maintaining the 
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status quo in the Far East. However, German diplomacy was awkward: while 
Eckardstein, taking advantage of Hatzfeldt’s illness, tried to reach an 
Anglo-German-Japanese alliance whose purpose was to observe the Open Door 
principle, Kaiser William II wanted Britain to join the Triple Alliance of Germany, 
Austria and Italy in Europe. Suspicious of Germany’s behaviour, Salisbury cast doubt 
on the idea of close cooperation with this German-led alliance.
292
 In the end 
negotiations between Britain and Germany over an alliance failed to produce any 
concrete results. 
As the possibility of a German alliance faded from view, another option emerged 
more clearly: an alliance with Japan. Bertie insisted on the naval and financial 
advantages of Anglo-Japanese cooperation.
293
 On 20 June 1901 he advocated a 
reciprocal Anglo-Japanese agreement to assist in resisting foreign powers in Korea and 
the Yangtze region.
294
 Bertie’s memorandum of 22 July 1901 emphasised that naval 
cooperation with Japan could maintain the status quo in the Far East without increasing 
the budgetary burden.
295
 Given the financial constraints caused by the Boer War, an 
Anglo-Japanese alliance appealed to many British policymakers.
296
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   The Earl of Selborne, First Lord of the Admiralty, was another proponent of an 
Anglo-Japanese alliance. On 4 September 1901 he saw the Channel and the 
Mediterranean Sea as the likely main battle stages in a war with Britain’s arch-rival, 
France and Russia. By combining the Japanese navy with her own Britain could secure 
superiority over the Franco-Russian naval strength even without employing new 
battleships in the Far East. This would smooth the concentration of the Royal Navy in 
‘the heart of the Empire’, namely European waters.297 Selborne highlighted the aspect 
of imperial defence and expanded the horizons of the discussion of the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance beyond the Far East.   
   Balfour also put an Anglo-Japanese alliance in the context of imperial defence. He 
was concerned about the burden of defending the British Empire all over the world. 
Although equipped with ‘enormous strength, both effective and latent’, Britain could 
utilise her power only ‘if we can concentrate’. 298  Balfour supported Selborne’s 
argument for the concentration of Britain’s naval power in Europe. However, he realised 
that the naval factor was not sufficient for the defence of the British Empire, arguing 
that the navy formed ‘only a part – though perhaps the most important part of our 
                                                                                                                                                     
strategic foreign policy, 1902-1914’ in P.P. O’Brien, (ed.) The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1922 
(London, 2004), pp. 50-51. 
297 Memo. by Selborne, 4 Sep. 1901, CAB 37/58/81; Z.S. Steiner, ‘Great Britain and the Creation of 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance’ in The Journal of Modern History XXXI, 1, (1959), pp. 29-31. 
298 Hamilton to Curzon, 4 Jul. 1901, Hamilton MSS, MSS. Eur. C. 126/3. 
110 
 
Imperial policy – military, financial and diplomatic, which ... gives me at the present 
moment the greatest anxiety’.299 As Selborne had pointed out, Britain ‘could not afford 
to see our Chinese trade disappear, or to see Hong Kong and Singapore fall, particularly 
not at a moment when a military struggle with Russia might be in progress on the 
confines of India’.300 This highlighted that a war with Russia would involve not only 
naval warfare in Europe but also war on land along the borders of India with Persia and 
Afghanistan. Britain had to direct her attention to the linkage between India and the Far 
East in the case of an Anglo-Russian struggle.   
Many British politicians warned Balfour of India’s vulnerability to Russia and he 
shared their misgivings. Given Britain’s predicament in the Boer War, the Indian 
Secretary George Hamilton informed Balfour that Russia would ‘take advantage of our 
entanglement in South Africa’ and would do anything to squeeze Britain in Persia and 
Afghanistan.
301
 Both countries were vital to the defence of India, and particularly 
Chahbar near the Persian Gulf, ‘the best port along the coast as a maritime base’.302 
Financially weak, the Persian government was lured to receive a Russian loan in 
October 1901. It would be ‘most unfavourable both to British and to Indian interests’ for 
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Russia’s money to strengthen her influence on Persia. Britain desired to ‘debar Russia 
from establishing a military or naval station, or from acquiring for her trade a privileged 
position’ in the Persian Gulf.303     
Curzon, now Viceroy of India, also emphasised the importance of India. Pointing 
out that British rule there was becoming increasingly difficult, Curzon reported to 
Balfour that ‘as long as we rule India, we are the greatest power in the world. If we lose 
it, we shall drop straight away to a 3
rd
 rate Power’.304 Balfour took the same pessimistic 
view of Britain’s power. According to Hamilton’s letter to Curzon, Balfour had told 
Hamilton that Britain was ‘for all practical purposes at the present moment only a 
third-rate power; and we are a third-rate power with interests which are conflicting with 
and crossing those of the great powers of Europe.’305 Balfour realised that Britain had 
to adopt more active diplomacy to deal with this unfavourable international situation 
and saw an alliance with another great power as imperative. The problem was deciding 
which power to make this alliance with.    
Japan finally emerged in the view of British policymakers as a powerful candidate 
for an alliance with Britain, and the idea of an Anglo-Japanese alliance was specified 
further in October 1901. After meeting Tadasu Hayashi, the Japanese Minister in 
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London, Lansdowne prepared a rough draft of an agreement with Japan and asked 
Salisbury for his approval.
306
 Salisbury agreed with Lansdowne’s draft in general and it 
was circulated to the Cabinet on 5 November 1901.
307
 It stated that Britain should be 
neutral in ‘any war between Japan and one other Power’, and that she would be bound 
to help Japan if ‘the war involved two Powers against Japan’.308 This draft was not 
incompatible with Salisbury’s favoured limited agreement with Japan, which was 
confined to the defence of the coast of North China and Korea for the purpose of 
maintaining the status quo in the Far East.
309
 The majority of the Cabinet, including 
Salisbury, supported Lansdowne’s proposal of a regional arrangement with Japan.         
   In this context, and somewhat unusually, Balfour expressed strong opposition to 
both Salisbury and Lansdowne, criticising them for making ‘the perhaps rather hasty 
decision’ on a Japanese alliance. Concerned with the requirements of imperial defence, 
he was dissatisfied with the limited nature of the proposed Japanese alliance and 
favoured a fully-fledged alliance with Germany. In a detailed memorandum of 12 
December 1901 he insisted that Britain needed an ally because ‘a traditional policy of 
isolation’ was no longer successful. There were two candidates: the German-led Triple 
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Alliance or a Japanese alliance. If Britain reached an alliance with Japan, ‘we may find 
ourselves fighting for our existence in every part of the Globe against Russia and France, 
because France has joined forces with her ally over some obscure Russian-Japanese 
quarrel in Corea’. But, even in an Anglo-German alliance Britain would face the 
Franco-Russian combination all over the world, not only in the Far East but also in ‘the 
Channel, the Mediterranean, the frontier of India, and our great lines of commercial 
communication’. Balfour doubted whether Japan would be a useful partner in such a 
conflict.      
   Balfour’s strategic calculation was coolheaded. There was a hierarchy of British 
interests. ‘Our interests there [in the Eastern seas], including our interest in preserving 
Japan’, he observed, ‘are of course important, but they are not vital’. A Japanese alliance 
might drag Britain into a war with Russia and France over a matter in the Far East that 
was ‘indifferent to us’. On the other hand, to maintain the balance of power in Europe, 
Britain should protect Germany, Austria and Italy from ‘the hammer of Russia and the 
anvil of France’. Therefore, Balfour argued, fighting for the Central European powers 
was equal to ‘fighting for our own interests, and for those of civilisation, to an extent 
which cannot be alleged with regard to Japan’. His conclusion was that the British 
interests that a Japanese alliance would be intended to safeguard were less important 
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than those that a German alliance would protect.   
Balfour paid special attention to India. Its frontier was the ‘weakest spot in the 
empire’ and Britain would have to allocate vast military resources to protect it in a war 
with Russia. Thus a ‘quarrel with Russia anywhere, or about anything, means the 
invasion of India’. Balfour warned that if Britain had no allies, France would join 
Russia and Britain’s position in India would become more perilous. Restricted to the Far 
East, however, an Anglo-Japanese alliance would be totally useless in the defence of 
India, while Britain could expect the German-led Triple Alliance to support the fight for 
India against Russia efficiently. Moreover, cooperation with the Triple Alliance would 
probably deter France from ‘throwing in her lot with Russia’ due to her fear of a war 
with Germany. Unlike the limited cooperation proposed with Japan in the Far East, 
entering the German camp all over the world would bring valuable assistance to India’s 
defence that was vital to the British Empire. 
Apart from these strategic calculations there were some sentimental considerations 
at play between Britain and the powers of the Triple Alliance. While the leaders of the 
Triple Alliance were not necessarily reliable and British and German public opinion was 
sometimes hostile each other, Balfour argued that ‘none of us think that the Japanese are 
more to be relied upon than European governments’. This sentimental opposition was 
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too minor to justify abandoning the idea of an Anglo-German alliance. Taking a wide 
range of imperial problems beyond the Far East into consideration, Balfour concluded 
that ‘the dangers are less and the gains are greater from joining the triple alliance than 
would follow from pursuing a similar course with regard to Japan’.310 Balfour’s long 
memorandum demonstrated that his preference for an Anglo-German alliance remained 
strong even though other Cabinet members, including Lansdowne, had abandoned the 
idea of such a full-scale alliance.
311
 In addition, his strong interest in imperial defence, 
in particular the defence of India, enabled him to consider an Anglo-Japanese alliance 
from the global perspective. What Balfour desired was not a limited agreement for the 
purpose of maintaining the Far East but a comprehensive alliance that would protect the 
British Empire all over the world. To him, an Anglo-Japanese alliance was the former 
and was not acceptable.            
   Lansdowne defended the scheme of an Anglo-Japanese alliance. He saw the value of 
a Japanese alliance as lying in the limited regional nature that Balfour criticised. Thanks 
to its narrow application to the area of entanglement, an Anglo-Japanese alliance would 
have fewer ‘chances of the “casus foederis” arising’ than an Anglo-German alliance. 
Moreover, Britain should consider ‘whether we should allow Japan to be wiped out by 
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France and Russia’ in a war in the Far East. If the answer was no, Lansdowne observed, 
‘may we not as well tell her so beforehand and get what we can out of the bargain’.312 
Like Salisbury, Lansdowne preferred a limited agreement with Japan to a fully-fledged 
alliance with Germany. Although short and not specific, his argument contained a 
fundamental difference to Balfour’s on the significant question of whether Britain 
should protect Japan in a war with Russia. This question would reappear with the 
impending Russo-Japanese war. 
Balfour’s hope of an Anglo-German alliance ended on 19 December 1901 when 
Lansdowne discussed cooperation between Britain and Germany with Count Metternich, 
the new German Ambassador in London. Reiterating the history of negotiations 
between Britain and Germany, Lansdowne argued that Britain could not accept 
Germany’s proposal that she join the Triple Alliance. Instead, he suggested to 
Metternich ‘an understanding with regard to the policy which they might pursue in 
reference to particular questions or in particular parts of the world in which they were 
alike interested’. Metternich rejected this limited and flexible agreement, stating that the 
German government favoured ‘a case of “the whole or none”’.313 There was no 
compromise between Britain and Germany and this interview marked the end of 
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negotiations over an Anglo-German alliance. 
   Balfour had no choice but to accept an Anglo-Japanese alliance. The Cabinet 
discussion of 19 December 1901 revealed that there was no consensus about such an 
alliance; many ministers still desired that ‘the Japanese engagements should extend to 
India and Siam’.314 Sir Michael Hicks Beach, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was 
sceptical about the merits of an Anglo-Japanese alliance outweighing its financial cost, 
mentioning that ‘Balfour, who would have to defend it in the H[ouse] of C[ommons], 
and Chamberlain are inclined to the same opinion’.315 However, Balfour avoided 
expressing his strong opposition to an alliance with Japan. He probably realised that an 
Anglo-German alliance was no longer practicable and tried to maintain good relations 
with Salisbury, who did not completely reject the idea of an Anglo-Japanese alliance 
itself, although he pointed out its many dangers and the necessity for further 
negotiations.
316
 Thus the problem was not whether Britain should conclude an alliance 
with Japan but what the draft treaty should contain. On receiving a memorandum from 
Salisbury, Lansdowne accelerated the pace of negotiations for an Anglo-Japanese 
alliance.
317
 He hammered out the details of the draft treaty, intending to ‘meet the 
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Japanese desire for the special recognition of their interests in Corea, without at the 
same time giving too one sided an appearance to the article’.318 Although it was 
defensive and applied only to the Far East, Balfour finally agreed on the draft of the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance of 21 January 1902.
319
  
On 30 January the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed in London.
320
 As Leader of 
the House of Commons, Balfour had to defend it regardless of his own view of it. On 13 
February, he addressed in the Parliament: 
                  
I do not at all pretend that it [the Anglo-Japanese Agreement] is one of the 
ordinary, everyday diplomatic transactions between Power and Power. But the 
reasons for it seem to me to lie not in the secret archives of this or any other 
Foreign Office, but upon the broad facts and the large necessities of our interests 
and our policy in the Far East.
321
  
 
However, Balfour did not abandon his favour with the Anglo-German cooperation. ‘It 
seems to me so clear that’, Balfour told Selborne on 5 April 1902, ‘her [Germany’s] 
interests and ours are identical’. Therefore, he believed that Britain would not have to 
‘fear from Germany in the immediate future at all events’.322 In addition, he did not 
                                                   
318 Memo. by Lansdowne, 21 Jan. 1902, FO 46/563. 
319 Minutes by Balfour on Lansdowne’s memo. of 21 Jan. 1902, FO 46/563. 
320 For the final text, see “Anglo-Japanese Agreement, January 30, 1902”, BD Vol.2, No.125; Nish, 
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, pp. 216-217. 
321 Balfour, 13 Feb. 1902, Hansard: Series 4, House of Commons, vol. 102, col. 1294. 
322 Balfour to Selborne, 5 Apr. 1902, Selborne MSS, MS. Selborne 30. 
119 
 
lose sight of the significance of the imperial defence, repeating that Japan would not aid 
Britain in India under the Anglo-Japanese alliance.
323
 His concern would prove to be 
correct when he faced the dangers of the Russo-Japanese War as Prime Minister.       
 
III. 
 
As widely predicted, Balfour succeeded Salisbury as Prime Minister on 11 July 1902. In 
that role he established the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) in December 1902 to 
improve coordination between foreign and military policy. While Balfour attended CID 
meetings as its chairman, the bulk of the CID’s attention was dedicated to the defence of 
India. During Balfour’s premiership eighty-two meetings were held, over half of which 
(forty-three) were devoted to the defence of India.
324
 This was not surprising to Balfour, 
who regarded India as the ‘brightest jewel in the Imperial crown’, and argued that if 
India were successfully invaded, ‘the moral loss would be incalculable, the material loss 
would be important’.325 Thus on the subject of imperial defence he concluded that ‘the 
chief military problem which this country has to face is that of Indian, rather than Home, 
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Defence’.326 Since the Anglo-Japanese alliance applied only to the Far East, Britain was 
left to protect India unaided. In respect of the role of the British army, therefore, Balfour 
insisted that:  
 
our Regular Army does not exist principally for the defence of Great Britain, but 
almost entirely (1) for the defence of India, (2) the retention of South Africa, (3) 
conceivably (but only barely conceivably) for the defence of Canada, and (4) for 
the purpose of small expeditions against the Naval Stations and Colonies of other 
Powers.
327
     
    
Of these four purposes the defence of India was without doubt the most formidable, and 
here the Anglo-Japanese alliance proved to be of limited value. 
The main threat to India’s security was still Russia, and the rapid development of 
technology at the turn of the century made this threat more formidable. The advent of 
the railway realised Russia’s ambition to connect Moscow with India. It was forecast 
that the completion of the Orenburg-Tashkent Railway in around 1905 would strengthen 
Russia’s military position in Asia.328 The more troops Russia could transport to the 
border of India, the more difficult it would be for the government of India to deal with 
the Russian threat alone. The British government would have to send reinforcements, 
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but first it was necessary to know how many soldiers the Indian government would need 
in the event of a war with Russia. ‘The number of troops required by India’, Balfour 
remarked, ‘is the central element in the whole problem of Imperial Defence’.329 Britain 
had to calculate not only the number of troops but also the amount of finance necessary 
to despatch reinforcements to India, whose defence would throw ‘the greatest strain 
upon the Mother Country’. Balfour therefore thought that ‘the military relations of the 
two Governments, especially in the matter of finance, may have to be very carefully 
considered’.330  
Coordination and cooperation between London and Delhi was not easy. Each 
government complained about the other. Curzon had served as Viceroy of India since 
January 1899 and was frustrated at Britain’s cold attitude to India’s manpower and 
financial contribution to the British Empire.
331
 Balfour looked at the relationship 
between Britain and India from the opposite point of view. His impression was that 
‘India pays nothing for the Navy, without which Indian reinforcements could not be sent, 
and but little for an Army which exists chiefly on her behalf’.332 It was difficult to 
bridge this perception gap and divergences between the two arose easily and often, 
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making British foreign and military policy towards India more difficult.
333
         
Defending India from the Russian threat was a problem that went beyond the 
geographical limits of India itself. The focal points were Afghanistan and Persia because 
these two neighbouring countries would form the front line against a possible Russian 
advance to India. They were often called the ‘North West Frontier of India’, and many 
British policy-makers deemed them a ‘bogey’.334 This phenomenon was not new: 
Afghanistan and Persia had been the stage for the Great Game between Britain and 
Russia since the early nineteenth century, but the development of the railway had turned 
the international situation in Russia’s favour because she could now deploy her 
abundant manpower in Central Asia. Britain could not escape this adverse change. 
Balfour had to undertake a review of British policy towards Afghanistan and Persia in 
order to tackle the growing Russian threat in these countries.    
   Balfour advocated a drastic change of British policy regarding Afghanistan. 
Originally he had been ‘a good deal disquieted about Afghanistan’ and was not satisfied 
with the British position there.
335
 ‘The “Alpha and Omega” of our policy for the last 
thirty years’, Lord George Hamilton stated, ‘has been to try and secure the cooperation 
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of the Afghans in the event of a collision with Russia’.336 Britain had been giving 
money, arms and advice to the Amir, the ruler of Afghanistan, to retain Afghanistan as a 
buffer state against Russia. But Balfour criticised this traditional policy as ‘utterly 
unsatisfactory’.337 Abdul Rahman Khan, the late Amir, had obtained guns and subsidies 
from Britain and had succeeded in consolidating his own regime and army. However, he 
did not accept Britain’s advice easily and resisted her activities in Afghanistan. As a 
result, contrary to Britain’s objective, Afghanistan had become neither friendly nor 
dependent. On 16 December 1902 Balfour remarked: 
 
Nor, so far as I can see, do we possess any means of exercising the smallest 
influence over Afghanistan except by refusing subsidies which are apparently not 
desired: by stopping the import of arms with which the country is already gorged, 
and which may, in any case, be got in from the West almost as easily as from the 
East, or by threatening war.
338
  
 
The invasion of Afghanistan would not be easy. The Amir’s army was already equipped 
with modern rifles, and Britain would have to expend many lives and much money to 
defeat it.   
   Balfour’s solution was that Britain should abandon her traditional policy peacefully 
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and make a ‘direct arrangement with Russia, to maintain the status quo’.339 When 
Habibullah Khan, the son of Abdul Rahman Khan, had succeeded the Amir in October 
1901, Afghanistan was not united and many tribes would not obey him. Balfour 
believed that such a state was ‘ill-fitted to act as an effective dyke against Russian 
expansion’ because Russia could easily obtain support from anti-Amir tribes. Against 
the background of Russia’s unlimited troops, Balfour concluded on 30 April 1903:   
 
Afghanistan is not merely, perhaps not chiefly, valuable to us as a “Buffer State” 
– a State prepared to take the first brunt of aggression. It is also valuable because, 
in its present condition, and so long as it possesses few roads, and no railways, it 
will be impossible for Russia to make effective use of her great numerical 
superiority at any point immediately vital to the Empire.
340
            
 
If Russia could break through Afghanistan easily, modernising and strengthening it 
with military and financial assistance would be harmful rather than useful. It was better 
that Afghanistan remained a wasteland, preventing Russia from taking advantage of it as 
a forward base from which to attack India. Balfour proposed ending Britain’s 
commitment to Afghanistan. Balfour calculated that if the Amir had to face the Russian 
threat alone, he would become ‘more malleable’ and would ask Britain to help him, 
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making their common defence against Russia easier.
341
  
   On the other hand, the possibility of a direct agreement with Russia over 
Afghanistan had been gradually emerging since December 1902. A war against Russia 
was out of the question; Britain was suffering from a budget deficit due to the Boer War 
and naval shipbuilding and could not endure the enormous cost of such a war.
342
 A 
diplomatic solution was not only desirable but also necessary for Britain from the 
financial point of view. Russia was showing a positive attitude to a peaceful 
arrangement with Britain over Central Asia. Count Aleksandr Benckendorff, Russian 
Minister to Denmark and ambassador-designate to Britain, had unofficial talks about 
Afghanistan with Sir Charles Scott, British ambassador to Russia.
343
 Furthermore, the 
Russian Foreign Office published a statement that Russia had no intention of 
confronting Britain.
344
 This attitude on Russia’s part gave Lansdowne the optimistic 
view that Britain could conclude an acceptable agreement with her over Afghanistan.
345
 
Supporting negotiations with Russia, Balfour reported to the King that ‘some modus 
vivendi ... would diminish this perpetual friction between the two Powers [Britain and 
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Russia] in Central Asia’.346 Lansdowne’s optimism continued, and in April 1903 he 
informed Balfour: ‘I don’t despair of finding a reasonable solution of the Russo-Afghan 
difficulty, and perhaps of other tiresome questions which concern Russia & us’.347     
In relation to Afghanistan, British policy towards Tibet was essential to Balfour. Yet 
in discussion about Tibet there was a clear division of opinion on the Russian threat 
between the British Cabinet and the Government of India. Early in 1903 Russia tried to 
send her consul to the Tibetan capital, Lhasa. Curzon worried that Russia wanted to 
expand her sphere of influence in Tibet and suggested forestalling her advance by 
despatching a similar mission with an expeditionary force. Curzon did not hesitate to 
take the military option because he found it hard to believe in the possibility of a 
peaceful settlement with Russia over India and its adjacent regions. Russia could break 
any agreement ‘precisely when she chooses’, so Curzon argued that Britain should not 
rely on a direct agreement with her.
348
 Although Balfour agreed that it would be highly 
inexpedient to ‘permit the Russians to obtain a commanding or exclusive position at 
Lassa’, he refused Curzon’s request, fearing that irritating Russia unnecessarily over 
Tibet would ruin the possibility of an agreement with her over Central Asia. In the end 
he instructed Lansdowne to inform Russia that ‘if the Russians sent an agent to Lhasa, 
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we should assuredly send one too’, in which case it would be necessary for the British 
agent to be ‘accompanied by a large armed escort’.349               
   Given Tibet’s geographical location between India and China, it was impossible to 
avoid considering the influence of British policy regarding Tibet on the international 
situation in the Far East. Balfour calculated that it was not necessary for Britain to 
expand her territory in the Far East and that she should concentrate on strengthening her 
existing domains and maintaining the status quo in the region. In addition, Tibet was 
under the suzerainty of the Chinese Empire, so Britain securing a sphere of influence in 
Tibet through military means would be against the principle of British diplomacy 
towards China, namely the Open Door. On 28 October 1903, Balfour told St. John 
Brodrick, Hamilton’s successor as Secretary of State for India:    
    
I strongly deprecate permanent entanglements in Tibet, partly because I think we 
have as much on our hands as we can look after, partly because if we 
“Manchurianize” [i.e. establish a de facto protectorate] what is technically a part 
of the Chinese Empire, we may greatly weaken our diplomacy in the Far East.
350
 
 
At that time Manchuria was the stage for a confrontation between Russia and Japan. 
Balfour already had misgivings that the Russo-Japanese negotiations would fail and the 
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confrontation between the two would spiral out of control. If a Russo-Japanese war 
broke out, ‘any complications in Tibet, even on the small scale suggested by the Viceroy, 
might prove exceedingly embarrassing’, because even such a quarrel could easily drag 
Britain into outright war against Russia.
351
 For these reasons ‘the “forward” policy of 
the Indian Government’ towards Tibet was not acceptable from the viewpoint of the Far 
Eastern politics.
352
             
The fundamental principle of Balfour’s policy towards Persia was quite simple: 
‘until Russia moves we remain still; as soon as Russia moves in the north we move in 
the south’.353 The purpose of this principle was ‘the maintenance of the status quo; and, 
in case of the status quo being disturbed, to prevent any other Power establishing its 
supremacy in the Persian Gulf, or in Southern Persia’. Russia’s historic aim was ‘access 
to the sea as extensive and as free as possible – on the east, China; on the west, Persia; 
to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea’.354 Yet Russia’s relentless attempt to achieve 
this goal was resisted by many great powers: in Turkey, Britain and Germany blocked a 
Russian bid to dominate the Turkish Straits, and in China, the Anglo-Japanese alliance 
checked her southward advance. Persia was the only remaining possibility, and it was 
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likely that Russia would direct her spearhead there. Britain could not abandon her own 
right and position of ascendancy ‘not only of the Persian Gulf, but of the Southern 
provinces of Persia, and those provinces which border on our Indian Empire’.355 Thus 
Balfour authorised Lansdowne to issue the following statement in the House of Lords 
on 5 May 1903, showing Britain’s intention not to surrender to Russian pressure in 
Persia by stating the principle of her policy in Parliament: 
 
I say it without hesitation – we should regard the establishment of a naval base, 
or of a fortified port, in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave 
menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it with all the means at 
our disposal.
356
   
 
   However, Balfour was concerned that even if the principle itself was simple, ‘the 
application of the principle is not so simple’.357 With regard to the countermove in 
southern Persia, if Britain were satisfied with occupying the ports on the Persian Gulf, 
this could be easily achieved with a small British fleet. But if she also wanted to 
advance inland, she would have to consider awkward questions: how many troops 
would she need, and where would she find them? Therefore not only civilian 
departments such as the Foreign Office but also the Admiralty and the War Office 
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attended an interdepartmental conference to discuss the many questions relating to 
Persia.
358
 Although he did not rule out utilising the Army and the Navy, Balfour 
advocated that ‘even the smallest appearance of military activity on our part, whether 
by way of massing ships or otherwise, should follow, not precede, any threatening 
language or movement on the part of Russia’. The reason Balfour was passive was that 
he believed that ‘at all events, there would be no question of a war with Russia’.359  
However, British policymakers considered the possibility of a war with Russia in 
October and November 1902, repeating the argument that Balfour had presented just 
before the signing of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. ‘War with Russia’, Assistant 
Quartermaster-General Lt. General E.A. Altham stated, ‘would almost certainly involve 
also war with France’. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was limited to the Far East and 
Britain could not expect to obtain Japanese support in a war with Russia over Persia. 
Therefore, she had to face the question of whether she could ‘fight single-handed 
against the [Franco-Russian] Dual Alliance?’ Against the background of her limited 
military resources, Altham concluded that a war against Russia and France would 
plunge Britain into ‘a period of humiliating disasters, from which recovery will be most 
difficult’. Yet from the viewpoint of the Indian defence, Britain could not let Russia 
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absorb Persia. The only remaining option was to conclude a ‘mutual understanding 
between Germany and Great Britain as to Asia Minor and Persia’ to checkmate Russia 
without risking a war.
360
 Major-General W.G. Nicholson, the Director of Military 
Intelligence, supported an agreement with Germany.
361
 In the end, however, this 
proposal was abandoned due to the negative opinions of Field Marshal Sir Frederick 
Roberts and Brodrick, the Secretary of State for War.
362
                                      
   Seistan, on the border with Afghanistan, occupied a special position in Southern 
Persia. It provided a route into India without crossing through Afghanistan, so Britain 
had to prevent Russia from utilising it as a base for her operations against India. Thus, 
although the Government of India saw building a railway from India to Seistan as 
essential to the expansion of British trade, Balfour opposed a railway from the military 
point of view.
363
 Once the railway was completed, if Russia succeeded in capturing 
Seistan, she could use it to connect Northern Persia to India and concentrate many more 
troops to invade India. This was the worst-case scenario, but Balfour could not ignore 
the possibility of disaster. As in Afghanistan, he favoured ‘an agreement with Russia’ to 
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defer all railway-building in Seistan.
364
 In sum, his main purpose was ‘the maintenance 
of the status quo in Seistan’ from the point of view of Indian defence.365 Curzon and 
Field Marshal Viscount Kitchener of Khartoum, Commander-in-Chief of India, accepted 
Balfour’s opposition but left an ominous prediction in their memorandum: ‘Matters 
move so rapidly in the East, that in a few years from now we might find that our present 
opinion was out of date’.366                     
This prediction proved true, but the trigger for the rapid change was not India but 
the Far East. The confrontation between Japan and Russia over Korea and Manchuria 
had gradually been intensifying since April 1903.
367
 The growing rivalry between Japan 
and Russia presented both opportunities and risks for Britain. Japan sought a so-called 
‘Manchuria-Korea exchange’ deal with Russia, with Japan taking Korea and Russia 
obtaining Manchuria.
368
 Britain feared that Japan and Russia were trying to create a 
sphere of influence for one another in Korea and Manchuria, which was not compatible 
with the Anglo-Japanese alliance because the independence and territorial integrity of 
China and Korea would be violated. Thus, although Britain did not clearly oppose the 
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Russo-Japanese negotiations, she warned Japan that negotiations with Russia ‘should 
not be conducted in a manner which might suggest that the Anglo-Japanese Agreement 
had been in any way impaired’.369 In August 1903 Japan proposed a Manchuria-Korea 
exchange deal to Russia, only to be rebuffed by her.
370
 As the negotiations reached 
deadlock and the confrontation grew, the possibility of an unsound Russo-Japanese 
agreement retreated. Instead, however, the possibility of the outbreak of a 
Russo-Japanese war loomed. Britain had to consider her policy regarding Russia and 
Japan, taking into account a possible war in the Far East.                  
Meanwhile the issue of Chilean warships tested Britain’s attitude towards Russia 
and Japan in October 1903. Chile had placed an order for two battleships with British 
yards, but had then had to sell them on the market. Britain wanted Japan to obtain them, 
so Lansdowne proposed guaranteeing a loan to facilitate this with the aim of 
strengthening the Japanese and to ‘“clinch” their friendship to us’. Moreover, 
Lansdowne expected that Britain’s support for Japan might encourage Russia to soften 
her attitude, and bring about ‘a frank understanding between us as to Manchuria, Thibet, 
Afghanistan, Persia &c’.371 At first Balfour supported the idea of cooperating with 
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Japan to change Russia’s attitude towards Britain.372 Lansdowne showed his sympathy 
for Japan and the connection between Far Eastern politics and the Indian defence. The 
Russian threat to the British Empire was directed at not only the Far East but also India, 
and thus, Britain’s policy towards Russia in the Far East inevitably affected the defence 
of India. British policymakers could not ignore this essential connection and had to 
consider a Russo-Japanese conflict from a perspective beyond Far Eastern politics.            
However, Japan’s slow and wavering reaction forced Britain to make another choice. 
Although the Earl of Selborne was constantly urging the Japanese government to buy 
the Chilean battleships, her offer was no higher than Russia’s. If Russia obtained the 
warships, ‘the balance of naval power in the Far East will be seriously modified’. 
Fearing a change in Russia’s favour, Balfour discussed whether Britain should buy them 
instead, even though this would increase the budget deficit.
373
 Receiving support from 
the King and realising that the ‘Japanese regard Russian purchase without alarm’, 
Balfour decided to make an offer to the Chilean government on 30 November 1903 and 
bought the battleships for Britian.
374
 Nevertheless, Japan then proposed to purchase 
them from Britain on 17 December 1903. Lansdowne rejected her offer because Russia 
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would deem the transfer of the warships from Britain to Japan as ‘a distinct declaration 
of hostility’.375 Balfour’s view of Japan was harsh. He criticised her reaction and 
claimed that ‘dilatoriness is hardly a sufficient explanation of a course of inaction which, 
as far as I can see, makes their position, either as negotiators or as combatants, almost 
hopeless, unless they secure an ally’.376 Unlike Lansdowne, Balfour showed neither 
support nor sympathy for Japan. On 22 December 1903, he told Lansdowne that:  
 
We must, I take it, be most careful not to give any advice to the Japs to which, in 
case of war, they might point and say “you must help us, for it was through 
following your lead that we find ourselves in this mess”!377  
           
   A war in the Far East appeared inevitable now. British politicians had been 
discussing such a scenario and its possible ramifications since the summer of 1903. On 
27 August 1903 Sir Ernest Satow, the Minister to China, warned that Russia was likely 
to win the war, and would ‘become the dominant Power in this part of the world, and 
will swallow up at that all of northern China’. He found this outcome unacceptable 
because ‘if Russia is victorious over Japan then, though we shall not have lost a ship or 
a man, we shall be powerless in the Far East’.378 Satow was known for his anti-Russian 
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tendency, but not all British policy-makers agreed with his opinion.
379
 There was a 
consensus in the British government that Russia would win the war, so which country 
would be victorious was not the main topic of discussion. Rather British policy-makers 
focused on the danger that a Russo-Japanese conflict in the Far East might turn into a 
war between the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the Franco-Russian Dual Alliance. On 11 
December 1903, Balfour warned the King that: 
 
a war between Russia and Japan might draw us in: and that if we were drawn in 
France might find it difficult to keep out in the face of her treaty obligations. It 
was impossible to contemplate anything at once so horrible and so absurd as a 
general war brought on by Russia’s impracticable attitude in Manchuria.380   
                   
A general war with France and Russia would not be restricted to the Far East: it might 
expand to India, Africa and Europe. But as Austen Chamberlain, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, noted, it would be impossible for Britain to ‘finance a great war, except at 
an absolutely ruinous cost’ in the present financial conditions.381 Britain needed to 
arrest any escalation of such a war by all means.  
Balfour dealt actively with this dangerous situation. He asked the intelligence 
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departments of the Navy and Army for a rough estimate of the expected naval and 
military operations in the event of a Russo-Japanese war breaking out.
382
 However, he 
had already analysed the power relations between Japan and Russia and his estimate of 
Japan’s naval and military capacity was gloomy. He could not ‘for the life of me see 
how, unaided by some other naval power, the Japanese are to land any effective force in 
Corea or Manchuria’. Balfour had no choice but to conclude that ‘both diplomatically 
and strategically they [the Japanese] are in a very helpless position’.383 Neither did he 
consider Russia’s naval power in the Far East sufficient for her to attack Japan itself 
directly, but he remarked that with her abundant soldiers Russia could easily overrun 
Korea, which Japan had always regarded as ‘a “vital interest”’.384        
   At the same time, the British Cabinet discussed how Britain should tackle a 
Russo-Japanese conflict in the Far East to avoid a disastrous war with France and 
Russia.
385
 This discussion clearly revealed a division in the Cabinet. Selborne and 
Austen Chamberlain sent a letter to Lansdowne, and the debate began on 21 December 
1903. Selborne was ‘very anxious about the Far East’ and insisted that Britain could not 
‘afford to see Japan smashed by Russia’. As an early advocate of the Anglo-Japanese 
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alliance, Selborne could not endure the idea that Japan’s defeat would also wreck his 
policy. Moreover, he was worried that ‘our intervention might also entail that of France, 
and we and France might be driven into war, an appalling calamity!!’ Selborne’s 
solution was to cooperate with France in applying joint pressure on Russia to prevent 
the outbreak of a war. Japan favoured this diplomatic option. By acknowledging Japan’s 
‘special and exclusive interest in Corea and ... her treaty rights in Manchuria’, Britain 
would prepare to prevent the destruction of Japan, and France would not support Russia 
in resisting ‘so reasonable a proposal’. Selborne concluded that this Anglo-French 
combination would deter Russia and ‘surely there will not be war’.386           
   Austen Chamberlain was more robust, and pondered the Far Eastern situation from a 
global perspective. He regarded a Russo-Japanese war as ‘the moment for securing 
whatever we require as a guarantee for our future security in Seistan and in the Persian 
Gulf, and generally for settling all outstanding questions with Persia’. This perception 
was based on his fear that if Russia beat Japan and was free of the dispute in the Far 
East, her inclination to negotiate a settlement of outstanding questions with Britain 
would evaporate. Thus Chamberlain insisted that Britain should take advantage of 
Russia’s preoccupation and embarrassments to strengthen her position against Russia. 
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He suggested that the British policy elites should ‘take a leaf out of the notebook of 
German diplomacy, and for once play a selfish but national game’.387      
   Lansdowne was inclined to support Selborne rather than Chamberlain, but his policy 
was to put Anglo-French-American pressure on both Russia and Japan to avoid the 
outbreak of a war. Like Selborne, Lansdowne considered that Britain should not ‘allow 
Japan to be invaded’, and must ‘leave no stone unturned’ in preventing a 
Russo-Japanese war. Lansdowne preferred more neutral mediation to that of Selborne 
and expected that America might take the initiative in this. First, Britain, France and 
perhaps America should persuade Russia to draw up an agreement over Manchuria 
which Japan could accept. Then they would ‘tell the Japanese distinctly that they must 
be content with the best bargain they can get as to Korea’.388  Unlike Selborne, 
Lansdowne did not hesitate to urge Japan to moderate her demands. But he was more 
sympathetic to Japan than Chamberlain and was trying to save her from possible ruin by 
preventing war.                     
   Balfour was not convinced by Lansdowne’s argument and sided with Chamberlain’s 
neo-Bismarckian diplomacy.
389
 He was sceptical about the likelihood of Japan being 
invaded and devastated by Russia. According to his calculations, Russia’s naval forces 
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in the Far East would be superior to those of Japan, so she would be able to prevent 
Japanese troops landing in Korea. Yet Russia would not be strong enough to invade 
Japan directly. Balfour envisaged that a Russo-Japanese war ‘would not “smash” Japan 
in the sense of wiping it out as a military Power’. If Japan were not crushed under any 
circumstances, Britain ‘should let her work out her own salvation in her own way’. To 
Balfour, Lansdowne’s mediation plan would force Japan to moderate her demands, 
offend the sentiments of the Japanese people and create antagonism against Britain.
390
 
He concluded that Britain should not mediate a conflict between Japan and Russia 
which would be likely to result in stalemate. 
   The stalemate would benefit Britain. Balfour predicted that Russia would occupy 
the Korean Peninsula, but that this new territory would be ‘a new and very heavy 
burden upon Russian finance’. While Britain cared little for Korea, Japan saw it as a 
vital interest and would therefore try to recover it by any means, so Russia would have 
to concentrate her army and navy in the Far East for a long time. This would weaken the 
Russian military threat to other regions, in particular India. British mediation would not 
only hinder these favourable conditions but also strengthen Russia’s position against 
Japan in the Far East. Balfour observed that Britain should not interfere in a 
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Russo-Japanese conflict; this would be possible because the Anglo-Japanese alliance 
only required Britain ‘to “keep the ring”’ in a war against just one belligerent. Although 
Balfour detested ‘all war, and on general principles would always try to stop it’, a 
Russo-Japanese war was exceptional. ‘Both “before, during and after” its outbreak’, he 
stated, ‘it is likely to do wonders in making Russia amenable to sweet reason’.391 There 
was no reason to prevent such an advantageous war, so Britain should stay her hand.                             
   Balfour’s policy towards a Far Eastern war was based on his serious consideration 
of Russia as a threat to the British Empire not only in the Far East but also in India and 
Central Asia. In his draft memorandum of 21 December 1903 he often referred to 
Central Asia and India, even when discussing Far Eastern politics, clearly demonstrating 
that he considered Britain’s policy on a Russo-Japanese conflict in a global and imperial 
rather than a regional context. He was pessimistic about reaching a permanent 
agreement with Russia over Central Asia and the Far East. Yet, however momentary, 
temporary arrangements would be better than nothing, because ‘they smooth things for 
the time being’. Furthermore, Balfour realised the difficulty of negotiating with Russia 
over Asia. The purpose of British policy in Asia was not to gain new territory but to 
make her existing possessions secure. However, Russia was aiming at ‘pressing forward 
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Eastward and Southward’, and Balfour feared that Russian politicians believed that ‘if 
she could secure a position of strategical superiority along our Indian frontier we should 
be so much afraid of her in Asia as to be her very humble servant in Europe’. The 
difference in the two countries’ objectives made bargaining difficult. Britain could not 
react to Russia’s encroachment of China, Persia and Afghanistan by expanding her own 
territory. An aggressive and expansive policy would add to Russia’s strength but weaken 
Britain’s strategic position. Even with this gloomy forecast, Balfour did not abandon 
hope for a temporary agreement with Russia. However, he expressed the reservation 
that if Russia broke ‘certain well-defined principles (e.g. the integrity of Afghanistan)’, 
Britain should regard such behaviour as a casus belli. According to Balfour, these were 
‘the only principles governing our relations in Asia which are likely to be permanently 
observed’. As he indicated, it would not be easy to formulate these principles.392 But at 
least, the integrity of Afghanistan, which was vital to the defence of India, was the basis 
of his policy towards Russia in Asia, including the Far East.  
   Balfour’s policy faced fierce opposition from his ministerial colleagues. Although 
Selborne agreed that Britain should not force Japan to abate her demands, he insisted 
that Balfour’s argument had ‘a fatal flaw’. Selborne’s counter-memorandum of 24 
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December 1903 revealed that the problem was not whether Japan was invaded directly 
but whether the Japanese navy would survive a war with Russia. If war broke out, 
Russia would occupy Korea and fortify the port of Masampho in southern Korea. Japan 
would resist this by all means possible, including fleet action, because Russia’s control 
of Korea would be ‘a question of life and death’ for Japan. Russia could defeat Japan’s 
navy with reinforcements of warships from the Mediterranean and cause ‘the 
disappearance of the Japanese battle fleet’. Britain could not accept this possibility 
which ‘would inevitably entail increased naval expenditure on our part’, so Selborne 
concluded that Britain could not allow Japan to be crushed at sea.
393
            
   Lansdowne also opposed Balfour’s policy, expatiating Selborne’s argument. The 
Foreign Secretary’s estimate of Japan’s naval power was more favourable than 
Selborne’s; he argued that Japan would be able to send her expeditionary forces to 
Korea and occupy Masampho for some time. However, by the autumn of 1904 Russia 
would dominate the situation and ‘might impose terms on Japan which would wipe the 
latter out as a military power, and obliterate her fleet’, which could render Japan ‘an 
almost negligible factor in Far Eastern politics’, and this disadvantage would outweigh 
any advantages accrued from Russia’s possible entanglement in the Far East. 
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Lansdowne summed up the three risks involved in a Russo-Japanese war: 
 
1. The possibility that our ally may be crushed.  
2. The possibility that we ourselves may become implicated, not on account of 
our Treaty engagement to Japan, but because the British public will not sit still 
while the crushing is being done.  
3. The aggravation of our present financial difficulties, already grave enough.
394
  
 
For these reasons, Lansdowne wanted Britain to play the role of mediator to avert a 
Russo-Japanese war. He advocated a multilateral arrangement with all the powers that 
had interests in Manchuria, to maintain the status quo. 
   Lansdowne’s proposal was countered by Austen Chamberlain. The Chancellor 
expressed doubt about the utility of such a mediation based on the same logic as 
Balfour’s. If, as Lansdowne observed, Japan possessed naval predominance at the 
present moment and Russia would dominate the situation a year later, Japan should fight 
at once before she lost her favourable position. Chamberlain summarised Japan’s 
feeling: ‘Now is her time to secure herself’. Under the circumstances, Britain’s 
unsought-for intervention would incur ‘a great responsibility, and probably great distrust 
and ill-will on the part of the Japanese people’. Chamberlain was also loath to accept 
Lansdowne’s multilateral arrangements because he did not want Britain to ‘take any 
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responsibility towards Japan for its due observance’.395  Chamberlain did not put 
forward a policy of his own, but his opposition to Lansdowne resulted in support for 
Balfour.             
   Lansdowne and Selborne’s opposition could not shake Balfour’s confidence. On 26 
December 1903 he replied to Lansdowne that Russia could not invade Japan, that Japan 
would not ‘be crushed’ and that British public opinion would not require the 
government to go to war.
396
 In his answer to Selborne he pointed out a fundamental 
flaw in the Anglo-Japanese alliance: if it required Britain to enter a war to support Japan 
at any time, it would be ‘absurdly one-sided’. Under the term of the alliance, Japan was 
not obliged to help Britain to ‘prevent Amsterdam falling into the hands of the French, 
or Holland falling into the hands of the Germans’. More importantly, Japan would not 
‘involve herself in any quarrel we might have over the north-west frontier of India’. 
This was a repetition of his strong opposition to an alliance with Japan in December 
1901. Furthermore, Balfour reminded Selborne that ‘though Russia’s resources in men 
are unlimited, her resources in money are not’; the expenditure of her financial 
resources in the Far East would render her impotent everywhere else. With regard to 
Russia’s naval power, even if Japan were defeated in a naval battle and her battle fleet 
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was lost, ‘Russia could not come out of it unscathed’. Balfour believed that a 
Russo-Japanese war ‘would render Russia innocuous for some little time to come’, so 
Britain should not prevent the war through unnecessary mediation.
397
  
Balfour’s letter to the King of 28 December 1903 also demonstrated that his views 
were unchanged. He stressed that Britain was ‘under no treaty obligations to fight 
unless France joins Russia against Japan’ and that France would ‘not join Russia unless 
we first join Japan’. Britain would enter a war only if Russia was about to crush Japan, 
but this contingency was ‘exceedingly improbable’. A war between Japan and Russia in 
which Britain did not intervene, would not be ‘an unmixed curse’ because it would 
weaken Russia’s financial and military capabilities. As a result, Balfour remarked, 
Russia ‘would be much easier to deal with, both in Asia and in Europe, than she is at 
present’. On the other hand, British mediation would hurt the feelings of the Japanese 
people and lead them to regard the British as ‘false friends who were really backing up 
Russia’. This would diminish the value of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and Britain 
‘should lose Japan in trying to save it’.398           
Balfour concluded the discussions with a lengthy memorandum on 29 December. 
He declared that under the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Britain did not assume moral 
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obligations that exceeded her legal ones. Therefore every demand made of Britain 
beyond the latter ‘should be considered solely in the light of British interests, present 
and future’. If Japan were ‘crushed’ and reduced to ‘a position of military impotence’, 
this would be contrary to British interests. Balfour, however, insisted that the chance of 
such a situation was ‘none’. Although Russia could overrun Korea, Japan would not be 
directly invaded. Britain should consider whether ‘Russia, as a world Power, would be 
stronger all along the vast line of her frontier, from the Baltic to Vladivostock, if she 
added Corea to her dominions’. Balfour believed that the occupation of Korea would 
drain Russia of her financial resources, invite Japan’s bid to retake Korea, and force 
Russia to concentrate her army and navy in the Far East to prepare for Japan’s 
retribution. On the other hand, British intervention would bring France into the Russian 
camp, and a Russo-Japanese war would become ‘a world-wide war’. Balfour worried 
that only Germany would benefit from such an unexampled calamity. 
   As stated above, Balfour did not limit his analysis to the Far East. This was because 
Russia’s threat to the British Empire was not only in the Far East but also in Europe and 
India. He argued that Britain should fear Russia chiefly as ‘(a) the ally of France; (b) the 
invader of India; (c) the dominating influence in Persia; and (d) the possible disturber of 
European peace’. Even if she won a war in the Far East, Russia would be not stronger 
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but weaker from these four perspectives. As a result, a Franco-Russian combination 
against Britain would not operate well in Europe and India. Furthermore, Balfour 
expected that Russia’s ‘whole diplomacy, from the Black Sea to the Oxus, might be 
weakened into something distantly resembling sweet reasonableness’. Resting on ‘a 
cool calculation of national interests’, Balfour concluded that Britain should maintain 
strict neutrality and allow Japan to fight the war alone.
399
 He did not modify his 
strategic calculations and kept to the same argument and policy from the beginning to 
the end of the discussion.     
Lansdowne and Selborne were not yet convinced by Balfour’s argument. Both of 
them had gloomier expectations of a war between Russia and Japan. Although 
Lansdowne agreed that Russia’s occupation of Korea would not strengthen her position 
against Britain all over the world, he had more misgivings than Balfour did about ‘a 
serious defeat of Japan by Russia’. That defeat would deprive Japan of ‘her position as a 
naval Power in Far Eastern waters and of her value as an ally’.400 Thus, he desired to 
avert a Russo-Japanese war. Selborne was also concerned about the destruction of 
Japan’s naval power in the war, the consequence of which would be ‘a disturbance of 
the present balance of naval power wholly to our disadvantage’. Furthermore, Selborne 
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predicted that a decisive defeat would cause Japan to abandon the idea of revenge 
against Russia and try to seek a peaceful agreement with her for the purpose of 
‘enjoying her friendship & patronage’.401 Selborne insisted that Britain should prevent 
the war by mediation. However, Balfour obtained the King’s assent and pushed his own 
opinion through as official British policy.
402
           
Once the discussion ended, Balfour immediately put his policy into practice. As 
Lansdowne noted, Japan had been so concerned about her lack of financial resources 
that she had asked Britain for financial assistance just before the outbreak of the war.
403
 
But Balfour had rejected this request because guaranteeing a war loan to Japan was ‘as 
near as possible an “act of war”’ against Russia. Moreover, if Britain were dragged into 
the war, she would have to use ‘every shilling of credit’ for herself.404 As representative 
of the Treasury, Austen Chamberlain shared Balfour’s strong opposition to a financial 
loan to Japan and the Japanese government had to seek a private loan without the 
guarantee of the British government. Not only attempting to maintain neutrality but also 
taking the worst case scenario into consideration, Balfour could not offer financial 
assistance to her ally.    
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The CID was a crucial institution for the implementation of Balfour’s policy. On 4 
January 1904 Balfour convened a meeting of the CID to discuss British action in a 
conflict between Japan and Russia in the Far East. The Prime Minister had received 
military intelligence reports from the War Office. Assistant Quartermaster-General Lt. 
General E.A. Altham agreed that Britain could maintain neutrality during a 
Russo-Japanese war, but emphasised the importance of preparatory measures in case of 
her becoming involved in the war. His proposed measures covered a wide range of 
points including transportation routes and supplies, but the main concern was sending 
reinforcements to India to defend her from the Russian threat.
405
 General Sir Henry 
Brackenbury, the Director General of Ordnance, took the same line, advocating the 
despatch of a small British force from South Africa to Singapore or Hong Kong.
406
 On 
receiving this military intelligence, Balfour concluded that Britain ‘could take no action 
at the present moment in the direction of a threat to Russia or a guarantee to Japan’. 
However, he did not approve all the preparatory measures suggested by the War Office 
and refused to send British troops to the Far East.
407
 After a long and controversial 
discussion, Britain decided to adopted strict neutrality in the event of a Russo-Japanese 
conflict. 
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  IV. 
 
Following the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War on 8 February 1904, Balfour’s 
concern about the defence of India remained strong. He predicted that the outcome of 
the war would be advantageous in terms of the defence of India. However, this did not 
mean that Britain did not have to consider India during the war. Receiving information 
from Meshed in north-eastern Persia that Russia was saving munitions for her troops on 
2 March 1904, Balfour stressed the need for careful preparation for any possible war 
with Russia.
408
 As his telegram to Lord Roberts showed, Balfour regarded India as ‘the 
weakest spot in our Imperial armour’.409 Even if Russia fought in the Far East, she 
might take advantage of the threat to India to extract diplomatic concessions from 
Britain.
410
 Thus Lord Roberts was asked to consider measures to ‘meet possible 
demonstrations on her [Russia’s] part towards India in the near future, as an outcome of 
the present conditions in the Far East’.411 British policymakers had to observe the 
progress of the war in the Far East relating to the situation in India.        
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   The front line in the defence of India was still the north-western frontier. Balfour’s 
doubts as to the value of Afghanistan as a buffer state did not change with the outbreak 
of the Russo-Japanese War. On 24 March 1904, he emphasised the need to consider 
Britain’s strategic policy if ‘the Afghans were to join the Russians’.412 In accordance 
with traditional policy Britain should continue to subsidise the present Amir to 
strengthen his army to fight Russia. But Balfour’s opinion was ‘quite the other way’. He 
insisted that: 
 
Afghanistan is invaluable to us as a defence against Russia, not because the 
Afghans are a warlike and independent people, who could be counted upon to 
give us effectual aid against the invader, but because Afghanistan, as it now is, 
presents most formidable obstacles to an attack on the Indian frontier, by reason 
of the absence of roads, railways, food-stuffs, and transport animals, in addition 
to the natural defences presented by the conformation of the country.
413
 
 
If Afghanistan became formidable, the Amir would take advantage of the threat to throw 
in his lot with Russia in order to extract further subsidies from Britain. However, if 
Afghanistan were still weak, faced with the threat of war with Russia, he would have no 
choice but to cooperate with Britain. Therefore, Balfour concluded, Britain should ‘give 
up the hope of turning Afghanistan into a powerful ally’, and avoid ‘the fear that she 
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may prove a powerful enemy’.414     
Colonel George Clarke, the secretary to the CID, supported Balfour’s idea. Clarke 
paid more attention to the Afghan tribesmen than to the Amir. In contrast to earlier 
periods, many tribesmen could now obtain large quantities of arms and ammunition. 
These powerful tribesmen rendered Afghanistan ‘far more difficult to invade either by 
Russia or by ourselves than formerly, the nature of the country being admirably adapted 
to guerilla [sic] warfare’. Even though Britain supported the Amir and had trained his 
army, these measures would not be useful for suppressing tribesmen. More importantly, 
Clarke argued that Japan’s unexpected victories in the Russo-Japanese War might 
encourage the Afghans to incline toward independence and defy both Russia and Britain. 
Thus strengthening Afghanistan would be not only useless but also dangerous. The 
conclusion Clarke reached was to leave the Afghans alone. He foresaw that even if the 
Afghan tribesmen became strong, they would be beaten by Russia and would beg 
Britain for her assistance in the long run.
415
                      
As Clarke pointed out, the influence of the unexpected Japanese victories on 
Afghanistan was significant. Many Afghans were strongly interested in the war, and 
most were pro-Japanese. Both Muslims and Hindus hoped for Japan’s success and were 
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excited by her victories.
416
 The Amir was no exception; encouraged by Japan’s 
victories over Russia, he believed that ‘the Afghans could be made as efficient as the 
Japanese’.417 He regarded Japan as a model for modernised Afghanistan, so he studied 
her history and emphasised the importance of education. Furthermore, he saw the 
Russo-Japanese War as a war between East and West. He offered the analogy that 
‘civilization was like the sun, which rises in the East and sets in the West’, and 
concluded that ‘[t]he time has now come ... for the second rising of civilization in the 
East to take place, and Japan is an example of this’.418   
   Balfour and other politicians, however, did not share the Afghans’ enthusiasm. In 
October 1904, Curzon submitted his own review of British policy towards Afghanistan 
to the Cabinet. In his memorandum he stated that the ‘example of Japan, to which the 
Amir is in the habit of alluding, presents no analogy whatever to the condition of 
Afghanistan’. Balfour agreed with Curzon’s negative view of the Amir and Afghanistan. 
Balfour described the Amir as being in a ‘state of “swollen head,” which makes him 
compare Afghanistan to Japan’. The Amir’s attitude aggravated the difficulties of 
Britain’s traditional policy of turning Afghanistan into a buffer state. Balfour insisted 
that ‘it seems doubly dangerous to sharpen for him [the Amir] a weapon which may 
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make him aggressive towards Russia, and which in an emergeney [sic] may possibly be 
turned against ourselves’. Therefore, the Afghans’ increasing confidence as a result of 
the Russo-Japanese War strengthened Balfour’s idea of a policy of non-intervention 
towards Afghanistan. He concluded that: 
 
If Afghanistan is to be, under all temptation, a faithful ally, the stronger she could 
be made the better for us. But her fidelity is doubtful; and her inalienable value to 
us lies, not in the efficiency of her army, but in her difficult passes and barren 
ranges.
419
  
 
However, as Kitchener had indicated, the Amir seemed inspired with the idea ‘that 
he, like the Japanese, would be capable of not only withstanding but of defeating 
Russia’.420 It was clear that Britain’s control over Afghanistan was further decreasing 
and that Afghanistan’s action would change the international situation regarding the 
defence of India.     
The Amir and the tribes in Afghanistan also mattered from the viewpoint of 
cooperation between Britain and India. Their attitude was a serious factor in Britain’s 
strategic scheme for the defence of India. Balfour realised that Britain’s dealings with 
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them was ‘largely a question of Indian diplomacy’.421 British diplomacy towards 
Afghanistan should be conducted by the Indian government and carried out with its full 
consent. Thus it was vital for London to secure the cooperation of Delhi. Balfour was 
dissatisfied that the government of India had ‘largely failed both with the tribes and the 
Amir’. In the summer of 1904 Curzon was supposed to return to Britain and attend the 
CID, and Balfour hoped that a discussion with him would ameliorate the coordination 
of Britain and India over Afghanistan.
422
        
However, it was Tibet that prevented smooth Anglo-Indian cooperation. Although 
Balfour and other Cabinet colleagues were opposed to an expedition to Tibet, Major 
Francis Younghusband started to advance there under Curzon’s orders in the summer of 
1903.
423
 Younghusband finally entered Lhasa and made an agreement with Tibet in 
August 1904, but had caused some armed conflicts with Tibetans during his military 
campaign.
424
 This adventurous expedition provoked anger and anxiety among British 
policymakers in London; Brodrick, the Secretary of State for India, reminded 
Younghusband that even though Curzon desired the permanent occupation of Tibet, the 
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British Cabinet ‘had no intention of remaining there permanently or of keeping a force 
there during this winter at any serious military risk’.425 Balfour, unusually, showed his 
anger at Younghusband’s disobedience, stating that Younghusband had driven Britain 
into ‘a most abominable mess’. His fury led him to remark aggressively: 
‘Younghusband will have to be publicly repudiated!’426           
This controversy demonstrated that Balfour was considering Tibet from the 
standpoint of India. There were two reasons for his objection to the ‘forward’ policy, 
namely Younghusband’s expedition to Tibet. Firstly, it was inexpedient to add to the 
military burden of the government of India. This concern was acute because the 
completion of the Russian railways to Afghanistan was greatly increasing the Indian 
government’s military responsibilities. Secondly, Tibet was technically part of the 
Chinese Empire and its occupation would contradict the British pledge to maintain the 
integrity of China. Moreover, Balfour was concerned that the contradiction between the 
home government and local officers on the spot would damage the credibility of British 
diplomacy. According to him, Russia had lost her credibility because her government’s 
conciliatory promises were often broken by the aggressive policies of her local officers. 
Younghusband’s expedition to Tibet was precisely ‘copying the least creditable methods 
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of Russian diplomacy’.427 Balfour still hoped to make a direct arrangement with Russia 
in Central Asia, but it was ironic that the adoption of Russian methods should damage 
Britain’s credibility, creating difficulties in making such an arrangement.           
Balfour specified British policy regarding Persia, including Seistan, in the 
Russo-Japanese War. Although Britain had decided to maintain strict neutrality, her 
policymakers discussed defending India against the Russian threat, concentrating on the 
north-west frontier of India. The vital problem was that while Russia could strike at 
Britain through Afghanistan at any time, Britain could ‘hit back at her nowhere’.428 
Admiral Sir Walter Kerr, First Naval Lord, summed up how Russia was ‘very 
unassailable to a sea power with a small army’ owing to her geographical position.429 
Selborne did not accept this and suggested to Balfour that ‘the whole Russian coastline 
should be subjected to a microscopic examination’.430 Selborne did not confine this 
suggestion to Persia but included ‘[e]very possible point of access to Russia by Baltic, 
by Black Sea, by Persian Gulf, by Pacific, by India, by China’.431 Balfour’s reply also 
had a global perspective. He agreed to examine ‘the Russian Frontier from the Baltic to 
Vladivostock’, and found that the Persian Gulf appeared to be the easiest point of attack. 
                                                   
427 Balfour to Knollys, 6 Oct. 1904, Balfour MSS, Add. MSS. 49684. 
428 Selborne to Kerr, 1 Apr. 1904, Balfour MSS, Add. MSS. 49707. 
429 Kerr to Selborne, 2 Apr. 1904, Balfour MSS, Add. MSS. 49707. 
430 Selborne to Balfour, 5 Apr. 1904, Balfour MSS, Add. MSS. 49707. 
431 Selborne to Kerr, 1 Apr. 1904, Balfour MSS, Add. MSS. 49707. 
159 
 
However, he doubted the practicability of attacking Russia. He saw Russia’s real 
weakness as financial, and did not believe that ‘Russia is vulnerable in any mortal spot 
except her Exchequer’. He preferred to wait for the Russo-Japanese War to weaken 
Russia’s finances seriously.432              
However, if Russia tried to dominate Persia, Britain would have to check her. From 
‘the point of view of Imperial Defence’, Balfour stated Britain’s reasons for preventing 
Russia from taking control of Persia: 
 
(a.) That Russia would then be able, in time of peace, and at leisure, to establish 
secondary bases for an advance on India through Kandahar or through 
Baluchistan.  
(b.) That she would be in a convenient position to stir up local discontent in 
Baluchistan. 
(c.) That she might arrange the Persian railway system so as to acquire a third line 
in addition to the two already constructed, or in process of construction, 
connecting her European with our Indian possessions. 
(d.) That she might create a naval base on the Persian coast which would threaten 
our sea communication with Bombay and Kurrachee.
433
       
 
Balfour realised that Russia would not try to invade Persia directly, fearing that a 
disturbance of the status quo would involve world-wide war with Britain. What worried 
him was that she might increase her political influence in Persia through trade and 
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eventually Russianise that country. Britain should take peaceful rather than military 
measures to counteract Russia’s infiltration of Persia. Balfour advocated the use of ‘the 
ordinary weapons of international diplomacy’ and support for the Persian monarchy in 
resisting Russia.
434
 
    In connection with Seistan, Balfour paid special attention to Chabar, a port in 
southern Persia. Seistan was important because it could provide Russia with a suitable 
base from which to attack India. Balfour considered ‘the military occupation of Seistan 
by Russia a casus belli’, and tried to limit her influence in that province. However, this 
was not sufficient for the defence of India. Russia was actively building railways to 
connect her European region with Persia via Seistan. It was predicted that these would 
extend as far as the Indian Ocean. The railway network in Persia might enable Russia 
not only to deploy a large number of troops near the Indian border but also to menace 
British sea communications with India. Chabar, which could easily be fortified, was the 
most suitable port for the termination of the Russian railways. Therefore, Britain’s 
occupation of Chabar had the potential to put a stop to the whole Russian railway 
scheme. Balfour concluded that the main purpose of occupying Chabar was to ‘prevent 
the would-be invader from making in time of peace preparation which in time of war 
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would render invasion relatively easy’. 435  He saw the occupation of Chabar as 
permissible because its occupation and defence would not entail enormous financial 
cost.  
   Even after the Russo-Japanese War broke out, Balfour did not change his mind 
about Indian security. He still wanted a non-intervention policy towards Afghanistan 
and a direct arrangement with Russia over Central Asia. There was no place for the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance in Balfour’s policy on the defence of India and its adjacent 
region. However, the Russo-Japanese War had an impact not only on the Far East but 
also on India. In addition, Anglo-Russian relations could not escape the effect of the war 
although Britain maintained strict neutrality. Soon Balfour would face the change of 
international situation surrounding the Indian defence and have no choice but to review 
his policy towards the defence of India and the Anglo-Japanese alliance.           
Despite Britain’s strict neutrality during the Russo-Japanese War, relations between 
Britain and Russia gradually deteriorated. In the summer of 1904 the Russian volunteer 
fleet posed a dangerous threat to the security of British ships. This fleet consisted of 
private merchant ships, but the Russian government converted them into warships.
436
 
The volunteer fleet’s status was ‘in the highest degree ambiguous’, and if Britain was to 
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avoid all-out war with Russia, Balfour had to consider how to deal with it.
437
 Warning 
that Russia was ‘under the delusion that a conciliatory attitude is a weak attitude’, 
Balfour insisted that Britain’s tougher stance would ‘conduce to peace rather than to 
war’.438 He made a strong speech in the House of Commons to inform Russia of 
Britain’s intolerance of any Russian seizure of British merchant vessels.439 However, he 
was careful to make the speech ‘without being in any way offensive to the Russian 
Government’.440      
The Dogger Bank incident required Balfour to walk this fine line further. On its way 
to the Far East the Russian Baltic Fleet sank several British trawlers off the Dogger 
Bank on 21 October 1904.
441
 This fuelled public anger in Britain, and Anglo-Russian 
relations became highly volatile.
442
 Balfour’s attitude to this crisis was the same as his 
attitude to the Russian volunteer fleet. While he presented a strong stance on Russia, he 
tempered it to avoid driving the crisis into an uncontrollable confrontation with her.
443
 
He knew that the British navy was strong enough to beat the Baltic Fleet, but did not 
want to ‘bring the country [Britain] perilously near to overt hostilities’. Thus, in his 
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public address at Southampton on 28 October 1904, he paid the closest attention to his 
words to prevent Russia from interpreting the address as a declaration of war.
444
 
Although Russia promised to punish the guilty officers on 2 November, Balfour 
considered that ‘the prospects were gloomy’ and continued to discuss measures for 
dealing with her.
445
 The CID discussed various possibilities and decided to shadow the 
Baltic Fleet, although it warned that this ‘might provoke the catastrophe it was intended 
to avoid’.446  
Among the many potential clash points with Russia, Balfour directed his attention to 
the Persian Gulf, which, he remarked, ‘is now one of the sensitive spots on the world’s 
surface, and we ought to be careful not to get involved, unconsciously, in some 
far-reaching embroglio’.447 Russia’s occupation of ports in the Persian Gulf ‘would 
inevitably involve Great Britain in increased naval expenditure, and would undoubtedly 
have a considerable political effect by increasing Russian prestige’. 448  He cited 
Lansdowne’s House of Lords speech of 5 May 1903 once more, and demonstrated that 
Britain’s will to defend the Persian Gulf was unshaken. If the Russian Baltic Fleet 
occupied any ports in the Persian Gulf, Britain would withdraw her ambassador from St. 
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Petersburg and concentrate her superior naval force at Bombay to deal with the 
occupation. In his report to the King on 19 November 1904, Balfour hoped that Russia 
had no intention of entering the Persian Gulf, but underscored that it was ‘necessary to 
be prepared for the worst, should the worst unhappily come about’.449  
During the discussion about the Persian Gulf, Chabar came up again. Although 
Chabar lay outside the Persian Gulf, Balfour regarded Russia’s potential occupation of it 
as ‘a direct menace to Baluchistan, Karachi, and Bombay’. From the viewpoint of the 
defence of India, this could not be permitted. Seeing the potential occupation of Chabar 
by the Russian Baltic Fleet as ‘an unfriendly act’, Balfour decided to adopt the same 
measures as he would apply in the Persian Gulf.
450
 This led to another decision: if the 
Russian fleet did not try to enter Chabar or the Persian Gulf, Britain would not disturb it 
on its way to the Far East. Balfour understood that this transaction might hurt Japan’s 
feelings, but supposed that it would not be ‘a technical breach of neutrality’.451 
Moreover, it was more important for him to protect British interests in Persia and India. 
As he had with the Russian volunteer fleet in the Dogger Bank crisis, Balfour took a 
tough stance towards Russia to protect Britain’s national interests, mixed with caution in 
order to avoid inviting a showdown. The deterioration in Anglo-Russian relations made 
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a direct arrangement with Russia over Central Asia more difficult at that time.   
As the discussion in the CID and the Cabinet before the Russo-Japanese War 
showed, one of the essential questions about the defence of India was the number of 
British reinforcements that should be sent to India in the event of war with Russia. 
Although the Cabinet estimated this at 100,000 before the war, the changed 
international situation as a result of the war made it necessary to revise this. Balfour 
realised that the number should be decided not only from the military but also from the 
financial and political points of view. Even if Britain needed to send more troops to 
defend the British Empire, her financial resources were not inexhaustible. The dilemma 
he faced was that ‘a battalion more would be an extravagance, and a battalion less 
would be a danger’. Furthermore, the increased military cost and drastic reform of the 
army might outrage the public and evoke ‘a violent anti-military reaction’.452 The 
problem of the number of reinforcements for India demonstrated the difficulty of 
imperial defence in changing circumstances.            
   The more strongly the Russian threat was perceived, the more soldiers were required 
for India. On 8 January 1904, Curzon told the British Cabinet that the government of 
India would need 107,000 soldiers in the event of war with Russia. This number was 
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nearly equal to that calculated in London, but Britain had to bear in mind that the 
Russian railway system might be extended further into Central Asia. The extension of 
her railway to Termez, a city on the border of Afghanistan, was ‘a natural corollary to 
the Orenburg-Tashkent line’ and would enable Russia to carry out a more rapid advance 
to Kabul.
453
 The government of India shared this concern. As a result, on 27 July 
Kitchener estimated that the total number of British reinforcements should be 
135,614.
454
                        
   The Dogger Bank incident of October 1904 raised the danger of an Anglo-Russian 
conflict and emphasised the necessity of the up-to-date preparation of reinforcements 
for India. Balfour again faced a dilemma between military requirements and the burden 
of their supply. He received a statement from the Indian government that 158,000 men 
would be required for the country’s defence. While he realised the inadequacy of 
guaranteeing more than 100,000 reinforcements, he did not rule out the chance to ‘give 
all possible military assistance consistent with Imperial policy if the need should 
arise’.455 With the scrutiny of the General Staff, Balfour understood that 143,000 men 
would be needed to defend India.
456
 The remaining problem to resolve was how Britain 
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would prepare such reinforcements with its limited budget. The key to this difficult task 
was the Anglo-Japanese alliance.        
 
V 
 
Contrary to Balfour’s forecast, Japan won a number of victories on land and at sea.457 
By January 1905 it appeared unlikely that Russia would conquer the Korean Peninsula, 
and Britain had to review her policy on the Russo-Japanese War and adjust to the 
change in international circumstances. This unexpected result raised Japan’s reputation 
as a great power all over the world. In particular, British policymakers were impressed 
with the efficiency of the Japanese army, not only because Japan had defeated Russia, 
whose army was numerically superior, but also because Britain had lost confidence in 
her own army’s efficiency due to the hard fighting in the Boer War. The British 
government sent many military observers to the Far East to obtain first-hand knowledge 
about Japan’s troops on the battlefield.458 Lord Esher, who was a courtier and took part 
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in the War Office committee, praised Japan’s effective fighting and preparation for the 
war and concluded that ‘the Oriental Renaissance, led by Japan’ should not be ignored 
when Britain pondered the future of the world.
459
 Even Lord Roberts thought that 
Britain could learn from Japan.
460
        
Leo Amery, then a South Africa-based journalist and later a Unionist politician, 
advocated that Britain should take a further step. His experience in South Africa had 
made him a fierce critic of the British army. He was in constant touch with the CID 
through Clarke, and became acquainted with Balfour.
461
 Amery’s plan was aggressive 
in the extreme; he proposed that with Sweden’s assistance Britain should attack Russia 
to rescue Finland, which lay within a stone’s throw of European Russia, in particular St. 
Petersburg. The main merit of Amery’s scheme was that ‘it strikes at the very heart of 
Russia, and, as long as a hostile army is at the gates of St. Petersburg, India will be safe’. 
His argument revealed how the global nature of the British Empire connected 
international affairs in Scandinavia with those in India. However, Amery’s distrust of 
the British army’s efficiency forced him to acknowledge that Sweden’s help would be 
essential in carrying out this adventurous policy. In contrast to the British army, he 
admired the Japanese army and lamented that ‘if we had anything like the national 
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organization of the Japanese we could do it easily’.462            
Balfour’s reply was negative. Amery’s approach would clearly violate the strict 
neutrality that he wished to preserve. Balfour though that while Britain could not 
guarantee support, she should not encourage the Finns to fight Russian rule. Even if 
Britain succeeded in expelling the Russians from Finland, she would have another 
problem, namely whether Sweden and Finland could endure Russia’s pressure and 
maintain their possession for themselves after the war. Balfour forecast that Scandinavia 
would ask Britain for a guarantee of peace there, but would Britain ‘be prepared to give 
a permanent guarantee of this character?’ Britain had achieved a consensus on the 
necessity of the independence of Holland, so her guarantee to Holland had been 
effective. However, Finland was remote and touched ‘no obvious or direct British 
interest’, so it would be difficult to convince the British people of the need for a 
guarantee for Scandinavia.
463
 Neither Russia’s military disaster nor Japan’s remarkable 
efficiency allowed Balfour to side with Japan.   
Japan’s growing reputation as a great power strengthened some British politicians’ 
conviction of the value of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The alliance was to expire in 
1907, but they began to think that it should be renewed before the end of the Balfour 
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administration. On 13 January 1905, Earl Percy, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, proposed that Britain should ‘offer now to renew for another 
period of 5 years the Anglo-J[apanese]. Alliance’.464 Despite the fact that his speciality 
was Middle Eastern affairs, Percy could wield strong influence over the policymaking 
process due to his good relations with Balfour.
465
 The Conservatives and Liberal 
Unionists had been in power since 1895 and their popularity was gradually waning. 
Percy doubted that Balfour could maintain his administration after 1905, and it was 
uncertain whether a successive Liberal government could renew the Japanese 
alliance.
466
 In fact, there was a press campaign in Europe stating that Britain was 
waiting for the expiration of the alliance due to her preference for an Anglo-Russian 
Entente. Percy wanted to ‘put a stop to such a campaign by taking time by the forelock 
and binding ourselves for another five years’.467 Lansdowne approved his suggestion, 
stating that Britain should offer such an extension now to ‘show the Japanese that our 
affection is unabated’.468 Emphasising the value of an ally in the Far East, Lansdowne 
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deemed the simple renewal of the Anglo- Japanese alliance essential to Britain. 
However, Balfour was not willing to renew the alliance. Originally he had been 
opposed to its conclusion because it was restricted to the Far East and did not apply to 
the security of India.
469
 Even though Japan had become strong and had consolidated her 
position in the Far East, the simple renewal of the alliance would not resolve this 
shortcoming.
470
 Balfour also realised that he might not win the next general election 
and did not trust a succeeding Liberal government to maintain the alliance. Even so, he 
insisted that renewal of the alliance before the expiry date might be a violation of the 
liberty to revise the engagements at quinquennial intervals.
471
 Moreover, he did not 
expect the Russo-Japanese War to end soon. Even if the war continued beyond the term 
of the alliance and the then British government did not want to renew it, Balfour pointed 
out, it would not expire automatically, at least during the war.
472
 All these 
considerations made him view simple renewal of the Japanese alliance with disfavour.           
A revision, by contrast, was worth considering. Balfour thought that if Britain made 
an agreement with America that absorbed the Anglo-Japanese alliance, such a revision 
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would be legitimate even before the expiry date. This highlighted that Balfour realised 
the value of an Anglo-American-Japanese agreement. Importantly, however, the 
backbone of his scheme was a direct arrangement with America.
473
 His belief in 
Anglo-American cooperation had not changed since the conclusion of the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance. Britain’s relationship with America ‘should be based on that 
foundation of mutual comprehension, affection, and esteem which form stronger links 
than the most formal treaties’. This had been Balfour’s ‘most fondly cherished hope’ 
throughout all his political life.
474
 He considered that both Britain and America shared 
the same interest in securing the integrity of China.
475
 Thus in theory it was not 
impossible for Britain to make an agreement with America over the maintenance of the 
status quo in the Far East. 
However, Balfour was never optimistic about cooperation with America. The 
difficulties, mainly caused by the Americans, were immense. Although he did not 
believe in the notion of the “Yellow Peril”, he worried that some aggressive powers 
might dominate an important portion of China in the future. Anglo-American 
cooperation seemed to him the best way to prepare for such a perilous situation. 
However, he remarked that:       
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If America and ourselves were to enter into a Treaty, binding us jointly to resist 
such aggression, it would never, I believe, be attempted. Together, we are too 
strong for any combination of Powers to fight us. I believe there would be no 
difficulty on this side of the Atlantic in the way of such a Treaty. The difficulty, I 
imagine, would be rather with the United States, whose traditions and whose 
constitution conspire to make such arrangements hard to conclude.
476
 
 
In the end, as Balfour had predicted, a direct arrangement with America was no 
longer mooted. Even after the Anglo-Japanese alliance was signed, Balfour continued to 
believe that America would be the best partner for cooperation in the Far East. Although 
the Americans were unwilling to make a binding agreement with Britain, his belief in 
Anglo-American cooperation remained strong. It was crucial that Balfour referred to an 
Anglo-American-Japanese tripartite arrangement, although the Anglo-Japanese alliance 
did not collide with Anglo-American cooperation. Before the Russo-Japanese War 
ended, Balfour had already considered that an Anglo-American-Japanese agreement 
would be a desirable future development of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. However, he 
remained sceptical about the Anglo-Japanese alliance even when Japan proved her 
power and efficiency during the Russo-Japanese War. If it could not be modified into an 
Anglo-American-Japanese agreement, he would not prevent the coming expiration of 
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the alliance.              
Balfour did not share the opinion that Britain should renew the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance to show her support for Japan. He had tried to maintain strict neutrality in the 
Russo-Japanese War and had taken care not to side with one belligerent unilaterally. His 
cautiousness was evident when Percy proposed that Britain should honour Japan.
477
 
Balfour refused to give the Garter to the Japanese Emperor during the war because 
Britain could not give it to the equivalent person in Russia, the Czar, who already had 
it.
478
 Balfour even deemed the peace feeler an unnecessary intervention. While he 
showed some sympathy for the Archbishop of Canterbury’s desire to end the war 
quickly, he stated that British peacemaking would be ‘not only useless, but worse than 
useless, unless, and until, the combatants are willing to take advantage of it’.479 He did 
not necessarily think that the war should be brought to a conclusion at once. If it 
continued, Russia would exhaust her military and financial resources and, 
correspondingly, her threat to India would be eased. From the viewpoint of imperial 
defence, the continuation of the war would bring the result that Balfour had desired just 
before the outbreak of the war. Thus he concluded that: 
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I am, on braod [sic] moral grounds, very anxious that we should do everything 
we can to put an end to the war. But I have to admit that, from a narrowly 
national point of view the balance of advantage, I suspect, is on the side of 
continued hostilities.
480
                   
 
It was the Indian defence problem that now changed Balfour’s half-heartedness 
towards the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The turbulent stage was Afghanistan and the main 
character was the Amir. Britain had negotiated with Afghanistan over the British 
subsidy since December 1904.
481
 In Balfour’s view the subsidy had been granted not to 
the Afghan dynasty but personally to Abdul Rahman Khan, the late Amir, and therefore, 
Habibullah Khan, the present Amir, did not have an automatic right to it. Britain could 
withdraw the subsidy altogether from the successor, or if it continued, it should be 
subject to new conditions.
482
 Having doubts about the buffer state policy, Balfour tried 
to reduce Britain’s financial assistance to the Amir, who however, was keen to receive 
the same subsidy that his father had received. His attitude was much stronger than 
Britain expected, and the negotiations reached a deadlock in February 1905.    
Japan’s victories in the Russo-Japanese War made the Amir a hard-liner.483 He 
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regarded Japan’s victories against Russia as Asian victories against Europe. He felt 
himself ‘a free man’, and was not inclined to obey either Russia or Britain.484 Balfour 
attended a Cabinet meeting on Afghanistan on 15 February 1905 and reported to the 
King that he had ‘seldom taken part in discussions more anxious or more prolonged’. 
He harshly judged that the Russian defeats at the hands of the Japanese had encouraged 
the Amir to develop ‘the idea in his ill balanced brain that he can go and do likewise’.485 
Curzon repeated that Britain should not make compromises with the Amir and stressed 
that he would yield to Britain’s undaunted stance in the end.486 Yet the British Cabinet 
feared the rupturing of negotiations because the Amir’s strong attitude raised two fresh 
concerns. The first was Russia’s ‘permeation’ of Afghanistan. By placating the Amir 
with a soft approach, embattled Russia might take advantage of the discord between 
Britain and Afghanistan and within a few years ‘would have the ground thoroughly 
prepared for a friendly understanding with Afghanistan in case of a war between Russia 
and England’.487    
The second and more serious concern was the possibility of an Anglo-Afghan war. 
With his modernised army and strong confidence, the Amir might not hesitate to fight 
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Britain to strengthen his position. On the other hand, Clarke prophesied that Russia 
would ‘hardly embark on fresh adventures of an unprofitable character for several years’ 
after the Russo-Japanese War.
488
 But, on 11 February 1905, he worried that there was 
‘far greater danger of a war with Afghanistan than with Russia’. Given ‘an inflated 
sense of his power’, the Amir had the intention and ability to launch an attack on the 
Indian frontier. Britain could not tolerate conflict with Afghanistan because ‘[w]e cannot 
conquer Afghanistan; we can gain nothing by war; we may assume that such a war 
would exactly suit the Russian game’.489 Britain was not ready to go to war with 
Afghanistan.
490
 In conclusion, the British Cabinet had to accept that ‘a war with 
Afghanistan would be a calamity both to India and the British Empire’.491                             
Britain finally approved the Amir’s requirement and a new treaty with Afghanistan 
was concluded in March 1905. However, this revealed many problems with imperial 
defence. Curzon was not satisfied with the Cabinet’s policy and indicated his 
resignation from the Viceroyalty; relations between London and Delhi were at their 
nadir. Moreover, Afghanistan’s standing in the defence of India had changed with the 
Russo-Japanese War. Neither Britain’s traditional buffer-state policy nor Balfour’s 
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non-intervention saw Afghanistan as an independent power in international politics 
where Indian defence was concerned. In fact, however, Afghanistan could become a 
formidable enemy. Balfour and the British policy elites had to review the premise of 
British policy towards Afghanistan. Balfour’s alternative policy, namely a direct 
arrangement with Russia over Central Asia, was no longer practicable due to worsening 
relations between the two countries after the Dogger Bank incident.  
Even in early 1905, Balfour saw the Russian threat to India and its adjacent areas as 
a serious matter. Clarke acknowledged that ‘a serious Russian attempt to invade India is 
out of the question at present’. However, Russia’s fears about her position in Central 
Asia would be aggravated by her defeat in the Far East, so he warned Balfour that 
Russia might carry out ‘an attack on the Afghans’ to re-establish her damaged 
prestige.
492
 Clarke repeated his concern in a memorandum of 20 March 1905. As 
Balfour had already mentioned, Russia’s occupation of Herat or Afghan Turkestan, the 
northern region of Afghanistan, was not improbable at that time.
493
 Balfour pondered 
whether, even if it might not be advantageous to her, Russia wished to establish a 
fortified naval base in the Persian Gulf. He would not tolerate such a bid, which would 
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inevitably throw a new burden upon the British navy in the region.
494
 Furthermore, he 
had to decide on Britain’s policy regarding the defence of India, considering not only 
the discussion in London but also opinion in Delhi. At a CID meeting on 22 March 1905, 
he said: ‘[t]he Government of India appeared to desire a forward policy, and to believe 
that the recent disasters in the Far East would have the effect of directing Russian 
activities towards Persia and Afghanistan’.495 Britain needed a different policy which 
would adjust to the new international situation caused by the Russo-Japanese War in 
order to defend India and its north-west frontier from Russia.     
Balfour’s answer was to extend the scope of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to include 
India and to utilise the Japanese army in the defence of India. The main reason he had 
opposed the alliance was its one-sidedness; it gave Japan many advantages, for example 
British backing in the Far East, which the former saw as the most important region in 
Asia, but Britain gained no advantages from the alliance in her vital territory in Asia, 
namely India. In a report to the King on 23 March 1905, Balfour explained how the 
Japanese alliance could be made impartial: 
 
One suggestion well worth weighing was to turn the alliance into one offensive 
and defensive in favour of the status quo in the Far East. The effect of this would 
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be to oblige us to aid Japan if Russia attempted, after the peace, to encroach upon 
Japanese rights; and Japan would be equally bound to assist us in defending the 
position of Afghanistan and India. These are but rough ideas, which, even if 
acceptable in principle to the contracting parties, will require the most careful 
thrashing out in detail.
496
 
 
An extension of the alliance would thus resolve the shortcomings that Balfour could not 
accept. Moreover, if Britain could use Japanese troops, whose efficiency was praised in 
Britain, for the defence of India, she would not have to bear the huge financial burden of 
preparing massive reinforcements.      
Balfour’s idea was backed by two members of the CID in April 1905. George Clarke 
took the same line as Balfour. A simple renewal of the Japanese alliance would suit 
Japan because it would enable her to cooperate with Britain against a combination of 
two or more powers in the Far East after the Russo-Japanese War. But he did not believe 
that ‘a mere renewal would be of any real advantage to us’. Even though her defeat in 
the Far East had inflicted great hardship on Russia, the British public would not feel 
secure about the safety of India. Moreover, criticism of the British army’s efficiency 
was likely to continue both within and outside the government. Thus, Clarke concluded 
that ‘any arrangement under which a portion of the Japanese Army might be rendered 
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available to reinforce us on the Indian frontier would be a direct gain’. However, it was 
clear that extension of the scope of the alliance was essential to carry out this scheme. 
Clarke applied his idea not only to India but also to Hong Kong, the Straits Settlements 
and Ceylon. In order to protect these ‘British possessions in Asia’, he proposed that the 
Royal Navy should cooperate with the Japanese navy, and Japan should offer ‘a 
contingent not exceeding 100,000 combatants’.497     
The other backer was Captain Charles Ottley, Director of Naval Intelligence. It was 
important that Ottley also considered Russia a serious naval and military menace to 
Britain even after the Russo-Japanese War. Ottley was concerned that Russia would 
rebuild her fleet against Japan in the Far East after the war, but she would be unlikely to 
be able to do so if she always had to fight Britain and Japan together. Turning the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance into an offensive and defensive alliance would deter ‘Russian 
naval recuperation’, and Britain would be freed from ‘the perpetual menace which the 
expansion of the Russian fleet has constituted’. On the other hand, if Russia’s expansion 
in the Far East was stopped, she would direct her spearhead at India. Japan had ‘a large 
and thoroughly efficient field army’ whose despatch from Japan to India was safer, 
faster and cheaper than sending British forces from Britain. Extension of the scope of 
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the alliance would enable Britain to utilise Japan’s army to defend India and its 
north-west frontier from the Russian threat.
498
              
On 12 April 1905, the CID informally discussed the extension of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance on behalf of the Cabinet. Balfour took the initiative in the 
discussion.
499
 Although the CID members agreed to transform the alliance into an 
offensive and defensive one, it was emphasised that ‘the provisions should be so framed 
as neither to constitute a menace, in reality or in appearance, to the position and 
interests of friendly Powers, such as France and the United States, nor to be regarded as 
an Anglo-Japanese Alliance against Europe’. The CID also approved the extension of 
the scope of the alliance, adding one condition: 
 
If, however, we bind ourselves to place the services of our navy at the disposal of 
Japan in such an eventuality, we should naturally expect her to make a reciprocal 
promise as regards her army, which should be made available for the defence of 
India against external aggression.
500
 
 
Finally, the CID confirmed that the alliance should be operative ‘in the case of Persia, 
China, and Afghanistan only when they were acting in alliance with either of the 
Contracting Parties’, fearing that these ‘semi-barbarous Governments’ might recklessly 
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provoke Russia to declare war against them.
501
 This clause clearly showed how Balfour 
and other colleagues were keeping the Amir’s growing confidence in his power and 
increasing rivalry with Britain and Russia in mind.   
   Clarke further embodied the extension of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. On 4 May 
1905, he stated the objects of a new alliance: one was the defence of the whole of Japan 
and all British possessions in Asia north of the Equator; another was the maintenance of 
the territorial status quo and the Open Door principle in China. Like Ottley, Clarke 
sought to prevent Russia’s naval revival in the Far East by means of the Anglo-Japanese 
naval combination. In return for naval protection for Japan, he insisted that ‘she should 
undertake to supply (say) 150,000 troops for the defence of our Indian frontier’. It was 
no coincidence that Clarke’s proposal agreed with the number of British reinforcements 
needed for India in the event of a war with Russia. This large Japanese army would 
deter the Russians from attacking the Indian frontier. As a result, Clarke considered, 
‘[w]e also should be able to cease from interference in Afghan affairs, which would be a 
great advantage’.502 The intended result of the extension of the Japanese alliance was 
the same as that of Balfour’s non-intervention policy towards Afghanistan.  
   Although Britain steadily specified the scheme of an extended Anglo-Japanese 
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Alliance, Japan did not share her view of it. Appreciating the value of the alliance, Japan 
hoped to renew it, but India was not one of her vital interests and the expansion of the 
alliance into India would be an unnecessary burden on her. Consequently, the Japanese 
government supported a simple renewal of the alliance, opposing the extension of its 
scope beyond its present limits.
503
 Balfour was surprised at this, probably because he 
knew that Taro Katsura, the Japanese Prime Minister, had informally declared his wish 
that the alliance might be given ‘a larger and wider scope’.504 But Balfour strongly 
remarked that, even if the extended alliance was advantageous to Britain, ‘it was not our 
business to sue for it in forma pauperis’. It was decided that ‘the matter should, for the 
moment, be allowed to sleep’ until Japan accepted the extension.505 To Balfour, the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance was only one measure in the defence of the British Empire. He 
could not accept the possibility that its revision would damage the reputation of the 
British Empire and weaken her position vis-à-vis Japan.        
   Negotiations over the future of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance stagnated temporarily, 
but Britain did not compromise. While Japan stuck to a simple renewal, discussion of an 
extension continued in the Balfour administration. On 16 May 1905, Balfour informed 
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the King of the Cabinet’s conclusion:       
 
They [the Japanese] are becoming impatient for a renewal: we on the other hand, 
though firmly adhering to the policy of renewal, see some difficulty in renewing 
at a period so far anterior to the natural expiry of the existing treaty. If the treaty 
was to be extended in scope, this would supply a sufficient reason for immediate 
action. If, on the other hand, the Japanese Government desire an extension in 
time, without any alteration of substance, there seem to be strong reasons against 
immediate action and few reasons in its favour. 
 
This repeated Balfour’s negative earlier view of the simple renewal of the alliance 
before its expiry date. Lansdowne, who was originally in favour of the simple renewal, 
was instructed to communicate this Cabinet conclusion to the Japanese government.
506
 
Moreover, he demonstrated Britain’s need for Japan’s military assistance in the defence 
of India due to the danger that Russia ‘would almost certainly turn her attention to other 
parts of the Asiatic continent, with the result that Great Britain would be more seriously 
threatened than at present upon the Indian frontier and at other points’.507 In the end 
Japan accepted this scheme, and both powers agreed to renew and enlarge the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance.
508
  
After the Cabinet approved the extension of the alliance, Balfour undertook to work 
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out the details of its provisions. The most important problem for him was the defence of 
India. There was no doubt that the enlarged Japanese alliance would apply to India, but 
it was not clear to what extent it would cover regions adjoining India. Afghanistan 
should be included. Balfour was concerned that Russia would strengthen her influence 
in Afghan Turkestan by taking advantage of Afghan misgovernment, and Britain could 
not prevent Russia from infiltrating that country. ‘It is’, Balfour remarked, ‘one of the 
weaknesses of the position which has to be recognised, but which, so far as I can see, 
cannot be remedied’.509 Then he revealed that Seistan and Eastern Persia were ‘as vital, 
or almost as vital, to the security of India as Afghanistan itself’.510 He concluded that 
these areas also should be incorporated in the revised alliance.  
Balfour preferred to use vague phrasing in the extended Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 
order to include as many of India’s adjacent regions as possible. After Japan accepted 
the principle of an expanded alliance, its provisions became the focus of negotiations 
between Britain and Japan. Gathering what Balfour desired, Clarke was reluctant to 
‘define the military obligations of Japan as limited by “India”’.511 Balfour applied 
himself to rewriting the wording of a draft treaty. At first, the draft preamble specified 
that the extended alliance should be applied to ‘Eastern Asia’ and ‘India’. Balfour 
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wanted to change this to ‘Eastern & Southern Asia’ to include territories next to India, 
notably Afghanistan and Seistan.
512
 However, he was not satisfied with this and 
pondered whether Britain should enumerate the regions to be incorporated into the 
alliance, namely ‘Afghanistan, the strip of Persian territory adjoining Afghanistan and 
Beluchistan, or, if the last be too large, then Seistan alone and possibly, Tibet’. From a 
strategic point of view, he described these areas as ‘the non-Indian territories which are 
necessary for the defence of India’.513 In the end, the provisions of the revised alliance 
did not enumerate them, but Balfour always linked these areas beyond India to the 
extension of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.        
The revision of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance shed fresh light on another factor, 
namely America.
514
 Japan required Britain to acknowledge her preponderating 
influence in Korea in return for extending the alliance to India. Balfour did not oppose 
this and considered that Britain would have no objection even if Japan tried to annex 
Korea.
515
 However, Japan might assert her strong authority and violate other powers’ 
existing rights in Korea. Balfour feared that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, now an 
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offensive and defensive one, would drag Britain into ‘a conflict with some third Power 
– say the U.S.A. – due to the desire of the latter to defend rights which it had already 
secured by treaty with Korea’.516 Originally Balfour had keenly supported the idea of 
Anglo-American cooperation in the Far East, so it would be disastrous for him that 
Britain was obliged by the Anglo-Japanese alliance to fight America in support of 
Japan.  
Balfour rapidly had to find a way of avoiding such a calamity. He decided that 
Britain would not accept ‘a treaty obligation to assist Japan in any quarrel arising out of 
existing treaty arrangements between Korea and other countries’.517 He emphasised that 
the main concern was not Japan’s violation of other powers’ rights in Korea but 
Britain’s responsibility for siding with Japan in any conflict caused by such violation. 
To avoid the latter, he could tolerate the former. Thus he reminded Lansdowne that:     
 
the cabinet was not proposed to insist on the explicit declaration by Japan that she 
would not violate established treaty rights, provided we got the explicit assurance 
that in any case we were not to be dragged into any quarrel which those rights 
might occasion.
518
   
 
The Japanese government soon stated that Japan would respect existing rights in Korea, 
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but kept complete silence on whether Britain would always be obliged to support Japan 
in ‘the imaginary case of a war arising from a violation of the established Treaty rights 
of other Powers in Korea by Japan’.519 Finally, although Britain confirmed that she took 
no responsibility for assisting Japan in such a war, no formal declaration was issued on 
this point.
520
      
Balfour did not forget to keep America informed on the extended Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance. President Theodore Roosevelt had conveyed to the British government that 
Japan should be permitted to retain Port Arthur and paramount influence in Korea after 
the Russo-Japanese War.
521
 Knowing Roosevelt’s view, Balfour and Lansdowne 
assumed that the new alliance would be in accordance with American policy towards 
the Far East, and the American policymakers’ response matched their expectations.522 
Lansdowne discussed Korea with Senator Henry Lodge and Francis Loomis, Assistant 
Secretary of State, day after day in Britain, and both asserted that ‘the United States’ 
government saw no objection to the establishment of Japanese control in Corea’.523 
Roosevelt also showed Sir Mortimer Durand, the British ambassador in Washington, the 
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Taft-Katsura Agreement on 4 August 1905. This agreement recognised Japan’s 
preponderant position in Korea and America’s in the Philippines, Japan and America 
having already agreed to mutual understanding regarding the Far East.
524
 Thus, 
although temporarily, Britain did not have to worry about a US-Japanese conflict over 
Korea.            
   After tough negotiations the new Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed on 12 August 
1905. It was renewed and remained in force for ten years from the date of its signature. 
It was now an offensive and defensive alliance and its scope was extended to India. By 
recognising Japan’s paramount position in Korea and promising naval cooperation in 
the Far East, Britain obtained Japanese military assistance in the defence of India. It was 
true that some problems remained. For example, coordination between British and 
Japanese military officers had to be discussed further. The possibility of being dragged 
into a conflict between Japan and America was not completely removed, although 
Korea as a cause was ruled out for a while.  Compared to 1902 when Balfour had 
become Prime Minister, however, Britain’s position in international politics had 
improved. In particular, as Balfour had wished, the new alliance was useful in the 
defence of India. 
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   Balfour was satisfied with this result. Publication of the revised Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance was delayed due to peace negotiations between Russia and Japan at 
Portsmouth, America.
525
 Before its publication, Balfour summed up his estimate of it:  
 
This Treaty differs from the old Treaty in being for 10 years instead of for 5. This, 
however, is a detail. The really important changes are that it is a defensive 
alliance, not against any two Powers, but against any single Power, which attacks 
either us or Japan in the East: so that Japan can depend upon our Fleet for 
defending Korea, etc, and we can depend upon her Army to aid us on the 
north-west frontier if the security of India is imperilled in that quarter.
526
  
 
This clearly highlighted that Balfour’s emphasis was not on the renewal but on the 
extension of the alliance. It was Balfour that decided a line of British policy towards the 
revision of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. British defence planners, such as Clarke and 
Ottley, played an important role in hammering out the details of the revised alliance. 
However, the significant point was that, before Clarke and Ottley tackled this matter, 
senior British policy-makers, for example Lansdowne and Percy, advocated the 
immediate and simple renewal of the Japanese alliance. Thus, the extension of the 
alliance to India was not an established line from the start. Balfour’s strong and 
consistent opposition to the simple renewal paved the way for putting the 
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Anglo-Japanese alliance on the global stage beyond the Far East. While the threat 
against Britain and Japan was not mentioned in the new alliance, the Russians would 
realise that it was aimed at them. Balfour freely admitted this, insisting that Russia was 
‘the main danger in the Far East to Japan, in the Middle East to us’.527 Combined with 
Russia’s defeat in the Far East, the alliance improved Britain’s position vis-à-vis Russia 
all over the world. Although forecasting that Russia would need to make an agreement 
with Britain, Sir Charles Hardinge, the British ambassador to Russia, insisted that 
Britain did not have to discuss this immediately, thanks to the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance.
528
 Balfour resigned from the post of Prime Minister in December 1905, but the 
extended alliance was one of his important achievements, and one that was to last for 
nearly another two decades. 
 
VI 
 
Balfour was closely involved in the framing of foreign policy from 1894 to 1905. 
Britain had to deal with volatility in the Far East, and particularly Russia’s expansion 
into northern China and Korea after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. Concerned 
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about the weakening of Britain’s international position, Balfour keenly realised the 
necessity of alliance with foreign powers while he sought a direct arrangement with 
Russia. His favoured candidate was America, whose traditional isolationism, however, 
crushed the idea of an Anglo-American alliance. Paying little attention to Japan’s 
growing power, Balfour tried to establish an Anglo-German alliance and an 
understanding with Russia in which each recognised the other’s sphere of influence in 
China.      
However, Balfour had to consider the option of cooperation with Japan. Neither the 
Scott-Muravev agreement nor the Anglo-German Yangtze agreement could check 
Russia’s bid to expand her influence in China. Although many British policymakers 
supported a limited Anglo-Japanese alliance, Balfour adhered to the idea of a global 
Anglo-German alliance. His consideration was based on the defence of the whole of the 
British Empire. He did not reckon that British interests in the Far East deserved to be 
protected by fighting a war with the Franco-Russian alliance. Moreover, a regional 
agreement with Japan that applied only to the Far East would not be useful in defending 
the Indian frontier from Russian invasion. In the end, Balfour accepted the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance, but he was not convinced of its utility from the viewpoint of 
imperial defence.   
194 
 
Balfour’s policy towards the Russo-Japanese War was always framed in the context 
of imperial defence. Balfour mainly discussed in the CID the defence of India and 
adjacent regions as Britain’s most important problem. His basic policy for these regions 
was non-intervention and a direct arrangement with Russia. Despite the strong 
opposition of some Cabinet members, Balfour decided to maintain strict neutrality 
during the war. He calculated that the war in the Far East would drain Russia’s military 
and financial power, and weaken her threat to India. Although the Russo-Japanese War 
took place in the Far East, Balfour dealt with it in relation to the defence of India.     
Balfour’s main concern was the Indian defence even after the Russo-Japanese War 
broke out. However, Japan’s unexpected victory made his policy more difficult. In 
particular, the Afghans’ increased confidence in their own power and efficiency made 
them defiant against both Britain and Russia. Direct agreement with Russia was almost 
impossible due to the deterioration of Anglo-Russian relations during the war. Not even 
the Russian defeat in the Far East afforded Balfour any relief: he worried that Russia, 
whose expansion had halted in the Far East, would now turn her spearhead towards 
India. The Russian threat to India was still serious, and Britain needed another policy to 
deal with this problem. 
The solution was to extend the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which had been limited to 
195 
 
the Far East, to cover India and adjoining regions in order to secure the Japanese 
military assistance in the defence of India. Discarding his previous negative attitude to 
the alliance, Balfour took the initiative of extending its scope after Anglo-Afghan 
relations reached their nadir. The process of its extension created a serious possibility 
that Britain would find herself fighting a war against America over Korea. Balfour made 
every effort to avoid such a situation, attaching paramount importance to the 
cooperation with America, and succeeded in making the Anglo-Japanese alliance useful 
in the defence of British Empire without damaging Anglo-American relations. 
Henceforth, however, he would have to tackle the coexistence of imperial defence with 
Anglo-American cooperation in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.  
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                          2 
Testing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1905-1918  
 
I  
 
Immediately on assuming power, the Liberal Campbell-Bannerman administration that 
succeeded Balfour’s government in December 1905 began to discuss the nature of 
military assistance in the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The main reason that Balfour had 
taken the initiative in renewing the alliance was to obtain the help of Japanese troops in 
the defence of India.
529
 However, the General Staff’s attitude to Japan’s military help 
was lukewarm. In November 1905, when Balfour was still Prime Minister, they had 
opposed the despatch of Japanese troops to India in the event of war against Russia 
alone for two reasons: it would be impossible to employ a large number of Japanese 
soldiers, for example 150,000 men, on the north-west frontier of India due to supply and 
transportation difficulties; and using Japanese help would be interpreted as ‘a clear 
proof of our national decadence’ which might damage Britain’s prestige in Asia. Instead, 
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the General Staff proposed that Japan should fight Russia in the Far East in order to 
divert Russia’s resources and attention from India. However, if Russia engaged in a war 
against Britain in cooperation with other powers, the value of Japanese military 
assistance in India would increase, because Russia and other powers could prevent 
Britain from sending her own reinforcements to India. In that case, the General Staff 
admitted, it seemed desirable for Britain to accept Japanese troops in India.
530
 Further 
consideration of Japan’s military aid was needed by statesmen and servicemen.                 
   The Liberal Cabinet discussed Japan’s military assistance in the CID, referring to 
the General Staff’s memorandum. On 1 February 1906, Campbell-Bannerman agreed 
that Britain should not ask Japan to send forces to India, but the CID decided to wait for 
the view of the Government of India because John Morley, Secretary of State for India, 
advocated the need to understand it.
531
 Viceroy Lord Minto replied that the Government 
of India did not ‘at present consider it would be advisable to employ Japanese troops in 
or through India’, although he did not completely oppose using the Japanese army, 
adding: ‘We are not, however, prepared to say this might never be advisable’. However, 
Morley insisted that the Government of India agreed with the General Staff. While the 
General Staff considered the case of war against Russia both alone and with other 
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powers, Liberal statesmen did not pay attention to the difference between the two. In the 
end, on 15 February the CID concluded that ‘Japan should not be asked to send troops 
to India to co-operate with us in a campaign on the north-west frontier’.532 This 
conclusion reflected that London had to take into account Delhi’s attitude to Japanese 
military aid. Later Balfour would face the same problem during the Great War. 
However, not all the members of the CID shared this negative view about the 
possibility of Japanese military assistance. A conference between British and Japanese 
military representatives was to be held in London in May 1907 to discuss the details of 
mutual military assistance. On 25 April, just before the conference, the CID once more 
discussed Japan’s military help in India. Campbell-Bannerman was absent from the 
meeting and Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, served as Chairman. Lord Haldane, 
Secretary of State for War, was in favour of Japanese aid and critical of the fact that ‘the 
authorities in India had been premature in rejecting the idea that Japanese troops should 
be employed in India’.533 Clarke had originally understood that an invasion of India by 
Russia would be checked by the ‘fear of being involved in war in Manchuria and in 
Afghanistan at the same time’534 Citing Kitchener’s positive opinion, however, he 
proposed the employment of Japanese troops in southern Persia to attack the flank of a 
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potential Russian advance against India. While predicting objections from the 
Government of India, Grey admitted that ‘the door should be kept open for their 
employment in Persia’. Therefore, the CID concluded that the possibility of utilising the 
Japanese army in India and Persia should be discussed at the coming military 
conference.
535
 Although the British military representatives at the conference did not 
adopt this proposal, some British policymakers who shared Balfour’s interest in 
imperial defence still sought to employ Japan’s troops in India.    
Anglo-Russian relations over India and Central Asia began to improve after the 
Russo-Japanese War. Russia, suffering from war losses and internal turmoil, sought 
good relations with Britain. Considering her weakness, Clarke advocated an 
Anglo-Russian treaty ‘binding both parties to respect the integrity of Afghanistan’ 
which would supplement the Anglo-Japanese alliance.
536
 Tough negotiations between 
Britain and Russia produced the Anglo-Russian Convention of 31 August 1907.
537
 
Although the Convention did not completely remove the rivalry between Britain and 
Russia over Central Asia, it temporarily improved Anglo-Russian relations.
538
        
                                                   
535 Minutes of 97
th
 Meeting, 25 Apr. 1907, CAB 2/2/97. 
536 Note by Clarke, 15 Dec. 1906, Sydenham MSS, Add. MSS. 50836. 
537 For more on the negotiations, see Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar, pp. 267-288.  
538 On the limit of the Anglo-Russian Convention, see K. Neilson, ‘“Incidents” and Foreign Policy: 
A Case Study’ in Diplomacy & Statecraft IX,1, (1998), pp. 53-88; J. Siegel, Endgame: Britain, 
Russia and the Final Struggle for Central Asia (London, 2002); K. Neilson, ‘“Control the 
Whirlwind”: Sir Edward Grey as Foreign Secretary, 1906-16’ in T.G. Otte, (ed.) The Makers of 
British Foreign Policy: From Pitt to Thatcher (Basingstoke, 2002), pp. 136-137. 
200 
 
   Even after resigning from the premiership, Balfour maintained a strong interest in 
the defence of India. Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese War had made her less of 
threat to India, but Balfour did not drop his guard, pointing out that the defence of India 
was as significant as home defence in the House of Commons: Britain had to ‘maintain 
an Army adequate for home defence, which need not be on a very large scale, and an 
Army adequate for the defence of the north-west frontier of India’.539 Even though 
Balfour extended the Anglo-Japanese alliance into India, he warned that it was 
dangerous to assume that Britain could rely on ‘an unlimited supply of men from 
Japan’.540 Britain should therefore keep reinforcements in India against the possibility 
of war. India’s importance had not changed since the end of the Russo-Japanese War. 
Balfour wrote to Esher: ‘India ought not to treat with us as if we were an allied, but 
foreign, Power. We are engaged in a common work; and we are the predominant 
partner’.541 In his mind, India was not foreign and her status was higher than that of a 
foreign ally such as Japan.   
The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 did not shake Balfour’s belief in the 
necessity of reinforcements for India at once. In 1908, David Lloyd George, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, wished to reduce military expenditure in order to increase 
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the welfare budget. The improvement of Anglo-Russian relations was an opportunity to 
realise his disarmament programme. Objecting to Lloyd George’s reduction of army 
personnel, Esher argued that the British army was ‘maintained for the purpose of 
re-inforcing British troops in India and Egypt, and for relieving troops wherever they 
are quartered abroad’.542 On 25 May 1908, Balfour agreed with Esher, emphasising ‘the 
fundamental obligation of keeping adequate reinforcements for India, which are just as 
necessary now as they ever were’.543 He did not deny the utility of the Anglo-Russian 
Convention. However, in a comment on the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale, he could 
not approve of Britain being dependent on a paper agreement for her security.
544
         
   Another significant problem to consider was British policy on a war between 
America and Japan under the Anglo-Japanese alliance. During his premiership Balfour 
was concerned that Britain’s alliance with Japan might drag her into a US-Japanese 
conflict in the Far East and oblige her to offer the latter naval or military assistance 
against America. The Anglo-Japanese alliance would not take effect unless ‘the 
territorial rights of her ally [Japan] were threatened in Asia’. This meant that Britain was 
bound to intervene in a war caused by aggressive American action against Japan’s rights 
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in the Far East. While the possibility that America would behave in such a way was 
small, the General Staff proposed that the CID should consider Britain’s policy in the 
case of such a contingency before the 1907 conference of British and Japanese military 
representatives, where Japan might raise this question.
545
 However, the Foreign Office 
opposed this proposal; if America learnt of any discussion about British policy 
regarding a US-Japanese war, Anglo-American relations would be seriously damaged. 
They concluded that Britain would not have to risk her friendship with America by 
discussing such an improbable eventuality.
546
 Although the Liberal Cabinet approved 
this objection, it was impossible to postpone addressing this problem indefinitely due to 
the deterioration of the US-Japanese relations.  
   Since the Russo-Japanese War, Japanese emigration to America had gradually 
increased the two countries’ mutual suspicion. In December 1906 California’s local 
policy to keep Japanese students out of ordinary schools developed into a diplomatic 
issue between America and Japan.
547
 President Roosevelt, who managed the racial 
problem carefully, approached the British government for support. As the Dominions, 
for example Canada, Australia and New Zealand, were also experiencing Japanese 
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immigration, he assumed that it would be possible to persuade Britain to join America’s 
stance. His effort was aimed not only at Liberal statesmen but also at Balfour. On 5 
March 1908 Roosevelt wrote to Balfour that Britain and America shared the same 
interest in preventing Asian immigration to Australia and North America.
548
 Contrary to 
the period from 1895 to 1905, America tried to persuade Britain to act with her to 
protect their common interests.       
However, Balfour did not see the Japanese immigration problem as serious. While 
affirming Anglo-American cooperation based on Anglo-Saxon solidarity, he did not 
think the race had much influence on relations between Japan and America or the 
Dominions. The notion of the Yellow Peril did not worry him: ‘The idea of Japan 
heading an Eastern crusade on Western civilisation seems to me altogether chimerical’. 
Strategic calculation supported his opinion. Even if Japan undertook such an 
adventurous project, she was never likely to have ‘a Navy sufficient to meet the Fleets 
of the Christian world, who could therefore always cut her off from free communication 
with the mainland of Asia’.549 Balfour’s answer to the racial issue was to leave it alone. 
When Clarke pointed out Australia’s problematic treatment of Japanese immigrants as 
an inferior race, Balfour was not willing to force her to abolish such discrimination and 
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concluded that it would be best to ignore the matter ‘in the hope that ... it may not arise 
in an acute form’.550 Faced with the danger of ‘a violent outbreak of racialism’, 
however, Balfour had to address the racial issue after the Russo-Japanese War.
551
                
   A sensational book to which Balfour and other British policymakers paid attention 
reflected the atmosphere of the US-Japanese rivalry. The American General Homer Lea 
had written a book entitled The Valor of Ignorance, arguing that owing to racial 
difficulties America and Japan would inevitably enter into a war before the expiration of 
the Anglo-Japanese alliance.
552
 This book became popular in America and was 
translated into Japanese. Its influence was not confined to America and Japan: both 
Esher and Lord Roberts read it and sent it to Balfour.
553
 Shrewdly grasping the 
importance of the racial problem, Esher presented Britain’s dilemma:     
 
while we are bound on the one hand by [Anglo-Japanese] Treaty to Japan, and by 
the probable sympathy of the people of this country with the view that the 
Japanese have established a moral right to be treated upon an equality with 
European races, we are hampered on the other hand by the prejudices of our 
Colonial fellow-countrymen in Australia and Canada against men of colour. 
There is very great likelihood that, in the event of war brought on by the 
insistence of the Japanese that they should be accorded equality of treatment with 
Europeans in regard to settlements in countries other than their own, the 
sympathies of the majority of the English people would be on the side of the 
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Japanese, while the sympathies of at least two of our great dominions would be 
on the side of the United States.
554
    
 
Realising the moral power of racial equality, Esher feared that the immigration problem 
might cause a rift between Britain and America or the Dominions. He insisted that the 
CID should examine the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in relation to the 
strategic problems raised by Homer Lea’s book.555    
Balfour was not concerned about the British dilemma that Esher outlined. In his 
mind, Japan’s requirement for equal treatment would never overwhelm Anglo-Saxon 
solidarity. Regardless of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, he observed, it would be 
impossible for Britain to join Japan’s war against the United States in order to obtain 
emigration privileges into North America. Moreover, his cool-headed strategic 
calculation reckoned that Homer Lea’s book exaggerated Japan’s chance of victory: 
 
It would, in my opinion, be folly for the Japanese to provoke a war which, 
however great their initial success, could only end in the richer and bigger 
country building a fleet superior to their own: and long before that position of 
superiority was reached the whole position of an island Power like Japan would 
be imperilled by the possibility of a coalition between the U.S.A. and some other 
European nation which has, or might have, ships in the Far East.
556
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Balfour’s solution to the immigration issue was practical. He argued that, as long as 
Japan had ‘reasonable space for emigration in Asia’, there was no reason for her to go to 
war with America.
557
 As with the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1905, 
Balfour never imagined that Britain would support Japan in a war against America due 
to the alliance, which did not affect the importance of Anglo-American cooperation. On 
the other hand, he could accept the flux of Japanese immigration into Asia if they did 
not enter America or the Dominions. He was prepared to tolerate Japan’s expansion at 
the expense of Asia to maintain calm Anglo-American-Japanese relations.     
   The international situation in the Far East complicated Anglo-American-Japanese 
trilateral relations further and Britain had to take balanced action regarding America and 
Japan. On 18 December 1909, America suggested the internationalisation of the 
railways from Manchuria to Japan. Japan turned this proposal down and chose to 
cooperate with Russia. This enhanced Russo-Japanese rapprochement after the war, 
leading to the conclusion of a Russo-Japanese agreement confirming their interests in 
Manchuria on 4 July 1910.
558
 Britain remained a spectator and did not show any 
sympathy with America. Grey regretted that America’s ‘ill-timed proposals’ had drawn 
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Russia and Japan closer together, making ‘the task of preserving the open door 
increasingly difficult’.559 On the other hand, America was dissatisfied with Britain’s 
neutral attitude. Realising her irritation, James Bryce, the British Ambassador at 
Washington, proposed that Britain should ‘soothe American susceptibilities in Far 
Eastern matters’. 560  An Anglo-American arbitration treaty proposed by President 
William Taft offered an opportunity to mend relations with America.
561
  
   As a proponent of close Anglo-American cooperation, Balfour keenly supported this 
Anglo-American arbitration treaty. Although serving as Leader of the Opposition, 
Balfour did not jeopardise Anglo-American cooperation by opposing the ruling Liberal 
Party’s policy. He addressed to the House of Commons on 16 March 1911: 
 
... I cannot see why it [the arbitration treaty] could not be carried out between this 
country and America. ... I hope we may take the obiter dicta ... of President Taft ... 
that they represent the general feeling in the United States that the time has come 
when those two great countries should, whatever other countries may do, at all 
events recognise that, so far as they are concerned, peace is the greatest of their 
interests, and that the time has come when they may at least be bound in some 
mutual obligations by treaty to refer all questions that can possibly produce 
anything so horrible as war between them to some arbitration tribunal. ...
562
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The Anglo-American arbitration treaty obtained unanimous support in Britain.  
   However, there was a risk that the arbitration treaty would conflict with the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance, which was to expire in August 1915. If it was terminated, 
Britain would have to reinforce her fleet in the Pacific to maintain her naval supremacy 
in the Far East.
563
 Given the financial burden entailed in this and Japan’s potential as a 
threat, the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was advantageous to Britain. The 
Asquith administration thus wanted to make the Anglo-Japanese alliance consistent with 
the Anglo-American arbitration treaty. Grey was in favour of this and answered that ‘in 
order to obviate any difficulties connected with the Japanese Alliance they [the United 
States] should propose a similar Arbitration Treaty to Japan’.564 America took a long 
time to propose such an arbitration treaty, but Britain decided to wait for it. Taking 
advantage of the stagnation in negotiations, Japan suggested to Britain that they discuss 
the revision and renewal of the alliance in March 1911.
565
 Accepting Japan’s suggestion, 
the British Cabinet agreed to renew the alliance for ten years from the date of 
modification and to revise it to make it compatible with the arbitration treaty.
566
       
   The transformation of international politics after the Russo-Japanese War forced 
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Britain to reconsider the clauses of the Anglo-Japanese alliance relating to Japan’s 
military assistance. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 improved Anglo-Russian 
relations over Central Asia and reduced the Russian threat to India. The Liberal 
government decided not to ask for Japan’s military help, so Grey considered Article IV 
of the alliance, which stated that Japan would provide military aid for India, no longer 
necessary. Moreover, Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910 invalidated the clauses in the 
alliance relating to Korea. It was forecast that Japan would require acknowledgement of 
her special interests in, not Korea, but Manchuria in return for her military assistance for 
India. Grey therefore insisted that the revised alliance should not retain Article IV.
567
 
The India Office approved the omission of Article IV, and the revised alliance did not 
refer to India in its articles.
568
 Grey did not completely abandon the possibility of 
accepting Japanese military help in India, pointing out that ‘we could discuss it with 
Japan under Article I’.569 But, it was clear that the 1911 revision marked the end of 
Balfour’s scheme to enlist Japanese military assistance for India.          
   Instead, the defence of the Dominions, in particular Australia and New Zealand, 
attracted the attention of British policymakers. Even during the Russo-Japanese War, 
Balfour had wondered about the effect of the Japan’s growing power on Australia. His 
                                                   
567 Minutes by Grey on India Office’s telegram of 17 May 1911, FO 371/1140/18951. 
568 India Office to Foreign Office, 17 May 1911, FO 371/1140/18951. 
569 Minutes by Grey on Foreign Office’s telegram of 12 Apr. 1911, FO 371/1140. 
210 
 
interest was in whether it would strengthen ‘the desire for Imperial Unity’.570 After the 
war, as Balfour thought, Australia was more concerned about the possibility of an 
invasion by Japan. Given the increase in their population and wealth, it was reasonable 
to ask the Dominions to contribute resources to the defence of the British Empire to 
alleviate London’s burden. Balfour deemed that the CID was a suitable organisation to 
coordinate Britain’s and Dominion’s policy on various imperial defence problems. In 
1909 he suggested to Esher ‘a permanent representation on the C[ommittee of]. Imperial 
Defence, of the Dominion, for Imperial defence questions’.571 This was the realisation 
of his early idea that the CID would develop into an Imperial Council, dealing with 
imperial questions and strengthening the unity of the British Empire.   
   Balfour’s idea was realised by the Liberal government just before the renewal and 
revision of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. On 26 May 1911, the CID held a special 
meeting with representatives from Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa and 
Newfoundland to review their defence policies and British foreign policy.
572
 However, 
the British policymakers had already decided to renew and revise the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance and had no intention of changing this. Even before the meeting, Grey wanted to 
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impress upon the Dominion representatives ‘the serious effect that the denunciation of 
the [Anglo-Japanese] Treaty would have on their strategic position’.573 He reiterated to 
them at the meeting that ‘in the interests of strategy, in the interests of naval expenditure, 
and in the interests of stability, it is essential that the Japanese Alliance should be 
extended’. 574  Although concerned about Japanese immigration, the Dominions 
accepted the renewal and revision of the alliance.
575
 Therefore, the Asquith 
administration easily secured an agreement on the Anglo-Japanese alliance between 
Britain and the Dominions. At least, however, London no longer ignored the Dominions 
and had to take their opinions on the Anglo-Japanese alliance into account.      
   After negotiations between Britain and Japan, the renewed and revised 
Anglo-Japanese alliance was signed on 13 July 1911. Article IV of the revised alliance 
was the most important clause: 
 
Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with 
a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall entail upon such 
Contracting Party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such 
treaty of arbitration is in force.
576
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Although there was no reference to America, this clause was clearly aimed at avoiding 
Britain having to support Japan in a war against America. Balfour realised this point, 
reflecting that ‘some provision had been introduced which precluded the possibility of 
war with the U.S.A. being one of the possible consequences of our [Anglo-Japanese] 
Alliance’.577 From the viewpoint of Anglo-Saxon solidarity, Balfour did not oppose it 
in Parliament. This revision demonstrated his strong interest in maintaining 
Anglo-American cooperation, to which the Anglo-Japanese alliance was subject. 
However, the arbitration treaty eventually lapsed, following a confrontation between 
President Taft and the Senate. In September 1914, Britain concluded so-called Peace 
Commissions Treaty with America which was regarded as equivalent to the general 
arbitration treaty.
578
 Article IV then finally became effective. This episode indicated the 
difficulty in securing America’s commitment to the international scheme.  
India was only referred to in the preamble to the revised alliance and there was no 
concrete clause about military assistance from Japan. But this did not mean that Britain 
no longer related India’s security to Japanese military support. Balfour’s interest in the 
defence of India remained strong after the revision of the alliance. In 1913, referring to 
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a scenario in which India would be threatened due to a change in the Anglo-Russian 
Convention, Balfour considered the necessity of military assistance for India.
579
 It was 
not the collapse of the Anglo-Russian Convention but the outbreak of the Great War that 
once more raised the matter of the utility of Japanese military assistance for India. 
Balfour would tackle this problem and assume a crucial role in the British government 
during the war.    
 
II  
 
After the Great War broke out in the summer of 1914, Japan entered the war on the 
British side as part of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Although she was Britain’s ally, 
Japan’s entry into the war was controversial. Britain thought Japan’s cooperation 
strategically essential to tackle the German naval squadron and an individual German 
raider in the Far East.
580
 Thus immediately before the outbreak of the war, she asked 
Japan to support Hong Kong or Wei-hai-Wei if they were attacked by Germany.
581
 On 
the other hand, Britain was suspicious of Japan’s intentions and feared that she might 
take advantage of the war to expand her sphere of influence in the Far East. The British 
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Cabinet concluded that ‘the general interests involved in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
warranted and required common action but that the operations should be limited in area 
to the coasts of China and the China Seas and westward’.582 The Foreign Secretary, Sir 
Edward Grey, conveyed this judgement to Sir W. Conyngham Greene, the British 
ambassador in Tokyo, explaining that this restriction was ‘important to prevent 
unfounded misapprehension abroad’.583 
Japan, however, did not agree to these geographical limits to her operations. She 
declared war on Germany on 23 August, vaguely stating that she would ‘take such 
measures as may be necessary for the protection of the general interests contemplated in 
the Agreement of Alliance’.584 Immediately following her declaration of war Japan 
launched naval and military operations against the Germans in the Far East. The 
Japanese navy occupied German-held islands lying north of the Equator in the Pacific in 
October, and Japanese cruisers commenced operations against the German Far Eastern 
Squadron, escorting Allied troop carriers and commercial ships. The Japanese army 
captured Tsingtao and the bay of Kiaochow, which had been under German control. 
This campaign was a concerted British and Japanese operation due to Britain’s doubts 
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about Japan’s intentions and China’s request to watch Japan’s movements.585 Although 
there were some disagreements between the British and Japanese armies, they 
succeeded in eliminating the German base in the Far East. In contrast to the stalemate in 
Europe, Japan’s naval and military action brought the Allied Powers a quick victory in 
the Far East. 
At first Britain tried to restrict the Japanese naval and military campaigns in the Far 
East, but she soon came to keenly recognise the need for Japan’s assistance in Europe. 
Britain requested that Japan send her cruisers to the Mediterranean to tackle German 
cruisers on 2 September.
586
 However, Japan’s response was lukewarm. She was 
displeased that Britain now required her to dispatch her fleet as far abroad as Europe, 
although having attempted to restrict the sphere of her operations at the outbreak of the 
war. When Katsunosuke Inoue, Japan’s Ambassador to Britain, pointed this out, Grey 
replied that the British restriction ‘only applied to the area of the Pacific, and the 
Mediterranean is another question’. Inoue criticised Britain’s contradictory attitude and 
refused her request, giving the reason that the main purpose of the Japanese navy was to 
‘defend Japan from a foreign enemy’ which did not include an expedition to regions far 
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from Japan.
587
  
As with Japan’s naval assistance, although Britain attempted to limit the sphere of 
Japanese military operations at the outbreak of the war, expectations of her military aid 
soon emerged. Balfour did not have a position in the Cabinet, but as a member of the 
CID he considered the possibility that Japan would send an expeditionary force to the 
European Continent. In October 1914, he received a letter from the French philosopher 
Henri Bergson. He and Bergson were old acquaintances, both having delivered the 
Gifford Lecture at Glasgow and Edinburgh in 1913 and 1914. However, Bergson’s letter 
related not to philosophy but to politico-military matters. Bergson introduced Albert 
Kahn, the French banker, and wanted to talk with Balfour about Japanese military 
assistance. Kahn had been Bergson’s pupil and had a wide range of personal 
connections in the political and business worlds. He advocated the utilisation of 
Japanese troops in Europe to stop the German offensive and wanted to inform 
influential British statesmen of this idea. He had asked his mentor Bergson for an 
introduction and finally reached Balfour.
588
 
   On receiving Bergson’s letter Balfour sent it to Sir Arthur Nicolson, the Permanent 
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Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He did not express his own opinion on the 
matter because he did not have ‘sufficient knowledge of the relevant considerations’. 
However, he was concerned about the political and diplomatic effect of this assistance, 
quoting its potential effect on public opinion in Europe, North America and 
Australasia.
589
 He correctly realised the influence of Japan’s military aid beyond the 
military aspect. Nicolson’s reply was negative. Although he sent Bergson’s letter to 
Grey, he insisted that the Foreign Office had already seriously considered the question 
of Japan’s help, and the Japanese government was unwilling to take an active and direct 
part in military operations in Europe.
590
    
   In December 1914, Balfour met Bergson and Kahn in Scotland and discussed the 
matter of Japanese military assistance with them. Kahn gave Balfour a great deal of 
information about Russia’s weakness and advocated inducing Japan to send her army to 
the European theatre of war. However, Balfour, having already abandoned the idea of 
utilising Japanese troops on the western front, insisted that the eastern front was more 
suitable. He was impressed by Kahn’s account of Russian resources. According to Kahn, 
the Russians did not have sufficient ‘small arms or equipment for more than three 
million men, while their machinery for adding to their supplies seems insignificant’. 
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Balfour confessed, ‘if this story is true, or anything like the truth, their utility as Allies is 
less than I had hoped’.591 Therefore the addition of a Japanese expeditionary force to 
the Russian army would be exceedingly welcome for the purpose of bolstering the 
Allies’ military strength.592 Balfour gave Kahn a letter of introduction to the Foreign 
Office and suggested that Nicolson and Grey meet Kahn on this matter.  
Kahn was interviewed by Nicolson and Lord Haldane, who was temporarily 
replacing Grey, in London at the end of December 1914. Nicolson and Haldane also 
enquired of Count Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador to Britain, whether the 
Russian government would accept Japanese troops on the eastern front to ‘relieve the 
German pressure in the west’.593 But Grey had already decided that the ‘matter must 
drop for the present’.594 He declined a French proposal that Britain, France and Russia 
jointly appeal to Japan to despatch troops to Europe.
595
 At first Balfour thought that 
Kahn’s idea was worth the consideration of the Foreign Office, but his view of the 
utility of Japan’s assistance soon became pessimistic. In a letter to Sir John Fisher, First 
Sea Lord, on 12 January 1915 Balfour wrote:             
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I think it very unlikely that the Japanese would, under any circumstances, 
circumnavigate the Globe in order to fight in Flanders, and if they fight in 
Russia, this will only indirectly help us, if it helps us at all, to occupy what your 
correspondent calls the German and Belgian Coast between Kiel and Dunkirk.
596
 
  
Expectations of deploying Japanese troops in Europe faded. Balfour and the Foreign 
Office did not return to this subject for some time. Yet the idea of using Japanese forces 
had not been completely discarded; it would emerge again when the circumstances of 
the war worsened.  
Serving as a member of the CID and War Council, Balfour gradually came to work 
in close cooperation with David Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer and his 
former political enemy, to tackle the munitions shortage. Although Lloyd George had 
been strongly against the Boer War, he praised Balfour’s ‘war experience’ and ‘high 
intellectual gifts’.597 Balfour and Lloyd George required Asquith to set up a committee 
to address the lack of munitions. But it was not until the end of March 1915 that Asquith 
decided to establish the Committee for mobilising industry to increase the output of war 
equipment. Balfour complained that the Committee ‘ought to have been appointed 
seven months ago; and, if it had been, the Allies would be in a much more secure 
position than they are at the present moment’.598 However, he thought that the ‘delay 
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has been deplorable and fraught with peril: - but better late than never’.599  
   While the Committee for mobilising industry began to work, the Liberal 
administration split over the Dardanelles campaign.
600
 To deal with this political crisis, 
Asquith decided to form a coalition government and appointed Balfour as First Lord of 
the Admiralty. In the Admiralty Balfour was involved in utilising Japanese naval 
assistance, which became more desirable due to the urgent necessity for protecting 
Allied commerce and transportation from German U-boats. The Admiralty began to 
require that Japanese destroyers was involved in the Mediterranean, insisting that ‘the 
presence of a flotilla of Japanese destroyers in those waters [Mediterranean] would be 
of the greatest value, in view of the present demand for Allied vessels of this type’.601 
On receiving the Admiralty’s request Grey instructed Greene to ask Japan to send her 
flotilla to European waters on 4 February 1916.
602
 However, before Japan’s answer 
became clear, the German commerce-raider ‘Moewe’ would appear in the Indian 
Ocean.
603
 To deal with this new menace Britain had to change her original request. She 
desired Japan first to send a cruiser squadron to the Indian Ocean to protect the transport 
routes between Aden and Australia and second, to deliver four destroyers to assist in 
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patrolling the Malacca Strait.
604
 Although initially hesitant, at the end of March Japan 
eventually arranged to send a flotilla and some cruisers to operate in Singapore and the 
Indian Ocean.
605
                
 Although Balfour played a part in the Admiralty’s attempt to extract naval vessels 
from Japan, he was not always convinced of the value of Japan’s assistance at that time. 
In January 1916 he agreed about the utility of Japanese destroyers escorting Allied 
vessels with valuable cargoes in the Mediterranean.
606
 He also realised that a flotilla of 
Japanese destroyers in the Indian Ocean would be valuable to protect the trade route 
from German attack.
607
 However, when the Admiralty examined the purchase of the 
Japanese battle-cruisers to support the Royal Navy, Balfour showed his cautious attitude. 
He did not agree that Britain needed to buy Japanese battle-cruisers because Britain’s 
naval strength was not seriously diminished. On 10 June 1916, he concluded that Britain 
should not negotiate with Japan on the matter.
608
 Balfour regarded Japanese naval 
assistance as simply a question of adding auxiliary ships such as destroyers. It was not 
necessary for Britain to obtain Japan’s capital ships, such as battle-cruisers, unless the 
British navy’s vulnerability became obvious.   
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   Balfour’s duty was not restricted to the Admiralty. He joined the War Committee, 
which became the nucleus of the coalition government, and was directly involved in war 
planning. Here he realised that the shortage of munitions was greater than ever. In early 
1915 the shortage had been confined to shells and rifles. About two years later, although 
the coalition government had been set up, the war situation had deteriorated rather than 
improved. Balfour had to tackle a deficit not only of shells and rifles but also of all 
kinds of munitions and resources. In December 1916, he wrote in a memorandum:  
 
The fundamental difficulty of the present situation is that we do not possess – and 
are not likely to possess the instruments of modern warfare in sufficient quantity 
for ourselves, still less for ourselves and our Allies. There is a shortage of 
everything – Men, Money, Munitions, Steel, Ships of War, Merchant Ships, 
Aeroplanes, Foodstuffs. ... Take, for instance, the first of the war needs which I 
enumerated above – the need for men. We appointed a Man-power Board, which 
has done most valuable work; but as far as I can see – I may be quite wrong – the 
question which they consciously or unconsciously put to themselves is not; “How 
can be best use men for the war” but “How can we find most men for the 
army?”609 
 
The Asquith administration, however, was in turmoil again when Balfour warned it of 
the serious danger of the shortage with the above memorandum. Growing confrontation 
within the Cabinet forced Asquith to resign as Prime Minister on 5 December. Lloyd 
George established a new coalition government with Balfour serving as Foreign 
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Secretary.  
On becoming Foreign Secretary, Balfour had to review the whole of British foreign 
policy towards Asia during the war. Japan’s so-called ‘Twenty-one Demands’ caused a 
political crisis in the Far East while Britain was engaged in the war in Europe.
610
 These 
twenty one Japanese requirements had been presented to China on 18 January 1915.
611
 
Japan was trying to consolidate her position in Shantung, which she had occupied 
immediately after the Anglo-Japanese joint military campaign against Germany. 
However, Britain deemed some of these demands, which were referred to as Group V, 
‘the final touches to a Japanese protectorate over China’.612  Faced with China’s 
resistance and Britain’s objection, Japan omitted Group V and presented the rest of the 
demands to China with a final ultimatum. In the end China accepted them. This crisis 
strengthened Britain’s doubts about Japan’s diplomacy and the value of the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance. 
Japan’s encroachment of southern China strained Anglo-Japanese relations further. 
Taking advantage of civil war in China, Japan strengthened her influence in Yunnan 
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province and Tibet in 1916.
613
 Her presence in these regions, which were adjacent to 
India, caused the Government of India serious concern.
614
 London could not overlook 
this Far Eastern situation, although the war in Europe had reached a stalemate. However, 
it was Germany that benefited from the discord between Britain and Japan. Britain had 
to both check Japan’s expansion in the Far East and maintain harmony among the Allied 
powers.    
    On 13 February 1917, Balfour wrote to Greene that British policy regarding Japan 
was ‘one of forced acquiescence – not to obstruct, and yet not to offer any concession 
gratuitously’. Although cooperating with Japan over financial help for China, Britain 
was quietly resisting her bid to expand her influence in the Yangtze Valley and the 
Chinese provinces bordering India and Tibet. But given ‘the present condition of British 
political and financial helplessness in the Far East’, it was doubtful that Britain could 
maintain the status quo in that region. Moreover, she might have to request Japan’s 
naval and military help in the future. Balfour emphasised that Britain would always 
have to pay the price for Japan’s aid ‘at the expense of British interests in China’ and 
should not sacrifice her interests in India. For him this was ‘a cardinal point in British 
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policy’ and there could be ‘no compromise’.615  
This telegram showed three important elements of Balfour’s foreign policy 
regarding Japan. First, he clearly recognised Britain’s difficult position in Asia. Britain 
had to focus on the war in Europe and could not afford to appropriate any resources for 
use in Asia. Therefore, her policy towards Japan had to be passive. Balfour had no 
intention of allowing British interests to be violated, but he could not openly resist 
Japan’s advance to China to avoid disarray among the Allied powers and conflict in 
Asia. Second, he recognised the possibility that Britain would be forced to request more 
naval and military assistance from Japan. He considered that British interests in China 
could be used as the price for such Japanese aid. He did not want to renounce British 
interests unnecessarily, but regarded those in China as potential bargaining chips. 
Finally, realising a close strategic linkage between China and India, Balfour prioritised 
Britain’s interests in India over those in China. Even if Britain had to make concessions 
to Japan, he advocated that she should not even indicate that she might regard her 
interests in India as possible concessions. This argument which was the same as that 
before 1905 highlighted his determination to protect British interests in India absolutely. 
His attitude towards India was totally different to that towards China.  
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All the above-mentioned elements illustrated how Balfour’s policy regarding Japan 
during the war kept in mind not only the Far East but also India. The war situation in 
Europe was not improving, and Britain was suffering severely from a lack of manpower, 
warships and other munitions. Until he became Foreign Secretary Balfour had not 
believed in Britain’s imperative need of Japan’s naval and military aid. However, the 
difficult circumstances of the war forced him to acknowledge that she had to ask for 
Japanese help in Europe. At this point, Japan’s naval and military assistance became 
involved in Europe, India and the Far East. As the newly-appointed Foreign Secretary, 
Balfour had to tackle this global problem.    
 
III  
 
When Balfour became Foreign Secretary in December 1916, the circumstances of the 
war had worsened. In particular, German U-boats had stepped up their attack on Allied 
transportation routes and Britain had suffered a substantial loss of commodities. For 
instance, from January to August 1916, the average monthly loss to U-boat action was 
56,000 tons; and from September to December 1916, that number surged to 121,000 
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tons.
616
 Although Japan’s fleet had already assisted Britain in the Far East and the 
Indian Ocean, Balfour decided to request more naval aid. On 18 December, the 
Admiralty expressed its hope that Japan would send two light cruisers to the Cape of 
Good Hope ‘in order to operate against raiders in the South Atlantic or Indian Ocean’, 
and also asked for a flotilla of Japanese destroyers to be deployed in the Mediterranean 
for the purpose of ‘attacking submarines and protecting trade in the central part of the 
Mediterranean’.617 Balfour approved this request and instructed Greene to convey it to 
the Japanese government, simultaneously pointing out to the Admiralty the 
impossibility of examining all mail on Japanese ships at sea for evidence of German 
plots. In order to secure Japan’s full naval cooperation, Britain had to avoid such a 
measure which would seriously offend Japanese public opinion.
618
  
   The Japanese government needed some justification for the further naval assistance 
to convince the Imperial Diet and public opinion. Although there was a change of 
cabinet in Japan in October 1916, the new cabinet followed the previous policy 
regarding the provision of naval help. On 27 January 1917, Ichiro Motono, Japan’s 
Foreign Minister, wired Sutemi Chinda, Japanese Ambassador to Britain, that the 
Japanese government wanted ‘convincing evidence’ in order to send a fleet to Europe 
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because the ‘ex-Japanese Cabinet limited the sphere of naval operation and decided not 
to dispatch her navy to the Mediterranean’. For Motono, ‘convincing evidence’ meant a 
British guarantee of Japanese rights to the Pacific Islands north of the Equator and 
Shantung province at the future Peace Conference.
619
 When Motono informed Greene 
of Japan’s acceptance of Britain’s request, he also mentioned Japan’s desire for the 
Pacific Islands and Shantung.
620
 Motono did not state that this was a condition of 
further aid, but Chinda was more straightforward. He met Balfour on 2 February and 
said that if Britain did not accept Japan’s request, ‘the dispatching of the Japanese fleet 
would reach a dead end’.621  
Balfour and the Foreign Office considered it reasonable to assure Japan of her rights 
in Shantung and the Pacific Islands in return for her naval assistance. However, he 
realised that the Colonial Office should be consulted on this matter.
622
 Walter Long, 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, had emphasised the necessity of obtaining the 
concurrence of the Dominions, and the War Cabinet followed his suggestion on 1 
February. Although Australia and New Zealand might be reluctant to accept such 
assurance, Long considered that they would finally assent to the guaranteeing of Japan’s 
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rights in Shantung and the Pacific Islands if Britain stressed that Japan would have to 
consent to Britain’s rights to the Pacific Islands south of the Equator.623 Balfour agreed 
to Long’s proposal and quickly communicated with the Dominions about the disposal of 
the Pacific Islands and Shantung.
624
 Australia and New Zealand eventually accepted 
Japan’s conditions for her naval assistance.625    
America’s possible entry into the war accelerated Britain’s decision to approve 
Japan’s demands. America did not want Japan’s sphere of influence in the Far East to 
increase and was sure to oppose a guarantee of Japanese rights in the Pacific Islands and 
Shantung. Therefore, Britain had to agree to Japan’s request before America entered the 
war to avoid ‘the possible difficulties that might be created with the United States’.626 
On 14 February 1917, immediately after obtaining the assent from Australia and New 
Zealand, Balfour officially stated that Britain would guarantee Japan’s rights in the 
Pacific Islands and Shantung at the coming peace conference.
627
 Japan received 
Britain’s answer and accepted the condition that Britain would keep the Pacific Islands 
south of the Equator.
628
 As a result, Britain concluded a secret agreement with Japan 
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over this territory in the Far East.  
This highlighted how the Japanese naval assistance issue was so complicated that it 
could not be confined to Anglo-Japanese bilateral relations. Although Balfour 
considered Japan’s conditions permissible, he had to persuade Australia and New 
Zealand to accept them. Moreover, fear of opposition from America forced Balfour to 
reach an agreement with Japan quickly. Japan’s help might damage relations between 
Britain and the Dominions or America. Balfour prevented such disharmony. The 
performance of the Japanese cruisers was satisfactory. They sought the German raider 
‘Wolf’ on its way to the Mediterranean and arrived at Malta on 13 April, at once 
beginning to escort Allied merchant vessels and troop transports to reduce the threat of 
German submarines.
629
 Balfour’s management of this issue was successful during the 
war. However, Britain’s secret guarantee of Japan’s territorial rights would cast a 
shadow on Anglo-American-Japanese relations after the war.        
   After America entered the war in April 1917, Balfour led a British delegation to 
America to discuss British and American war policy. During his stay in America, 
Balfour found ‘a profoundly gloomy view of Japanese policy’ at the US State 
Department and had to ‘combat suspicions which seemed to me, on the evidence, 
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somewhat excessive’.630 At that time, America sought to increase the number of capital 
ships, and the construction of additional destroyers was impossible. Balfour had to 
persuade the American authorities to abandon their naval building programme because 
Britain needed more American destroyers to tackle the German submarines, but he 
made no progress because ‘fear of Japan is so great, both in the Navy Department and 
elsewhere’.631 Colonel Edward M. House, President Wilson’s chief advisor, suggested 
that America might accept Britain’s request if the latter could guarantee her assistance 
with capital ships ‘in the case of any attack upon the United States by a third party’.632 
He indicated that this guarantee might be developed into a mutually defensive naval 
alliance between Britain and America.
633
 It was obvious that the United States feared 
Japan most, so ‘the proposed guarantee or the Alliance would raise the whole question 
of our relations with Japan’.634        
   Balfour considered that an Anglo-American defensive alliance was desirable and 
would have the immense advantage of extracting destroyers from America. However, he 
foresaw that such an agreement between Britain and America ‘might produce a very 
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unpleasant feeling in Tokyo’. As long as the alliances were defensive there was no 
incompatibility between an Anglo-American alliance and the Anglo-Japanese one. But 
Japan would regard the conclusion of an alliance with America as ‘the beginning of the 
end of an [Anglo-Japanese] Alliance which has already lasted twenty years’. The best 
and only solution to avoid such circumstances was ‘to try to associate Japan from the 
beginning with the new arrangement’.635 On returning to Britain, he suggested a 
formula at a meeting of the Cabinet on 19 June:   
 
      That, in view of the diversion of Government shipbuilding in the naval yards of 
the United States of America from the construction of capital ships to that of 
vessels suitable for anti-submarine warfare, the Governments of the United 
States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy, Russia and Japan engage singly 
and severally to assist each other against any maritime attack for a period of four 
years after the conclusion of the present war.
636
 
 
This formula included six powers to show the unity of the Allied Powers, but its central 
point was the triumvirate of Britain, America and Japan. According to Balfour, this 
agreement ‘would have the triple effect of allaying Japanese fears, of engaging Japanese 
support, and of advertising the Treaty as a protection against Germany’.637 This was the 
crystallisation of his effort to keep Anglo-American-Japanese relations calm during the 
war. It was important that Balfour had no intention of weakening the Anglo-Japanese 
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alliance; his scheme of the tripartite naval agreement was rather the development of the 
alliance.    
   Although the British Cabinet authorised Balfour to negotiate with America about his 
scheme, President Wilson did not welcome it.
638
 His formula was ‘a violent departure 
from United States practice’.639 Even if Wilson himself agreed with Balfour’s plan, the 
US Senate would fiercely oppose a binding treaty with foreign powers. Thus Wilson 
rejected the scheme for an Anglo-American alliance, saying vaguely that ‘the United 
States will proceed as energetically as possible to build destroyers’.640 It was the death 
blow to Balfour’s bid to forge a multinational naval agreement including Britain, 
America and Japan. This failure showed the difficulty of securing American 
commitment in international security problems. However, Balfour did not completely 
abandon his idea of an Anglo-American-Japanese naval agreement: it would appear 
again after the war.       
Balfour successfully secured further naval assistance from Japan in February and 
made an effort to improve relations with America in May 1917. Britain’s prospects still 
did not improve as he had hoped. America was not yet ready for war, and could not 
offer the destroyers that Britain desperately needed at once. Furthermore, the German 
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submarine attacks on Allied shipping intensified, causing heavy damage to British 
commerce and transportation. The monthly loss of tonnage through U-boat offensives in 
January 1917 was 109,954, more than doubling in February and March 1917 to 256,394 
and 283,647 respectively.
641
 In the end Britain had to ask Japan to despatch more 
vessels to deal with this German threat. On 23 March, the Admiralty required three 
kinds of further naval help from Japan, namely: ‘(a) four cruisers or battleships to 
protect transports between Colombo and Australia, (b) for ships to be sent to the vicinity 
of Hong Kong, (c) for squadron to be sent to the coast of Queensland’.642 Moreover, 
Britain urged Japan to send twelve more destroyers to European waters on 30 April.
643
 
These urgent requests for Japan’s naval aid demonstrated how the threat of German 
raiders and submarines was more serious than Britain had expected. 
However, Japan was beginning to think that Britain’s requests were becoming 
endless. The Japanese Admiralty insisted that Japan had already provided the Allied 
Powers with new destroyers. The Japanese government refused Britain’s request 
because her Imperial Diet would oppose the dispatch of her navy to Europe, leaving her 
own waters vulnerable to German raiders.
644
 In response Britain modified her request at 
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once and asked Japan to send four destroyers to the Mediterranean.
645
 Japan finally 
agreed and officially announced this on 24 May.
646
 However, she added that her navy 
could not afford to dispatch any further vessels to Europe.
647
 There was now little room 
left for further compromise between Britain and Japan on naval assistance.   
   In the summer of 1917 Balfour again made a diplomatic effort to improve relations 
between America and Japan. Following the success of his US mission, Japan had also 
decided to send a special delegation to America led by Kikujiro Ishii, the former 
Foreign Minister. Just before his arrival on 13 August 1917, the US State Department 
unofficially asked Spring-Rice Britain’s opinion of Japan’s wartime cooperation with 
the Allies.
648
 Balfour desperately wanted to smooth US-Japanese relations and to 
extract more assistance from Japan. To solve the dilemma, he agreed with Sir Walter 
Langley, the Assistant Under-Secretary responsible for Far Eastern affairs at the Foreign 
Office, that ‘[w]e need only touch lightly on what they [the Japanese] have left undone 
but sufficiently to support our suggestion that the U.S. Gov[ermen]t. should direct their 
efforts to extracting tonnage’.649 Therefore his reply praised Japan’s contribution to the 
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Allies’ war effort, citing her vessels despatched to the Mediterranean and army 
equipment provided to Russia. On the other hand, he added the suggestion at the end 
that America should induce Japan to supply more mercantile tonnage.
650
 This answer, 
favourable to Japan and dishonest to America, was useful in overcoming the mutual 
suspicions between America and Japan. During his mission, Ishii succeeded in forging 
the Ishii-Lansing agreement with America, improving US-Japanese relations.
651
 
Balfour played a role in preparing for this achievement.                   
   A confrontation between Britain and Japan over further naval assistance finally 
occurred in the autumn of 1917. In September, the Admiralty warned that a new 
German battle-cruiser would threaten Britain’s naval superiority in the North Sea and 
proposed that utilising Japanese battle-cruisers was the ‘only way of meeting this 
danger’.652 Thus Britain asked Japan to sell her two Japanese battle-cruisers, but Japan 
declined this request on 5 October. Foreign Minister Motono cited three reasons for 
Japan’s refusal: first, Japan had only four battle-cruisers and could not afford to sell two 
of them to Britain; second, Japan’s Imperial Diet and public were so proud of the 
battle-cruisers that they would not agree to sell them to Britain; and third, Japan was 
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planning to add two more battle-cruisers to her existing four and it was impossible for 
her to cancel this program.
653
 Japan’s reluctance to part with any of her battle-cruisers 
was so strong that there was little possibility that she would accept Britain’s request. 
   However, Balfour did not abandon his effort to obtain Japanese battle-cruisers. He 
modified his request and asked Japan to lend Britain two battle-cruisers manned and 
commanded by Japanese sailors. Moreover, he suggested that Japanese battle-cruisers 
should be attached to the British Grand Fleet in the North Sea. He considered that this 
new proposal ‘might be more agreeable’ to Japan, and was disappointed when Chinda 
delivered the Japanese government’s refusal on 14 November.654 At this meeting 
Balfour insisted that Japan had taken the side of the Allies under the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance and had improved relations with America with the Ishii-Lansing agreement. 
According to him, the only naval threat that Japan had to fear was the German fleet, so 
Japan no longer had to ‘bottle up her fleet’ in Eastern waters.655 However, Chinda 
merely repeated in response that Japan’s population was strongly opposed. Balfour ‘did 
not pretend to be satisfied either with the course pursued by his [Chinda’s] Government 
or by the arguments with which that course was justified’, stating that ‘the Japanese 
people thought that Japan would not cooperate with Britain at all beyond the scope of 
                                                   
653 Greene to Foreign Office, 5 Oct. 1917, FO 371/2955/196674. 
654 Balfour to Greene, 18 Oct. 1917, FO 371/2955/201838. 
655 Memo. by Balfour, 15 Nov. 1917, FO 371/2955/217082.  
238 
 
the Anglo-Japanese alliance’.656 He had no choice but to give up hope of additional 
naval aid from Japan.                    
   The British need for Japanese naval assistance diminished after 1918 as the threat 
from German submarines eased and subsequently the loss of merchant tonnage 
decreased. The average monthly loss to U-boats from January to April 1918 was about 
200,000 tons. This number never surpassed 200,000 from May onwards and decreased 
to 136,864 tons in September 1918.
657
 Although Japan had not accepted any additional 
requests from Britain since October 1917, her naval operation in the Mediterranean and 
the Indian Ocean continued until the end of the war. Her mission was mainly to provide 
a convoy for Allied merchantmen, but her effectiveness was highly appreciated by 
British flag officers on the spot.
658
 Balfour repeatedly expressed his gratitude for 
Japan’s assistance and did not hesitate to point out its importance to statesmen of other 
Allied Powers.
659
 However, this did not mean that he was satisfied with Japan’s aid and 
attitudes towards Britain. In a letter to Viscount Milner, Minister without Portfolio, of 
19 January 1918, he confessed that Japan’s assistance was not ‘all that we had a right to 
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expect’ and that her refusal to sell or lend her battle-cruisers was ‘quite unjustifiable’.660 
Balfour did not make his dissatisfaction with Japan’s naval assistance public in order to 
maintain the unity of the Allied Powers, but as he carried out the many negotiations 
with Japan for her naval help, his discontent at her attitude grew.     
 
IV  
 
By December of 1916, the war in Europe was locked in stalemates on both the Western 
and the Eastern fronts. Moreover, Britain had failed to occupy Baghdad and was 
rebuilding her army in Mesopotamia. These failures caused not only a shortage of 
manpower but also a political crisis in Britain. Following Asquith’s fall and the 
formation of Lloyd George’s new coalition government, Foreign Secretary Balfour had 
to consider how to persuade Japan, a potential source of fresh manpower among the 
Allied powers, to provide military assistance. 
The Eastern front was the first area for the potential deployment of Japanese troops. 
Balfour discussed the question of Japan’s military assistance with Colonel Charles à 
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Court Repington, the military correspondent of The Times, on 23 January 1917.
661
 
Repington considered that ‘the failure to use the magnificent army of a warlike Ally 
with 77 million people was an incredible error’, and that ‘we really could not afford to 
forget Japan any longer’.662 He had already talked about this with General Saburo 
Inagaki, the Japanese military attaché in London, and had been told ‘that Japan could 
spare ten divisions, and that they could arrive on the Galician front in two months’.663 
Balfour gave Repington a mandate to consult Konstantin Nabokov, the Russian Chargé 
d’Affaires to Britain, to find out whether Russia would accept Japanese military help. 
He also agreed with Repington that this negotiation should be carried out unofficially. 
   Repington launched several discussions with the Russians about the possibility of 
Japan’s military assistance. First, he spoke with Nabokov on 24 January 1917. Although 
Nabokov appreciated the idea of Japan’s help, he stressed ‘that Russia did not lack for 
men and that her real need was for guns and rifles’. Thus he considered that assistance 
in the form of cash and war materials would be best for his country. As the price for her 
military aid, he mentioned giving Japan the northern part of Sakhalin, whose southern 
part Russia had ceded to her at the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth. Russian 
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merchants had no commercial interest in Sakhalin because it was too far from 
Moscow.
664
  
   Next, Repington held a meeting with General Konstantin Dessino, the Russian 
military liaison officer, on 27 January. Unlike Nabokov, Dessino frankly admitted that 
Russia was suffering from a serious shortage of manpower and needed a large number 
of trained men. He consented to Repington’s suggestion that ‘Russia might be well 
advised to take a quarter of a million trained Japanese if she could get them, and that it 
was of enormous importance to us on naval and financial grounds to finish the war as 
soon as we could’.665 Dessino also agreed with Repington that Russia could give Japan 
the northern part of Sakhalin as compensation for her military aid. Repington thought 
that the private talks had progressed well and implied to Balfour that official 
negotiations could now begin.
666
 However, Balfour did not share Repington’s optimism, 
warning that although the Japanese had recently shown themselves obliging in the 
matters of both armaments and ships, ‘whether they would lend a quarter of a million 
men ... is quite another question’.667 Balfour was more cautious than Repington and 
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realised that despatching troops to foreign countries was more difficult than supplying 
vessels or munitions to other powers.                   
   Balfour’s concern was justified. On 25 February, Repington had another 
conversation with Inagaki about Japan’s military help. Inagaki told him that Japan was 
anxious about Russia’s position in Eastern Asia and needed assurances before she could 
give her assistance. Repington had already suggested north Sakhalin as the concession, 
but this was not attractive to Japan. Inagaki proposed two alternative forms of 
compensation: Japan to control the Russian railway to Harbin, the major city in 
Manchuria, and the dismantling of the port and Russian naval base in Vladivostok, the 
most important city in eastern Siberia.
668
 These concessions were much bigger than 
Balfour had expected. On 1 March, Balfour wrote to Repington that Russia could not 
accept such a price and that Britain should give up ‘attempting to act in any way the part 
of the honest broker’.669 He realised that continuing negotiations on this matter would 
end in the deterioration of Russo-Japanese relations and damage the unity of the Allies. 
Thus it would be wise to abandon his attempt to mediate between Russia and Japan. 
Repington agreed with ‘the wisdom of the policy’ and the issue was finally dropped.670  
This fiasco of Balfour’s mediation reflected the difficulty of accepting Japan’s 
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military assistance in Europe. Balfour criticised Japan’s demand as being ‘on so colossal 
a scale’ that even to mention it to Russia would ‘do much more harm than good’.671 As 
Repington pointed out, that price was Inagaki’s individual opinion and the Japanese 
government might suggest a more modest one.
672
 However, these demands impressed 
Japan’s ambition to expand her influence in Siberia on Balfour. Furthermore, unlike in 
the case of Japan’s naval aid, he had to consider the intentions of the country 
accommodating Japan’s soldiers. Although Japan joined the Allies, not all the Allied 
powers were willing to accept the deployment of Japanese troops due to their suspicion 
of Japan. This discord within the Allied powers made it more difficult to use Japanese 
military assistance.     
   However, Balfour did not completely give up on the idea of utilising Japan’s army in 
Europe. In April 1917 the United States entered the war, but the mobilisation of her 
army was slower than he had expected. He complained that the American government 
did not ‘realise the scale of preparation required for the conduct of the war’.673 America 
herself began to consider the possibility of accepting Japan’s military help until she 
could complete her preparations for war. Therefore, even with America’s entry into the 
war, the shortage of manpower was not resolved and the value of Japanese troops 
                                                   
671 Balfour to Repington, 1 Mar. 1917, Balfour MSS, FO 800/210. 
672 Repington to Balfour, 6 Mar. 1917, Balfour MSS, FO 800/210. 
673 War Cabinet 164, 15 Jun. 1917, CAB 23/3. 
244 
 
remained high. On 16 June 1917, Spring-Rice reported that America had enquired about 
any British objections to, and possible compensation for, Japan’s military aid.674 
Although expressing anxiety about the concession that Japan would require, Balfour 
replied that Britain should welcome ‘active military cooperation with Japan’. Yet, even 
if Japanese troops were despatched to Europe, he was not considering deploying them 
on the Western and Balkan fronts because of the shortage of troopships. He thus 
concluded that the Allies should accept the Japanese forces on the Eastern front.
675
 The 
failure of mediation between Russia and Japan forced him to entertain some 
apprehensions about Japan’s high price, but he still recognised the value of her military 
assistance.   
Among the Allied Powers it was France that most keenly demanded Japan’s military 
aid. In France there was a mistaken impression that, although the Japanese government 
was willing to send troops to the Western front, the British government opposed such 
help.
676
 On 25 September, Paul Cambon, French Ambassador to London, requested 
British support in deploying Japanese troops in Russia or Salonica.
677
 Even before 
receiving France’s suggestion, Balfour and the Foreign Office had once more begun to 
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investigate the possibility of utilizing the Japanese army in Europe. If Japanese troops 
were to be dispatched to Russia, the Trans-Siberian Railway was the most suitable 
means of transportation. However, the condition of this railway was poor following the 
chaos caused by the February Revolution. ‘[U]ntil a drastic re-organization of the 
Trans-Siberian Railway is effected’, it was therefore impracticable to send a large 
number of Japanese troops to the Eastern front.
678
 Moreover, there was no prospect of 
the Russian government agreeing to pay high compensation for Japan’s military aid. 
The possibility of dispatching Japanese forces to Salonica was even smaller than 
sending them to Russia. Salonica was so distant from Japan that it appeared to ‘offer 
insuperable difficulties in the way of transport’.679 Balfour had to find another theatre 
of operation for the Japanese troops. 
On receiving France’s suggestion on 25 September 1917, he instructed the Foreign 
Office to consider the possibility of utilising Japanese troops in Mesopotamia. Already, 
on 24 September, he had discussed with Milner and Curzon, then Lord President of the 
Council, ‘the proposed invitation to Japan to send a small Force to co-operate with us in 
Mesopotamia’.680 The senior Foreign Office officials paid little attention to this idea at 
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first.
681
 But Balfour realised its importance and insisted that they ‘should also deal with 
the most promising theatre of operation – Mesopotamia’.682 In terms of transport and 
accessibility, the Persian Gulf was the most advantageous location for the deployment 
of Japanese troops. Although Britain had succeeded in occupying Baghdad in March 
1917, a Turkish counterattack was strongly expected. Britain feared that Turkey’s 
recapture would severely damage British prestige in the Far East, and judged that using 
Japanese forces in Mesopotamia would be less injurious to the loss of Baghdad.
683
 As a 
result, Mesopotamia emerged as the best region for the deployment of the Japanese 
army.  
On 11 October, Balfour established a committee to discuss Japan’s military 
assistance with the French authorities. He, Curzon and General Smuts, the South 
African representative on the Imperial War Cabinet, were the British representatives. 
Their French counterparts were Paul Painlevé, who had become the new Prime Minister, 
and Henry Franklin-Bouillon, Minister of State. The committee’s conclusions followed 
the Foreign Office memorandum of 6 October.
684
 The Western front and Salonica were 
ruled out due to lack of tonnage. Even if the British campaign in Palestine front were 
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successful, the fact that the Allied Powers relied on Japanese troops to capture 
Jerusalem would ‘shock European public opinion’. Nobody would be satisfied with 
Japan’s assistance in Palestine. The Eastern front seemed to be a possibility, but 
Russia’s domestic turmoil made it difficult for her to accept a large number of Japanese 
troops. Balfour argued that the employment of Japanese troops in Russia under such 
conditions was out of the question.
685
 Therefore, although the British army appeared to 
be sufficient for the defence of Baghdad, the committee confirmed that Mesopotamia 
was the only practical field in which Japanese troops could be deployed.
686
 
However, the question of Mesopotamia was not confined to the Foreign Office: the 
India Office and the Government of India were also important in this matter. The British 
campaign in Mesopotamia of 1916-1917 was run by India because Mesopotamia was 
regarded as part of India’s security sphere. Given the nature of the imperial defence 
problem, the effect upon India of receiving Japan’s military aid in Mesopotamia was not 
discussed by this committee ‘in view of the presence of the French representatives’.687 
Even before establishing the committee, the idea of deploying Japanese troops in 
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Mesopotamia had been severely criticised by Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for 
India from 17 July 1917. The War Cabinet had considered the possibility of utilising 
Chinese troops in Aden in September, but Montagu had strongly opposed using not only 
Chinese but also Japanese forces there. He emphasised Aden’s geographical closeness 
to India and feared a bad influence on Britain’s reputation in India if Japanese troops 
were deployed. Bearing in mind the rise of Pan-Asianism, he was also concerned that 
Japan would increasingly pursue ‘the policy of “Asia for the Asiatics”’ if she joined the 
military campaign in Mesopotamia. ‘We must not’, he concluded, ‘risk it being said in 
Asia that the British cannot do without the assistance of the Chinese or the Japanese’.688 
Balfour took the view that there was no Foreign Office objection to accepting Japan’s 
military assistance in Mesopotamia, but he could not ignore India’s opinion. After 
reading Montagu’s fierce argument against using Japanese troops, Balfour 
recommended that Curzon and Milner ask Montagu’s opinion from the Indian point of 
view.
689
 
The India Office did not absolutely oppose the employment of Japanese troops in 
Mesopotamia until the middle of November 1917. When Balfour reported the 
committee’s discussion about this subject with the French authorities on 16 October, 
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Montagu admitted that ‘if there were urgent military reasons for such intervention, 
political arguments should not count against them’.690 John Shuckburgh, head of the 
Political and Secret Department at the India Office, was also concerned about deploying 
Japanese troops in Mesopotamia and shared many of Montagu’s political objections to 
such a deployment. Even so, although he required the British government to give the 
India Office an opportunity to express its own opinion, he concluded that ‘these 
[political] objections may no doubt have to give way to military necessities’.691 As 
Montagu and Shuckburgh showed, the plan to accept Japan’s military assistance in 
Mesopotamia was not popular at the India Office. Yet it was widely believed that 
Turco-German forces would soon advance to Baghdad to oust Britain from Turkish 
territory in Asia. The India Office could not rule out the possibility of taking advantage 
of Japan’s military help to face the Central Powers’ threat to Mesopotamia.      
   The Government of India, however, had stronger objections to accepting Japan’s 
forces in Mesopotamia. Japan’s increased exports to India and aggressive espionage 
activities there stiffened Delhi’s attitude towards Japan during the war.692 When the 
India Office consulted the Government of India on Japan’s military aid, its reply was 
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unfavourable. The political reasons for its opposition ranged widely from, for example, 
the probability of the establishment of a Japanese military base in India and the 
employment of Japanese troops prejudicing Britain’s strategic position in Mesopotamia. 
Moreover, its objections were based on not only political but also military grounds. It 
considered that maintenance of the expeditionary force would become difficult if the 
Japanese army were attached to the British army in India ‘owing to differences in 
equipment, armament, supplies &c’. In addition, the recent success of British campaigns 
in Palestine and the Euphrates valley had strengthened her position in Mesopotamia, 
allaying fears of an Ottoman offensive. Citing all these considerations, the Government 
of India clearly opposed deploying Japanese troops in Mesopotamia.
693
     
The Government of India’s negative view of military assistance from Japan in 
Mesopotamia hardened the India Office against it. On 13 December 1917, Shuckburgh 
agreed with Delhi’s opposition and concluded that ‘[w]e shall have gained little by the 
elimination of Germany from Mesopotamia and the Gulf if Japan is to step promptly 
into her shoes’.694 Lord Islington, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for India, 
entirely concurred with Shuckburgh and had ‘no reason to doubt that Mr. Montagu 
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would be in agreement with the views’ expressed by Shuckburgh.695 The Government 
of India and the India Office reached a common opinion and there was little possibility 
that they would endorse the plan to use Japanese troops in Mesopotamia. 
India’s objections poured cold water on Balfour’s expectations of Japan’s military 
help in Mesopotamia. Unofficially he enquired about Chinda’s view of using the 
Japanese army ‘either in Russia or some other theatre of war’ at the meeting on 14 
November 1917. Chinda’s answer was negative, citing a shortage of tonnage, Russia’s 
reluctance to accept Japanese forces and the Japanese public’s opposition to despatching 
her troops abroad. Significantly, Chinda mentioned that Japan could not send her 
soldiers not only to Vladivostok but also to Mesopotamia. On receiving Chinda’s 
answer, Balfour had to conclude that the prospect of obtaining Japanese military aid was 
slight.
696
 Internal opposition on the part of the India Office and Government of India 
had destroyed his hope of utilising Japanese troops in Mesopotamia. Forcing official 
negotiations with Japan in the face of India’s opposition was not an option. This 
reflected that Japanese military assistance might conflict with India’s security. Even 
though Japanese aid would be helpful to Britain, Balfour could not sacrifice imperial 
interests.        
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   On 30 November, Balfour attended an inter-allied conference in Paris, and held 
some talks about Japan’s military help with his American, French and Italian 
counterparts. Stéphen Pichon, the French Foreign Minister, was keen for Japan to send 
her troops to Europe and insisted that the Anglo-Japanese alliance obliged Japan to 
cooperate with Allied Powers in Europe. However, Balfour disagreed with this 
interpretation of the alliance. This indicates that, while he was dissatisfied with Japan’s 
unwillingness to supply naval assistance beyond the scope of the alliance, he realised 
that Japan was not obliged to provide aid to Europe under the alliance. Although he 
consented to invite a Japanese delegation to the conference the next day, he did not 
expect the Allied Powers to be able to obtain Japan’s troops in Europe.697 As Balfour 
foresaw, Keishirou Matsui, the Japanese Ambassador to France, insisted that it would be 
impossible for Japan to despatch her troops to Europe, citing ‘difficulties of principle, 
difficulties due to the lack of sufficient national enthusiasm, and, above all, material 
difficulties, and especially that of transport’.698 The failure to employ Japanese soldiers 
in Mesopotamia made Balfour pessimistic about the prospect of obtaining further 
military support from Japan. 
   Even so, Balfour had not yet abandoned his hope of using Japanese troops. 
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Immediately after the inter-allied conference, he proposed to Lord Hardinge, now 
reinstalled as Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, that ‘before pressing the 
Japanese we must clear on our minds as to place where we want troops and the tonnage 
which is to carry them’.699 He later specified: 
 
(1) I think it extremely doubtful whether the Japs will give military assistance 
outside the Far East. 
(2) In certain circumstances, however, we might have to press them again on the 
off chance of their yielding. 
(3) But before doing so, we must make up our minds in the subjects mentioned in 
my minute. 
(4) Only so could we have any possible chance of success and 
(5) Investigation may show that even if per impossible the Japs were willing, 
their operation would be contrary to our interests political and naval 
(tonnage).
700
 
           
This minute clearly shows that, although Balfour had given up on the possibility of 
deploying Japanese forces in Europe, he still considered it possible that Britain would 
have to ask Japan for her military help. Before such an occasion arose, Britain would 
have to decide on a new theatre of operations for Japanese troops and the method by 
which to transport them. Moreover, even if Japan consented to provide assistance, her 
military campaign might be incompatible with the political interests of Britain or the 
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Allied Powers. Balfour was obviously keeping Mesopotamia in mind. It was true that 
Japan had not agreed to despatch her army to Mesopotamia. But had she been willing to 
do so, her military presence there would certainly be inimical to the interests of India, 
the central and most important part of the British Empire. Balfour desired to avoid a 
similar situation.  
   At this time the circumstances of the war changed dramatically. Russia was thrown 
into revolutionary turmoil after the Bolshevik coup on 7 November 1917. The Allied 
Powers feared that she would soon leave the war and Germany would advance eastward. 
The United States was concerned about the expansion of Germany’s influence in China 
and was considering a joint policy with Japan to exclude Germany from East Asia and 
maintain China’s integrity.701  Knowing of this American fear, Balfour considered that 
the ‘Americans ought in this event to co-operate with Japan in Siberia’.702 He related 
this idea to Japan’s military assistance and added it to his above-mentioned minute: 
 
6. I believe that if the Americans landed troops at Vladivostock the Japanese 
would insist on co-operating!
703
          
            
Therefore, Vladivostock in Siberia emerged as an area where the presence of Japanese 
troops would be acceptable. Unlike the European theatre of war, transport would not be 
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a serious problem here given the short distances involved. However, America’s attitude 
to Japan would be a complicating factor. Balfour and the Foreign Office began to 
discuss the possibility of accepting the Japanese army in Siberia. 
 
V 
  
Although he considered the possibility of Japanese military assistance in Siberia, 
Balfour’s attitude was cautious at first. At the inter-allied conference in Paris on 3 
December 1917, France’s Marshal Foch proposed that Japan occupy Vladivostok and 
the Trans-Siberian Railway to prevent German expansion into Asia. Balfour was not 
enthusiastic about this suggestion, however, from either a military or a political point of 
view. Although Foch’s plan would require a large number of troops, it was not clear 
whether Japan was willing to provide them. Moreover, there were ‘the elements in 
Russia that were still on the side of the Allies’. Given the uncertainty of any military 
intervention, Balfour wished to help them to resist Germany rather than to attack 
Russia.
704
 Foch’s proposal was reminiscent of Japan’s price for her military assistance 
in Balfour’s attempt to mediate between Russia and Japan from January to March 1917. 
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As the failure of the mediation highlighted, it was obvious that Russia could not accept 
such Japan’s military actions. Balfour did not want both the Bolsheviks and the 
anti-Bolsheviks to turn against the Allied powers.  
Balfour explained his policy regarding Bolshevik Russia in a detailed memorandum 
on 9 December 1917. His first priority was to prevent Russia from being driven into the 
hands of Germany. Russia’s collaboration would give Germany the opportunity to use 
various Russian resources and improve her strategic position due to the weakened 
Eastern front. Military intervention in Russia might provide her with a motive for 
welcoming Germany. Although he regarded the Bolshevists as ‘dangerous dreamers’ 
and their political system as ‘crazy’, Balfour thus opposed deeming them avowed 
enemies and proposed to avoid an open breach with Bolshevik Russia for as long as 
possible. He preferred the flexibility of this policy, insisting that ‘[i]f this be drifting, 
then I am a drifter by deliberate policy’. It was significant that he argued that a 
Russo-German combination would affect both the immediate conduct of the war and 
their relations with Britain after the war.
705
 He was already bearing post-war 
international politics in mind.   
The War Cabinet followed Balfour’s line. Lloyd George praised his memorandum as 
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‘one of Mr. Balfour’s most notable State documents’.706 Ministers agreed that Britain 
was not concerned with the Bolsheviks or other political parties in Russia except in so 
far as they continued fighting against the Central Powers. Britain’s main purpose was to 
keep Russia in the war and on the side of the Allies. If this could not be secured, she 
should ensure that ‘Russia was as helpful to us and as harmful to the enemy as 
possible’.707 The War Cabinet tried to maintain Britain’s peaceful attitude towards the 
Bolshevists and to avoid provoking them.                         
   Such policy, however, came to nothing as the situation in Russia deteriorated at the 
beginning of 1918. The Bolsheviks’ influence rapidly expanded into Siberia, plunging 
Vladivostok into chaos. The War Cabinet decided to send the cruiser Suffolk there to 
protect a large accumulation of Allied stores. Yet this did not seem to be enough, so the 
War Cabinet considered whether Britain should despatch military forces to Siberia.
708
 
British statesmen examined the possibility of Japan carrying out an armed intervention 
in Siberia alone. Lord Robert Cecil, the Blockade Minister, warned that Japan’s 
single-handed intervention would offend Russia and make it more difficult to secure 
Britain’s control of the Trans-Siberian Railway.709          
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In this situation Britain decided to establish an interdepartmental Russian 
Committee consisting of members of the Foreign and War Offices, to review the 
necessity of military intervention. On 16 January 1918, the committee produced a 
favourable report on armed intervention in Siberia. It argued that, once the Bolsheviks 
gained ascendancy over Siberia, it would be impossible for the Allies to check 
Germany’s penetration of Siberia. Moreover, the Allied powers needed to control the 
Trans-Siberian Railway in order to be able to supply anti-Bolshevik Cossacks in 
southern Russia. Japan could send a large force to Siberia and secure control of the 
Trans-Siberian Railway on her own. The committee therefore insisted that Britain 
should persuade her to send a force to Siberia and occupy the whole railway from 
Vladivostok to European Russia immediately. To obtain America’s approval for Japan’s 
intervention, the committee also advocated that Britain should point out to America that 
Japan’s involvement in Siberia would reduce ‘their activities in the south of China and 
on the Pacific Coast’.710 The committee’s conclusion was almost the same as Foch’s 
proposal of December 1917, but added the necessity in persuading America to accept 
military intervention in Siberia.     
   Balfour, however, did not agree with the committee’s report, commenting that its 
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suggestion was ‘startling’.711 He pointed out that Japan’s territorial ambitions would 
make staying in Eastern Siberia attractive with a view to consolidating her position on 
the Asian mainland. America would oppose Japan’s activities in Siberia because of her 
strong suspicion of Japanese policy on the Far East. The Russians, who had not 
forgotten their defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, would be furious about Japan’s armed 
intervention on their territory.
712
 Given these difficulties, he doubted the practicability 
of the committee’s Siberian intervention scheme.              
   While consultation with the Allied powers about Siberia progressed, Balfour was 
still undecided about its merits. After the Russian Revolution, from the Allies’ viewpoint, 
Germany’s influence appeared to steadily increase in Bolshevik Russia. Balfour realised 
that ‘Germanized Russia’ would provide Germany with valuable munitions during the 
war and would become ‘a peril to the world’ after the war. The Siberian intervention 
was ‘the only way of averting these consequences’. In a telegram to the British 
ambassadors to America, France and Italy on 26 January 1918, he speculated that the 
Allied powers might give Japan a mandate to carry out an armed intervention in Siberia 
and occupy the Trans-Siberian Railway.
713
 Emphasising America’s approval of the 
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intervention, he sent a separate telegram to Colonel House on 30 January. In Britain’s 
present difficult situation, Balfour considered it ‘of real importance to do all we can to 
encourage active Japanese participation’. To allay America’s concerns about Japan’s 
ambitions in the Far East, he stressed that the Siberian intervention would drive Japan 
into open conflict with Germany and ‘lessen Japanese pressure in other directions’.714          
   On many occasions, however, Balfour showed a lack of enthusiasm for Japan’s 
intervention in Siberia. He was reluctant to quarrel with the Bolsheviks. ‘[S]o long as 
they refuse to make a separate peace’, Balfour pondered, ‘we look at them with a certain 
measure of favour’.715 He was not hostile to the Bolshevik regime itself; his stance was 
flexible and practical. As long as the Bolsheviks opposed or embarrassed Germany, 
‘their cause is our cause’. Regardless of ideology, anyone in Russia who seemed likely 
to offer resistance to Britain’s enemies or aid to her friends deserved her support.716 In 
Siberia, the anti-Bolshevik General Gregorii Semenov had increased his troops and 
consolidated his position.
717
 Although Balfour realised that Semenov’s success 
depended on luck, he considered that if Semenov were to obtain enough power to resist 
not only the Bolsheviks but also Germany, ‘it may become less necessary to press 
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Japanese for assistance’.718 Moreover, on 1 February, House expressed his view that 
President Wilson would not approve the Siberian intervention.
719
 Balfour therefore 
suggested that Britain and America should defer their decision on Japan’s military 
action in Siberia until the result of Semenov’s movements became obvious.720  
However, the rapid changes in the Russian situation did not allow Balfour to 
postpone his decision any longer. It became clear that Semenov could at best control a 
small fraction of the Trans-Siberian Railway.
721
 The anti-Bolshevik Cossacks lacked 
vigour and were defeated by the Bolsheviks. Balfour had to admit that Britain’s efforts 
in Russia were ‘no more than a series of rear-guard actions’ which could not check but 
only delay the enemy’s advance. Britain needed to implement not only indirect action 
such as financial assistance for the anti-Bolshevik forces but also direct action to break 
the difficult situation in Russia. Balfour’s answer was ‘an incursion by Japanese troops, 
acting on an Allied mandate, which should penetrate as far as the Ural Mountains’.722 
Although he had finally accepted the necessity of Japan’s military intervention in 
Siberia, America still considered Japan the worst possible agent of the Allies in 
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Russia.
723
 Moreover, Balfour forecast that if necessary, Japan would not hesitate to 
occupy Eastern Siberia regardless of the Allied powers’ mandate. Yet it was doubtful 
whether she would agree to advance to the Ural Mountains due to the cost and serious 
military risk.
724
 It was essential for Balfour to persuade President Wilson to assent to 
Japan’s military action in Siberia and to understand Japan’s intentions regarding the 
intervention.                        
   Balfour now took the initiative in realising the scheme for a major Japanese 
intervention in Siberia. On 23 February 1918, he met the Japanese ambassador and 
proposed that Japan should control ‘the whole of the Siberian Railway as far as the 
Urals’ to prevent Germany using the railway and munitions in Siberia. Although the 
Japanese ambassador understood the need to seize Vladivostok, in the absence of 
instructions from his government, he did not commit himself on the matter. Balfour 
explained Britain’s dilemma to the War Cabinet. Japan’s public was suspicious of the 
Allies’ intention, remembering that Britain had tried to curtail Japan’s military activities 
in Asia early in the war. Balfour insisted that Japan might not want to cooperate with the 
Allied detachments because her population would regard such cooperation as restrictive. 
On the other hand, President Wilson could not agree to Japan’s single-handed 
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intervention in Siberia.
725
 Balfour saw persuading the President as the most important 
task and decided not to approach Japan again until he had obtained clarity on America’s 
view.
726
 To his mind, cooperation with America took precedence over coordination with 
Japan.                         
   Balfour addressed his efforts at gaining Wilson’s approval for the Siberian 
intervention. He took advantage of Motono’s declaration of 23 February 1918, which 
was interpreted by the Allies to mean that Japan was ready to carry out an armed 
intervention in Siberia.
727
 As Balfour had forecast, Japan could undertake military 
action in Siberia even without the assent of the Allied powers. If the Allies could not 
stop her intervention, it would be wise to give her their mandate. Without a mandate, 
Balfour insisted, it was obvious that they could not ‘control materially her policy in 
Siberia either now or in the future’.728 Secretary of State Lansing, who shared Balfour’s 
opinion, urged President Wilson to accept Japan’s intervention. On 1 March, the 
President drafted a note saying that, although America would not join the intervention, 
she did not object to Japan being asked to send her troops to Siberia.
729
 Receiving this 
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note, Balfour turned his attention to Japan.
730
              
   However, President Wilson’s mind was not yet made up. Unlike Lansing, House still 
had strong doubts about the value of an armed intervention in Siberia. He feared that 
approval of Japan’s action would damage America’s moral position and suggested 
reviewing American policy on this matter.
731
 House’s moral argument appealed to 
Wilson, who withdrew his support for the Siberian intervention.
732
 Indeed, he wrote a 
new note expressing his opposition to it on 5 March 1918.
733
 America’s objection to the 
intervention forced Britain to pay particular attention to ‘a possibility of a rift on a 
matter of cardinal policy between ourselves and the United States of America’. 
Moreover, the Cabinet gradually lost enthusiasm for Japan’s advance to the Urals. All 
they wanted Japan to do was to protect the munitions at Vladivostok, so they advocated 
that Britain should not ask Japan to march beyond Eastern Siberia, thereby also 
reducing the risk of provoking Russian resistance.
734
 America’s objections and the 
Cabinet’s reluctance blighted the prospect of a large-scale intervention.  
   Despite facing such pressure, Balfour did not give up on a major Japanese 
intervention in Siberia. To his mind, it was too early to assume that America would not 
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support Japan’s armed intervention or that Japan would refuse to go to the Urals. The 
reason he did not change his stance was the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on 3 
March, which made peace between Russia and Germany. Until its conclusion, he had 
hoped that Bolshevik Russia might resist Germany. But her surrender to Germany made 
it more important to prevent the valuable munitions in Siberia from falling into German 
hands. Balfour concluded that the only way of achieving this was ‘Japanese intervention 
on a considerable scale’.735 William Wiseman, a British intelligence officer in the 
United States, backed his opinion and encouraged the War Cabinet not to abandon hope 
of another change in American policy on the Siberian intervention.
736
           
Brest-Litovsk introduced another important factor into discussions about the 
Siberian intervention: imperial defence, and in particular, the defence of India.
737
 Since 
the Russian Revolution, the situation in the Caucasus and Persia had been ‘absolutely 
chaotic’ and ‘unintelligible’.738 The Russo-German peace treaty had also complicated 
the fragile situation in Central Asia. Balfour realised that Rumania could not fight alone 
and was likely to make peace with Germany. As a result, Germany could take advantage 
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of the railway facilities to Odessa and gain ‘access first to Batoum, then to Baku, and 
finally, by the Caspian, to North-West Persia’.739 Curzon was explicit about the German 
threat to the border area with India:           
 
Should the Japanese not enter Siberia and should German influence or German 
forces establish themselves there, there might arise a new Central Asian problem, 
as the danger thus created began to permeate southwards and to threaten 
Turkestan and the regions bordering the Indian Empire on the North.
740
 
 
Brest-Litovsk thus lent yet greater urgency to the military intervention in Siberia. 
   Against this background the War Cabinet discussed the matter again on 21 March 
1918. It was agreed that Japan’s intervention would not be of any real use unless it 
extended west far enough to prevent Germany from exploiting the considerable 
resources in Western Siberia. This meant that the War Cabinet shared Balfour’s idea of a 
large-scale Japanese intervention. Furthermore, the Cabinet realised that, if Germany 
established her influence in Western Siberia, this would stymie Britain’s ‘efforts to 
prevent a German advance eastward through Persia’. General Sir Henry Wilson, Chief 
of the Imperial General Staff, insisted that German control of Siberia would expand her 
power to Turkestan and imperil Britain’s position in India entirely, so Britain had to pull 
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‘Siberia out of the wreck, in order to save India’. Therefore, Japan’s intervention was 
essential to winning the war and defending India. This left the question of America’s 
opposition to the intervention. The War Cabinet agreed to renew the effort to persuade 
President Wilson of the necessity of the intervention, and instructed Balfour to take 
action along these lines.
741
            
   On 5 April 1918, Henry Wilson reiterated that the intervention was necessary, 
arguing that Britain’s success in Persia would be ‘largely dependent upon Japanese 
intervention in Siberia’ which could restore order in Transcaspia and prevent Germany 
from penetrating Afghanistan.
742
 Receiving Henry Wilson’s note, Lord Robert Cecil 
produced a draft telegram to President Wilson, which Balfour approved. It argued that 
Japan’s intervention would not only protect considerable supplies in Siberia but also 
stop the German plot ‘to become masters of the Caucasian districts’ in order to ‘stir up 
trouble for us in India’.743 In the end, Balfour modified this draft and sent it to Lord 
Reading, the new British ambassador at Washington, on 19 April, but its essential tone 
was not changed. It stated that Turco-German forces would try to advance into Persia, 
                                                   
741 War Cabinet 369, 21 Mar. 1918, CAB 23/5; V.H. Rothwell, British War Aims and Peace 
Diplomacy, 1914-1918 (Oxford, 1971), p. 186. 
742 Note by Wilson, 5 Apr. 1918, CAB 21/45. 
743 Memo. by Cecil, ? [13-14] Apr. 1918, CAB 21/45; Balfour to Hankey, ? [13-14] Apr. 1918, CAB 
21/45. 
268 
 
Turkestan and Afghanistan with the intention of destabilising India.
744
 For Balfour the 
defence of India was another important reason to realise a major Japanese intervention 
in Siberia.    
However, the logic of imperial defence did not appeal to President Wilson. Even 
Cecil admitted doubt about the power of the reference to India to influence American 
opinion.
745
 The President expressed his reservation frankly, arguing that the American 
people might think that Japan’s intervention in Siberia was intended ‘to secure the 
British position in India rather than as an effective factor in the present fighting in 
Europe’.746 America had no interest in India and it had been unwise to emphasise the 
German danger there. Balfour accepted that America’s indifference to Indian security 
complicated matters.
747
 This highlighted the difficulty of combining imperial defence 
with Anglo-American cooperation. Britain could not defend India only by maintaining 
good relations with America. Although Balfour was sure that France, Italy and Britain 
were in favour of Japan’s military intervention in Siberia, America remained reluctant to 
agree to it, and without her approved Britain could not begin negotiations with Japan.
748
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Balfour needed to find another means of persuading Wilson to accept the Siberian 
intervention. 
   The trump card that Balfour hoped for was an invitation from Bolshevik Russia to 
Japan to intervene in Siberia. Robert Bruce-Lockhart, British Consul-General in 
Moscow, proposed this idea and tried to extract a request for Japan’s military 
intervention from Leon Trotsky, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs. At first 
Balfour was unsure of the practicability of Lockhart’s plan, but he gradually came 
around to the view that ‘the ideal arrangement would be for the Bolsheviks to request 
Japanese, American and Allied assistance against German aggression’. 749  If the 
Russians sought an Allied military intervention, America would have no reason for 
objecting to it. In addition, with Russia’s agreement, Allied troops could easily traverse 
Siberia. In the end, Balfour authorised Lockhart to open negotiations with Trotsky. His 
expectation of Trotsky’s invitation to Japan to intervene grew, and on 23 April 1918 
Balfour told House that the ‘situation is entirely altered by apparent willingness of 
Trotski to invite allied assistance against German aggression’.750           
   Despite Balfour’s expectations, the initiative failed. As Russia’s relations with 
Germany improved, Trotsky lost his enthusiasm for cooperating with the Allied powers. 
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He raised various conditions in return for inviting Japan to intervene, including Allied 
assistance in rebuilding Russia’s fleet.751 This change moved an agreement beyond the 
realm of practical politics. Moreover, apart from Britain, the Allied powers did not 
necessarily share the idea of a Bolshevik invitation to Japan to intervene in Siberia. In 
particular, America and France’s lukewarm reception of Lockhart’s negotiations 
hindered progress.
752
 As a result, Lockhart changed his own opinion by the middle of 
May 1918 and came to insist that even without an invitation from Bolshevik Russia, the 
Allies should carry out the military intervention in Siberia.
753
 Balfour meanwhile 
continued his efforts to persuade President Wilson to accept the idea.       
   The last resort was the suggestion of an armed intervention with the Czech-Slovak 
Legion, deserters from the Hapsburg army, now stranded in Siberia.
754
 Tired of fruitless 
negotiations with President Wilson, Lloyd George argued that Britain should carry out 
the intervention, using the legion as the nucleus of the Allied forces in Siberia. Balfour 
was more cautious, but thought that if Britain commenced such an operation Japan 
would immediately wish to join it. Under such circumstances, Balfour forecast that 
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America would cooperate sooner or later.
755
 The Czech-Slovak forces could thus 
become the catalyst for the linkage of America and Japan in the Allied intervention.                   
   There were many obstacles to be overcome before the plan could be implemented. 
First of all, France opposed it because she was keen to utilise the Czech-Slovak legion 
on the Western front. Then, America remained hostile to military activities in Siberia 
and her attitude ‘paralyse[s] us for ever in the case of Japanese intervention’.756 
Without America’s assent, Balfour argued, military intervention in Siberia would divide 
the Allies and the American public. He feared that such a situation would alienate 
President Wilson and throw cold water on America’s willingness to cooperate with the 
Allied powers.
757
 Moreover, Japan was annoyed with the delay in the negotiations and 
suspected that Britain was not in earnest.
758
 The interests of the Allied powers were in 
conflict and it was of paramount importance to maintain their unity.  
Balfour tried to clarify Britain’s intention:        
 
      We had made our policy perfectly plain; we had stated that we did not propose 
to interfere in Russian internal affairs; our object was directed entirely against 
the Germans. To this end we had always worked with the de facto Government 
in Russia: we had worked first with the Czar while he was in power; we had 
worked next with the Socialists under Kerensky; then we had worked with the 
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Bolsheviks, and we would be prepared to work with whatever successors there 
might be to the Bolsheviks. ...
759
     
 
Balfour’s pragmatic attitude to Bolshevik Russia had thus not changed at all. The 
purpose of the intervention in Siberia was not to overthrow the Bolshevik regime but to 
check Germany’s advance into the East. Ideology did not come into it.      
   The Allied Supreme War Council of 1-3 June 1918 was vital to break the deadlock 
over the Siberian intervention. Britain reached agreement with France and Italy over the 
Czech-Slovak forces and the three countries agreed to ask Japan to carry out military 
action in Siberia on the condition that she promised to respect the territorial integrity of 
Russia, not interfere in Russia’s internal politics and advance as far west as possible for 
the purpose of countering the Germans.
760
 These conditions were compatible with 
Balfour’s desire for a major Japanese military intervention. Finally, the Supreme War 
Council seemed to be useful in persuading Wilson to accept military intervention in 
Siberia. British policy elites expected that if the Supreme War Council strongly insisted 
on the necessity of the intervention from the military point of view, the President might 
agree to military activity in Siberia.
761
  
Following the Supreme War Council, Balfour increased his efforts to make the 
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Allied intervention possible. While Japan had no objection to the Allies’ first two 
conditions, she expressed disapproval of the third. Tokyo thought it impossible to 
‘engage to extend westward the sphere of their military activities beyond the limits of 
Eastern Siberia’.762 Balfour was disappointed at Japan’s negative attitude and tried to 
impress on her ‘the extreme perils of German penetration through European Russia and 
Western Siberia’.763 At that time his hope was that ‘the time is very near when we may 
count upon assistance from the Japanese army’. If Japan confined her action to Eastern 
Siberia, it would ‘not be what we want’. Balfour believed that the German influence 
could not be checked effectively unless Japan intervened militarily as far as the Urals. It 
was true that Japan did not cooperate with the Allies ‘to the full extent which we might 
under certain circumstances hope for’, as Balfour argued in the Imperial War Cabinet of 
20 June, but she would do so in ‘a manner which will prove extremely important in 
redressing the balance of the war’.764 He was not completely satisfied with Japan’s 
attitude towards the contribution of the war, but still valued her military assistance and 
realised the necessity of her major armed intervention in Siberia.     
   The Imperial War Cabinet also underscored the imperial defence factor in a large 
scale Siberian intervention. Curzon regarded India as ‘the core and centre of the British 
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Power in the Eastern world’ and emphasised the need to defend it from Germany.765 
There were two lines along which Germany would advance towards India: ‘a northern 
line through the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Caspian and Turkestan, to the borders of 
Chinese Turkestan; and the southern through Palestine, Mesopotamia, and through 
Persia and Afghanistan against India’. According to Curzon, Britain’s measures to stop 
the German and Turkish advances were confined to the southern line, for example via 
cooperation with the Arabs in Palestine and Mesopotamia. As a matter of ‘immediate 
urgency’ Japan’s military intervention should expand to Central Asia to forestall 
Germany on the northern line.
766
 Since the argument of imperial defence was not useful 
in persuading America, British policymakers refrained from publicly articulating the 
link between the defence of India and intervention in Siberia. However, they remained 
aware of it.                 
   America’s attitude had been gradually changing since the Supreme War Council 
meetings. Wilson still opposed Japan’s military intervention, but realised the necessity 
of creating a new Eastern front.
767
 However, the Czech-Slovak forces had a strong 
influence on American policy. Not only Balfour but also Clemenceau and Marshal Foch 
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urged the President to approve the military intervention ‘on the grounds of the duty of 
the Allies to rescue the Czechs’.768 House, who had originally opposed the Siberian 
intervention, acknowledged that America could no longer reject the Allies’ request for 
the intervention and began to develop a policy which would be acceptable to President 
Wilson.
769
 Moreover, American public opinion generally supported the saving of the 
Czech-Slovak troops and became ‘far more favourable to Japanese intervention than 
three months ago’.770 Wilson could not ignore these internal and external pressures.  
   An action that Wilson could approve was despatching a Relief Commission to 
Siberia. Its main task was to deliver food and other supplies to Russian people and 
Czech-Slovak soldiers. But the President was inclined to agree that the commission 
should be escorted by an armed guard of Japanese and other Allied troops.
771
 This was 
a virtual military intervention under the guise of economic cooperation. The Imperial 
War Cabinet supported this plan and asked the Supreme War Council to urge the 
President to accept it.
772
 Wilson finally assented to the Siberian intervention on 6 July 
1918, but he did not accept the extension of Japan’s military intervention to the Urals, as 
Balfour had desired. The intervention would be to rescue the Czech-Slovak forces and 
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not to advance into western Siberia. Hoping that the Allied troops in Siberia would be 
reinforced, Balfour expressed ‘great satisfaction’ at the President’s approval.773 He had 
finally succeeded in removing the biggest obstacle to the Siberian intervention, 
managing the Anglo-American discrepancy over the Japanese military campaign.   
   The Siberian intervention, however, did not produce any of the results that Balfour 
had anticipated. Japan also had some disagreements with the Allied powers over the 
scale and purpose of the military intervention, but declared the despatch of her troops to 
Siberia on 2 August 1918.
774
 Japanese forces landed on Vladivostok on 12 August, but 
just three months later the Central Powers collapsed and the war was suddenly over. 
While other Allies withdrew their forces immediately after the war, Japan tried to 
maintain her own troops in Siberia. As a result, the other powers, in particular America, 
grew suspicious of Japan’s policy in the Far East. But this was the new situation after 
the war. At least, the Siberian intervention lost its character of the Japanese military aid 
for the Allies. When the war ended, Balfour’s involvement with Japan’s assistance was 
also over.            
 
                            VI 
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The Anglo-Japanese alliance was revised in 1911 to adapt to the significant international 
changes after the Russo-Japanese War. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 
improved Britain’s relations with Russia and reduced the necessity of Japan’s military 
assistance for India’s security. With Japan’s growing power and immigration issues, 
US-Japanese relations deteriorated and the Dominions’ suspicion of Japan increased. 
Against this background in consultation with the Dominions, the Liberal government 
deleted references to India and stipulated the coexistence with the Anglo-American 
arbitration treaty. Balfour supported this revision from the side of the opposition, as he 
wanted to remove the possibility of being dragged into a US-Japanese war. The 
coordination with the Dominions over the alliance was beneficial from the imperial 
point of view. The revision of 1911 succeeded in both maintaining the Anglo-American 
solidarity and contributing to the defence of British Empire.      
   The Great War brought back the importance of the Japan’s assistance. Balfour, who 
returned to the British Government during the war, had little expectation of Japan’s 
contribution to the war effort at first. However, the difficult circumstances forced him to 
review his opinion of Japan’s naval and military help. On becoming Foreign Secretary, 
he opened negotiations with the Japanese government, considering not only Japan’s 
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intentions but also Anglo-American cooperation and imperial defence.  
To secure Japanese naval help, Balfour had to ensure that Anglo-American-Japanese 
relations remained cordial. Although he regarded guaranteeing Japan’s rights in 
Shantung and the Pacific Islands as a permissible concession in exchange for her naval 
aid, he kept this secret to avoid alienating America, which was hostile to Japan’s 
expansion in the Far East. The multilateral naval arrangement including Britain, 
America and Japan was his attempt to allay mutual suspicion between America and 
Japan in order to extract more naval assistance from both powers. He saw the tripartite 
naval agreement as a development of the Anglo-Japanese alliance to make it compatible 
with the Anglo-American cooperation.  
With regard to the Japanese military assistance, imperial defence mattered. The 
shortage of the Allied tonnage and Russia’s reluctance to accept Japanese soldiers made 
Mesopotamia the best theatre for Japan’s military aid. However, the India Office and 
Government of India opposed employing Japanese troops in Mesopotamia because of 
the growing Japanese influence in India. Balfour had no intention of making a 
concession to Japan over India, so he had to give up the idea of her military help in 
Mesopotamia. Japan’s military assistance under the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which 
Balfour had valued, was no longer necessarily consistent with imperial defence.   
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The Siberian intervention, which Balfour envisioned as Japanese military aid in Asia, 
was linked to both Anglo-American cooperation and imperial defence. Balfour 
supported a major Japanese intervention from Vladivostock to the Ural Mountains in 
order to prevent Germany from not only exploiting resources in Siberia but also 
advancing to India. However, it was impossible for him to carry out an armed 
intervention without America’s assent. Given America’s suspicion of Japan, such 
military action might drive a wedge between Britain and America. More importantly, 
discussion of a Siberian intervention demonstrated that America did not always favour 
the defence of the British Empire. In the end, taking advantage of a pretext of relieving 
Czech-Slovak forces, Britain, America and Japan agreed to carry out the Allied military 
intervention in Siberia. Balfour was satisfied with this result, but he would face growing 
difficulty in coping with both Anglo-American cooperation and imperial defence within 
the scheme of the Anglo-Japanese alliance immediately after the abrupt end of the war.              
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3 
Managing the Termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 
1918-1923  
 
I  
 
As soon as the Great War ended, the Allied powers had to settle various problems 
caused by the conflict and to discuss the post-war international order. Balfour attended 
the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 as one of the British representatives.
775
 The main 
battlefield of the war had been Europe, so it was logical that the Allied powers should 
focus on the new international order in Europe. The Anglo-Japanese alliance itself was 
not directly discussed at the conference, but the non-European world was nonetheless 
significant. Balfour had to tackle three issues at the conference: the Sino-Japanese 
confrontation over Shantung, the League of Nations’ mandatory rule of the Pacific 
Islands and the Middle East, and the racial equality clause in the Covenant of the 
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League of Nations. These questions were all connected not only to Anglo-Japanese 
relations but also to Anglo-American cooperation and imperial defence.    
Balfour was at the forefront of the discussion of the Shantung question at the Paris 
Peace Conference. The principal partners in this dispute were Japan and China because 
the origin of the problem was Japan’s so-called ‘Twenty-one Demands’ of 1915. 
However, Britain’s involvement complicated the question and she could not feign 
indifference. She had made a secret agreement with Japan in February 1917, 
guaranteeing Japanese rights in Shantung after the war in return for Japan’s naval 
assistance. As Foreign Secretary at the time, Balfour had negotiated with Japanese 
diplomats about this secret arrangement. Prime Minister Lloyd George was more 
interested in European than in Asian affairs, and Balfour clearly had more knowledge 
about this question than he did. Thus, it was no surprise that Lloyd George wanted 
Balfour to ‘take the lead’ in discussing Japan’s demands regarding Shantung with 
Japan’s representatives at the Conference.776 Indeed, the American President, Woodrow 
Wilson, and the French Prime Minister, Georges Clemenceau, agreed with Lloyd 
George that Balfour should deal with this issue on their behalf.
777
 They expected him to 
find a peaceful solution to this Far Eastern question.       
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Like other British statesmen and diplomats, Balfour did not think highly of the 
Twenty-one Demands. Some of them were not acceptable to China, but Japan forced her 
to agree to them with a final ultimatum. After the war Balfour acknowledged that Japan 
‘had certainly behaved badly to China over the 1915 Treaties’.778 He concluded that he 
‘had nothing to say in defence of the Treaty of 1915’.779 It was difficult for him to 
approve Japan’s claims based on the Twenty-one Demands.      
Furthermore, Balfour could not ignore America’s hostility to the Twenty-one 
Demands. In March 1915, Woodrow Wilson had criticised the Group V ‘desiderata’ as 
going too far and constituting ‘a serious limitation upon China’s independence of action, 
and a very definite preference of Japan before other nations’.780 The Americans found 
Group V inconsistent with their preference for the Open Door policy and China’s 
territorial integrity, which formed the basis of their foreign policy regarding China, and 
American statesmen would not tolerate Japan’s demands. Balfour realised that 
‘American, as well as Chinese, sentiment was peculiarly sensitive’ to the Twenty-one 
Demands.
781
 If Britain sided with Japan carelessly, the Shantung question might drive a 
wedge into Anglo-American relations. Balfour, who valued Anglo-American 
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cooperation, had to avoid such a rupture.        
   Even so, however, Balfour could not have opposed Japan’s demands over Shantung 
easily. In February 1917 Britain had secretly pledged to support Japanese rights in 
Shantung and the Pacific Islands in order to obtain Japan’s naval assistance. As Foreign 
Secretary, Balfour had taken the initiative in forging the secret agreement and securing 
Australia and New Zealand’s consent to it. Although it was concluded before America 
entered the war, he had revealed the agreement to Wilson and ‘talked with him quite 
frankly about any and every question in which I supposed our two countries were 
interested’ during his visit to America in April 1917.782 Colonel House, Wilson’s close 
aide, affirmed that Balfour had discussed the secret agreement with Wilson and 
himself.
783
 While Balfour had only asked for America’s ex post facto approval, he had 
tried to remove obstacles to keeping Britain’s promise after the war. Thus, when Wilson 
stated that he had known nothing of the secret treaty until the Paris Peace Conference, 
Balfour found his denial ‘utterly unintelligible to me’.784 
Balfour’s negative attitude towards China was also important. Although he attacked 
the Twenty-one Demands, he was not sympathetic to China and was dissatisfied with 
her behaviour both during and after the war. China insisted that as an Allied Power she 
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was entitled to claim the surrender of all the rights that Germany had obtained in 
Shantung. But Balfour considered that China had made no contribution to the Allied 
war efforts: 
 
I, on the other hand, am more moved by contempt for the Chinese over the way 
in which they left Japan to fight Germany for Shantung, and then were not 
content to get Shantung back without fighting for it, but tried to maintain that it 
was theirs as the legitimate spoils of a war in which they had not lost a man or 
spent a shilling.
785
 
     
Balfour sometimes complained that Japan’s naval and military assistance had not been 
sufficient during the war, but her contribution had been far greater than China’s. Balfour 
repeated that China ‘had not spent a shilling or lost a life either in defending her own 
interests or in supporting ours’.786 Britain could accept that China had lost nothing due 
to her neutrality, but she was not responsible for supporting China’s effort to obtain 
something after the war.     
   There was another factor to consider: Japan had made several arrangements with 
China over railways in Shantung on 24 September 1918 as a result of which China had 
ceded certain privileges in Shantung to Japan in return for a loan to build railways in 
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that province.
787
 The British Foreign Office did not ignore these deals in the aftermath 
of the Twenty-one Demands of 1915. Ronald Macleay, a clerk in the Far Eastern 
Department, considered that these agreements seemed to ‘weaken seriously the Chinese 
case for restoration’.788  Balfour agreed with Macleay’s view and concluded that 
‘whatever might be said of the Treaty of 1915, the Treaty of 1918 between China and 
Japan was a voluntary transaction between sovereign States, and a transaction which 
gave important pecuniary benefits to China’.789 Thus Balfour could not support China 
wholeheartedly on the Sino-Japanese controversy over Shantung.  
Balfour took all of these complexities into account and pursued a compromise that 
all of the actors involved could accept. He began to discuss the matter with Wilson, who 
was inclined to favour China’s claims, on 15 April 1919. Balfour pointed out that Japan 
would not withdraw her demands because Japanese public opinion deemed them a 
matter of national honour and reminded Wilson that the Allied powers ‘were bound by 
our pledges to support them [the Japanese]’.790 On the other hand, when he spoke with 
the Japanese representatives on 27 April, he succeeded in extracting a pledge that Japan 
wanted to retain only economic rights in Shantung and intended to restore Chinese 
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sovereignty in the leased territories.
791
 This became the basis of a compromise. Balfour 
designed a permanent arrangement on Shantung between Japan and China, the essence 
of which was as follows: 
 
after German rights have been ceded to Japan, Japan will hand back to China the 
whole of the leased territory [Tsingtao] in complete sovereignty; that the only 
rights which Japan will retain are the economic rights enumerated in my 
Memorandum; and that Japan proposes to take every precaution to prevent undue 
discrimination in matters of railway rates, or port and harbour dues, and other 
cognate matters between nation and nation; in fact, that the policy of the open 
door should be fully carried out in the spirit as in the letter.
792
  
          
It was important that this arrangement combined Japan’s pledge with the Open Door 
policy, harmonising the solution to the Shantung dispute with common Anglo-American 
interests in the Far East. This was Balfour’s effort to maintain calm 
Anglo-American-Japanese relations. His remaining task was to secure the assent of the 
other nations.  
   Their reactions were varied. Wilson made it clear that he could not accept any 
settlement based on ‘the wrongful Twenty-one Demands’.793 Yet he approved the 
substance of Balfour’s permanent arrangement.794 The Japanese delegates also accepted 
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it, and Balfour expected that ‘the whole negotiation may be regarded as happily 
concluded’.795 However, China was disappointed that Japan had secured economic 
rights in Shantung and required information about all the discussions of the Council of 
Three.
796
 On 4 May 1919, a political demonstration against Japan’s privileges in 
Shantung took place in China in the so-called May Fourth Movement. This domestic 
turmoil paralysed the Chinese government’s decision-making process. Receiving no 
instructions, the Chinese delegation finally opposed Balfour’s compromise and refused 
to sign the Treaty of Versailles.
797
 Balfour was dissatisfied with this, remarking that the 
Chinese delegation did ‘not seem to deserve much sympathy’.798 In the end, the final 
settlement of the Shantung question was postponed to the Washington Conference of 
1921. Balfour had at least succeeded in making a compromise between Britain, America 
and Japan over the Shantung question, preventing their relations from deteriorating 
further.    
The Paris Peace Conference, which set up the League of Nations, is generally 
thought to have ushered in ‘New Diplomacy’. Although he advocated the establishment 
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of a supra-national organisation to maintain post-war international order during the war, 
Balfour was widely regarded as a master of ‘Old Diplomacy’.799 In fact, as ‘the last 
person to deride what is commonly called “The Old Diplomacy”’, he later insisted: 
 
The Old Diplomacy has for many generations done much in the cause of peace, 
and those who see in it merely a costly method of embittering international 
relations and snatching national advantages, completely misread the lessons of 
history.
800
 
     
On the other hand, Balfour also served as the British delegate in the League of Nations. 
He saw no contradiction in the fact that a supporter of Old Diplomacy was involved in a 
symbol of New Diplomacy. He considered that ‘the League is really a most important 
instrument of diplomacy from the British point of view’.801 He was not an enthusiast 
but a pragmatist regarding the League of Nations.       
In Balfour’s pragmatic view of the League of Nations, its mandate system was a 
significant tool for resolving territorial rearrangements after the war in favour of British 
national interests, in particular regarding imperial defence. The mandate in the Middle 
East demonstrated Balfour’s strategic calculation about imperial defence. Originally 
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Balfour had considered that ex-German and ex-Turkish territories should be governed 
not by Britain but by an international ‘condominium’, namely the joint rule of these 
territories by some Allied powers or international organisations. Although he admitted 
that such a condominium was a bad form of government and a hazardous experiment, 
he argued that no powers could utilise internationalised territories as a naval or military 
base for another war. Moreover, Britain could avoid the other powers’ criticism and 
hostility by surrendering her direct rule of these territories. He also saw the advantages 
of an international condominium from the point of view of the defence of India. During 
the Great War he had had to abandon the idea of securing Japanese military assistance in 
Mesopotamia due to opposition from the India Office and the Government of India. As 
this example showed, he could not separate the Middle East from India, bearing cultural 
and geographical proximity in mind. The Middle East mandates were of value regarding 
India:          
 
Even though the establishment of an Arab kingdom in the Hejaz, of an 
autonomous Arab protected State in Mesopotamia, and of an internationalised 
Jewish “home” in Palestine will not increase the territories under the British flag, 
they will certainly give increased protection to British interests, both in Egypt and 
India. They will constitute “buffer States,” of all the greater value to us because 
they have been created not for our security but for the advantage of their 
inhabitants.
802
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Balfour’s ‘buffer state’ scheme was in line with that of the Government of India. On 
7 July 1919, Hamilton Grant, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, expressed 
to Balfour the importance of ‘a Moslem barrier astride the Middle East to bar the path of 
the next European Power that attempts to move against us in this direction’.803 The 
mandates in the Middle East were clear evidence that Balfour tried to utilise the League 
of Nations as a practicable instrument of British diplomacy to defend its Empire.           
   The mandate system in the Far East was more complex. Japan was concerned that 
her right to the Pacific Islands north of the equator should be guaranteed at the Paris 
Peace Conference. As in the case of Shantung, Britain had made a secret arrangement 
with Japan on this matter during the war, with Balfour taking initiative in its negotiation. 
He had promised to guarantee Japan’s rights to these islands after the war in return for 
her naval assistance, and therefore did not oppose her possession of the Pacific Islands. 
However, fearing the expansion of Japan’s influence in the Pacific, President Wilson 
advocated that these islands ‘ought to be neutralised and worked in the common 
interests of humanity by some small nation acting under the control of the League of 
Nations’.804 Australia and New Zealand were also cautious about Japan’s ambitions and 
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aligned themselves with the American scheme.
805
 Although not necessarily sharing the 
President’s view, Britain could not ignore her anxiety and that of the British Dominions. 
It was necessary to devise a comprehensive solution for these conflicting actors.  
The League’s mandates served this purpose. While the Pacific Islands were under 
the authority of the League, Japan could maintain her preponderant position over them. 
Furthermore, the fortification of mandated territory was prohibited, so the islands could 
fulfil the role of ‘a demilitarized buffer zone’ between Japan and Australasia.806 Japan 
accepted this compromise in February 1919 the Pacific Islands became a C-class 
League of Nations mandate.
807
 By introducing the mandate system in the Pacific, 
Britain succeeded in maintaining Anglo-American cooperation and strengthening the 
imperial defence simultaneously.   
   A significant immigration issue, namely Japan’s racial equality proposal, produced 
another difficult problem at the Paris Peace Conference. According to Nobuaki Makino, 
Japan’s acting chief plenipotentiary at the Peace Conference, the anti-Japanese 
immigration policy of America and the British Dominions was an important unresolved 
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problem of Japanese diplomacy.
808
 Regarding Wilson’s Fourteen Points as an 
opportunity, the Japanese public requested the abolition of racial discrimination at the 
Peace Conference.
809
 Thus, on the establishment of the League of Nations, Japan’s 
delegates made every effort to secure guarantees against ‘the disadvantages to Japan 
which would arise as aforesaid out of racial prejudice’.810 Their solution was to include 
a clause in the Covenant of the League of Nations assuring racial equality and fair 
treatment, which would not only consolidate Japan’s position in the League but also 
invalidate the anti-Japanese immigration policy under the name of the League.  
   Balfour correctly understood the link between the proposal of racial equality and the 
immigration issue. When Colonel House consulted him about Japan’s proposed clause, 
Balfour indicated that it might have ‘the defect of indicating a sympathy on the part of 
the League of Nations with the principle of equal and unrestricted Immigration law’. It 
was obvious that America and the British Dominions could not tolerate increased 
Japanese immigration. As a result, Balfour concluded that: 
 
the insertion of any of the formulae [the racial equality clause] into the document 
establishing the League of Nations would have the triple disadvantage of exciting 
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hopes in the Japanese public which could not be fulfilled; of exciting fears among 
the English-speaking population in new countries lest they should be fulfilled; 
and burdening the League of Nations with a perpetual controversy incapable of 
satisfactory solution.
811
 
 
Like the case of the mandate rule in the Pacific, Balfour valued the maintenance of 
stable Anglo-American-Japanese relations. The racial equality clause might create 
discord between Anglo-American nations and Japan at the stage of the League, which 
Balfour deemed a useful instrument of post-war world order. He could not tolerate the 
risk of such discord.    
   On the other hand, Balfour realised Japan’s difficult position regarding immigration. 
Given her rapidly increasing population, he found it understandable that many Japanese 
people wanted to emigrate. The problem, as he saw it, was that ‘every outlet, whether in 
Asia, America or Australia’, was blocked by Japan’s allies. Balfour’s solution was to 
give Japan a reasonable space for her immigration.
812
 During the war he had already 
agreed with Sir Edward Grey’s view that if the Allies wanted to keep Japan out of the 
United States and the British Dominions, it would not be possible to forbid her to 
expand in China.
813
 Reiterating this opinion after the war, Balfour stated that if 
Japanese emigrants were not allowed to enter any country with a white population it 
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was unreasonable to prohibit them from going to China, where there was ‘a yellow 
race’.814 While he could not support the inclusion of a racial equality clause in the 
Covenant of League of Nations, he was ready to approve Japanese emigration to China 
in an attempt to harmonise the interests of the British Empire, America and Japan at 
China’s expense.             
   On 13 February 1919, Makino proposed Japan’s racial equality clause to the League 
of Nations Commission. Given the Dominions’ opposition, Britain was not in favour of 
Japan’s proposal and the negotiations reached a deadlock. To break this impasse and 
alleviate Britain’s suspicion, Makino removed the word ‘race’ and submitted the revised 
proposal to the Commission on 11 April. Although a majority of the Commission 
supported the revised clause, President Wilson, the Chair of the Commission, rejected it 
on the grounds of lack of unanimous approval.
815
 Anglo-American opposition blocked 
Japan’s bid to insert the racial equality clause. 
   Following this failure, Japan sought a political deal with Britain. The Japanese 
delegation found a linkage between the racial equality issue and the Shantung question 
as negotiations on both continued simultaneously. On 26 April, Makino visited Balfour, 
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who had assumed an important role in settling the Shantung problem, and insisted that 
Japan’s position would be very serious if she was to receive ‘one check in Shantung and 
another check as regards the League of Nations’. Realising the difficulty of overturning 
Anglo-American objections to the racial equality clause, Japan had decided at least to 
secure a favourable result on Shantung. Makino therefore suggested to Balfour that if 
Japan obtained a satisfactory arrangement over Shantung, she would drop the racial 
equality clause.
816
 Racial equality was an idealistic issue, but Japan’s diplomacy did not 
lose pragmatism. 
   It was not surprising that Balfour was in favour of Japan’s proposal. Given the 
perceived harmful influence of the racial equality clause on America, the Dominions 
and the League of Nations, he could not support it at all. But he was open to tolerating 
some of Japan’s claims to Shantung. He made every effort to persuade President Wilson 
to accept Japan’s deal, pointing out that the present Japanese government intended to 
adopt ‘a more liberal policy’.817 His efforts were fruitful: at the plenary session of 28 
April Makino dropped the racial equality clause, and on 30 April Wilson agreed to 
Balfour’s compromise on Shantung, which favoured Japan’s request. Although the 
rejection of the racial equality clause disappointed the Japanese public and increased 
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their dissatisfaction with the West after the war, Balfour had at least succeeded in 
managing the racial issue in a way that prevented Japan losing face at the Paris Peace 
Conference.
818
            
    
II 
 
Balfour left Paris on 11 September 1919 after completing his work at the Peace 
Conference. Although he no longer took on heavy administrative work and was anxious 
to relinquish the Foreign Secretaryship to Curzon in October, this did not mark the end 
of his political career.
819
  Lloyd George and Bonar Law wanted Balfour to remain in 
the Cabinet, and he accepted the position of Lord President of the Council because it 
seemed to him to be ‘the compromise of a lighter Office’.820 Thus removed from the 
daily grind of Whitehall routine, Balfour nevertheless played a significant role in 
discussions of the future of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.     
On 7 October 1919 Sir Beilby Alston, Charge d’Affaires in Tokyo, triggered a fresh 
discussion of the Japanese alliance by arguing against its renewal. Alston advocated that 
‘the chief raison d’etre of the Alliance’ had ceased to exist because the Russian and 
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German threats in the Far East had disappeared after the war. Rather, Alston argued, 
cooperation with America was far more important than any arrangement with Japan.
821
 
In addition, the alliance was not compatible with the League of Nations. The preamble 
to the 1911 alliance stipulated the defence of Britain and Japan’s ‘territorial rights’ and 
‘special interests’ in Eastern Asia and India.822 But Article 10 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations stated that the members of the League would ‘undertake to respect 
and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing Political 
independence of all Members of the League’.823 Britain’s obligation to support Japan’s 
special interests in China under the alliance was clearly inconsistent with the duty of a 
League member under Article 10.
824
 Alston therefore concluded that, supervised by the 
League, the alliance should be modified into ‘a union, embracing the United States, 
Japan, and Great Britain, pledged to rehabilitate China and to assure the peaceful 
development of this part of the world’. If the League project failed, Britain should 
pursue an Anglo-American understanding on China. Even if Britain failed to secure 
such an arrangement with America, Alston, while acknowledging Britain’s difficult 
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position in the Far East, did not propose to renew the Anglo-Japanese alliance.
825
 His 
view was similar to that of Sir Connyngham Greene, the British ambassador at Tokyo, 
in August 1917, whose negative attitude towards the Japanese alliance was typical of 
diplomats on the spot.
826
       
   The reaction to Alston’s opinion demonstrated London’s concern about the 
termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Lord Hardinge, the Permanent 
Under-Secretary, observed that Britain should ensure ‘a friendly Japan’ owing to 
Britain’s naval weakness in the Pacific region.827 For this reason, he concluded, alliance 
with Japan was ‘as essential to us as to Japan’.828 Curzon pointed out two problems to 
which more attention should be paid: ‘the danger that if we leave Japan alone she will 
quickly drop into the arms of Russia & Germany’, and ‘the extreme difficulty of a 
practical Anglo-American Agreement’.829  In December 1919, when he made this 
comment, there was controversy over America’s participation in the League of Nations 
and the Foreign Office decided to postpone discussion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance 
and await the further development of the League.
830
 While Curzon and Hardinge did 
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not necessarily trust Japan’s policy in the Far East, they feared adverse effects from the 
abrogation of the alliance, namely a Russo-German-Japanese combination, thus 
emphasising Britain’s vulnerable naval position in the region. America’s unwillingness 
to take part in the League reminded them of the strong roots of her traditional 
isolationism and cast doubt on the advisability of relying on cooperation with her as an 
alternative to the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Britain could not avoid considering such 
difficulties regarding the end of the alliance.                   
   The fear that Japan would seek to create an alliance with Russia and Germany was 
not new. Even during the war, Britain had been sensitive to the possibility of her 
collaboration with Germany. In January 1918, Shinpei Goto, then Japanese Minister for 
the Interior, described Britain as ‘a “spent power”’ and said that Japan had been 
mistaken in entering the war on Britain’s side. Greene regarded Goto as pro-German 
and reported his remarks to Balfour instantly.
831
 While not believing that Goto’s words 
represented Japan’s official opinion, Balfour responded that ‘it gives one furiously to 
think’.832 Furthermore, in May 1918 Terauchi Masatake, the then Japanese Prime 
Minister, indicated that if necessary Japan would form an alliance with Germany to 
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avoid total isolation after the war. Knowing this, Greene warned Balfour that Japan 
wanted to be ‘in utrumque parati after the war’ given her doubts about an Allied 
victory.
833
 These careless remarks by Japanese politicians increased Britain’s suspicion 
about Japan’s inclination to cooperate with Germany.              
   After the war, this concern remained at the Foreign Office. Given the fear of 
Russia’s revival under Germany’s influence, Curzon pondered whether Britain should 
provide ‘a counter-acting influence by continuing the Japanese alliance with such 
modifications as may be required in order to comply with the spirit of the Covenant of 
the League of Nations’.834 Adding to this view, C.H. Bentinck, a clerk in the Far 
Eastern department, argued that although Japan was ideologically incompatible with 
Bolshevik Russia and had fought the war with Germany, if she became isolated, she 
might seek ‘an alliance with a Russo-German combination to counterbalance an 
Anglo-Saxon co-operation’. He also mentioned that even though such a tripartite 
alliance appeared unlikely at that time, ‘the possibility which was referred to in 1918 by 
the late Count Terauchi, then Prime Minister, must not be lost sight of’.835 The 
experiences of the war remained in the minds of Foreign Office officials and justified 
their concern about Japan collaborating with Russia and Germany. 
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   A Russo-German-Japanese combination would threaten not only the Far East but 
also India. Even during the war, Britain had been annoyed at Japan’s policy towards 
India, for instance by her economic expansion into India and her harbouring of Indian 
seditionists. As Curzon wrote, a hostile or suspicious Japan alone might be ‘a great 
nuisance’ in India. 836  Furthermore, when Britain was engaged in a war against 
Afghanistan in 1919 it had become clear that Bolshevism had already influenced 
Amanullah Khan, the new Amir and son of Habibullah Khan.
837
 Given the strong 
Bolshevik influence in neighbouring Turkestan and Central Asia, Sir Charles Eliot, the 
British Ambassador to Japan, worried that ‘a deliberate attack on India from those 
regions can hardly be regarded as impossible in the future’.838 An alliance with Japan 
and Germany might encourage Russia to take a more aggressive stance against India.  
   However, even if the Anglo-Japanese alliance were renewed, the clauses concerning 
India would have to be amended. The 1911 revision had deleted the article that imposed 
on Japan the obligation to offer military assistance to India, but some references to India 
in the preamble still allowed the possibility of applying the alliance to India’s security. 
As the Government of India had shown during the war, it was not willing to accept 
Japanese troops in India because of its strong doubts about Japan’s motives. Hardinge, 
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who had served as Viceroy of India during the war, recognised the unpopularity of the 
alliance in India and lamented that ‘[i]f we are to educate the Colonies on the value of 
the Japanese Alliance we have a tough job before us particularly in India’.839 The 
Foreign Office understood India’s opposition to the alliance and proposed to the India 
Office that Britain should eliminate any reference to India from a renewed agreement 
with Japan.
840
 On 5 May 1920, both the India Office and the Government of India 
agreed that renewing the alliance in some form was desirable and that all specific 
reference to India should be omitted.
841
 From the viewpoint of India’s defence, Japan 
was already not an ally but a potential enemy. It was essential to prevent her from 
becoming an actual threat. The alliance itself was thus an instrument for the 
containment of Japan’s influence in South-East Asia.                                            
   There was consensus in the Foreign Office that Anglo-American cooperation was 
more important to Britain than an agreement with Japan. The question was whether 
Britain could rely on America’s constant support. Keen supporters of Anglo-American 
cooperation tended to have faith in the common cultural bond between the two countries. 
In a long memorandum, Bentinck wrote that ‘[t]he English-speaking communities 
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naturally tend to draw together’.842 On 1 August 1920 Alston, now British minister in 
Peking, insisted that ‘an Anglo-Saxon fleet’ should protect common Anglo-American 
interests in China and the Pacific.
843
 On the other hand, Sir Eyre Crowe, Assistant 
Under-Secretary, was sceptical about this cultural argument, commenting that 
Bentinck’s insistence was ‘poetry!’844 As for Alston’s argument, while conceding the 
importance of making efforts in that direction, Crowe noted that he wished he could 
share ‘Sir B. Alston’s robust faith in American “cooperation” in China or elsewhere’.845 
These internal divisions persisted in the Foreign Office and its officials failed to relieve 
Curzon’s concern about the difficulty of Anglo-American cooperation.846                              
   Curzon was influenced by telegrams from Tokyo and Washington supporting the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance. In addition, although no longer officially involved in foreign 
policy-making, Balfour was associated with some of the discussions about the alliance. 
When Hardinge asked Curzon whether he should obtain Cabinet approval to draft 
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telegrams to Eliot, Curzon replied that it would be sufficient ‘if Mr. Balfour 
approves’.847 Hardinge therefore sent Balfour a file of telegrams between London, 
Tokyo and Washington, and asked him to check the draft for a telegram to Eliot.
848
 
Balfour read all the papers and approved the draft with minor revision, which Curzon 
and Hardinge accepted.
849
 This episode demonstrated that Balfour still had influence in 
the Foreign Office even after resigning as Foreign Secretary. More importantly, he had 
already received significant information about the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance before the Cabinet began to discuss it.  
On 3 December 1920, Sir Auckland Geddes, British ambassador to America, urged 
that there should be ‘no break’ between Britain and Japan. While he understood the 
importance of securing co-operation with America, he concluded that ‘it would be a 
high, and I believe unnecessary, price to pay to purchase it at the cost of Japanese 
enmity’.850 Geddes was not a keen supporter of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, but his 
emphasis on the difficulty of guaranteeing constant American help took the same line as 
Curzon’s doubts about America and increased the value of the Japanese alliance.     
Eliot also supported renewing the Anglo-Japanese alliance and was concerned about 
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the following possibility:            
 
In a few years, if her [Japan’s] naval and military programme is executed and no 
internal trouble occurs, she will be very strong, and if we do not make her our 
Ally she will be decidedly hostile. I anticipate grave difficulties in India and our 
other Asiatic possessions in near future, and we cannot count on American 
sympathy there. I do not think that we can afford to risk enmity of Japan.
851
  
 
Eliot’s analysis recalled the crucial fact that a hostile Japan would be a threat not only to 
the Far East but also to India.
852
 The proponents of Anglo-American cooperation 
tended to focus on China, where America had political and financial interests. But it was 
essential to consider whether Britain could rely on America’s support for the defence of 
India, where the latter did not have any interests. Originally, America had not been in 
favour of British rule in India due to American hostility toward the concept of empire. It 
was not surprising that Curzon, a former Viceroy of India who was sceptical about 
America’s commitment, concurred with Eliot’s assessment regarding India. Curzon 
decided to circulate the despatches of Geddes and Eliot to the Cabinet, adding a 
comment that they were ‘of considerable importance’.853              
   The argument over the renewal of the alliance moved from the Foreign Office to the 
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Cabinet in 1921. After some delay due to Curzon’s ill health, the ministers discussed the 
matter on 30 May. Curzon took the initiative in the debate and summarised the 
advantages and disadvantages of a renewal. With the current disappearance of the 
Russian and German threats to Britain in the Far East, it did not seem to be necessary to 
renew the alliance. The deterioration of Anglo-American relations and the alienation of 
China made its renewal more difficult. On the other hand, if Russia and Germany 
recovered in the Far East, the alliance would be useful as a counterbalance. Furthermore, 
Britain could utilise the alliance to check Japan’s ambitious foreign policy in Asia. 
Finally, Japan wanted to renew it. In sum, given the difficulties of making an agreement 
with America, Curzon was inclined to favour renewing the alliance. Nevertheless, he 
did not forget to point out that a renewed alliance should be compatible with the 
Covenant of the League of Nations and should be for a shorter term this time, for 
example four or five years.
854
 
Edwin Montagu added the Indian viewpoint to Curzon’s argument. The Secretary of 
State for India criticised Japan’s secret connection with Indian seditionists, arguing that 
the references to India in the Anglo-Japanese alliance gave Japan ‘an excuse for 
penetration in India’. On the other hand, supported by Austen Chamberlain, then Lord 
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Privy Seal, Montagu insisted that Japan would become openly hostile to Britain and join 
a Russo-German combination if the alliance were terminated.
855
 Britain had to achieve 
two purposes simultaneously: keep Japan’s threat to India potential and curb Japanese 
intervention in India. Montagu’s solution was for the Anglo-Japanese alliance to be 
renewed without any reference to India. Although he ruled out the possibility of 
utilising Japanese assistance for the defence of India, he agreed with Curzon on the 
necessity of renewing the alliance for India’s security.  
   Curzon faced some opposition among his colleagues. Winston Churchill, then the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, emphasised the Dominions’ suspicion of the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance. Canada opposed its renewal and Australia and New Zealand 
feared the rapid growth of Japan’s naval power in the Pacific region. Churchill wanted 
to hold a conference to alleviate the Dominions’ concerns about British policy towards 
Japan. Furthermore, he insisted that the Japanese alliance might lead America to 
increase the size of her navy against those of both Britain and Japan, causing a naval 
armaments race in Asia. Lord Lee of Fareham, the First Lord of the Admiralty, backed 
Churchill, agreeing that America might ‘not only build [ships] against Japan, but also 
against Great Britain and Japan combined’.856 Given the recent rise in America’s power, 
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Lord Lee’s analysis was not unfounded; the Cabinet could not ignore this naval 
problem.   
Balfour pursued a compromise between his pro- and anti-renewal colleagues. He 
was in favour of renewing the alliance and praised Curzon’s arguments as ‘very 
convincing’. But realising that Britain had to deal with the Dominions’ concerns, he also 
agreed to a conference to discuss Pacific affairs. Balfour emphasised that if the alliance 
were renewed, Britain would have to correct America’s misconception that Britain 
would side with Japan in a war against America. He aimed at ‘combining Lord Curzon’s 
and Mr Churchill’s proposals’ and this was how he tried to bring about a consensus in 
the Cabinet on the renewal of the alliance. Lloyd George followed Balfour’s line, 
supporting the renewal and arranging the Pacific conference.
857
   
   After prolonged discussion, the Cabinet reached several conclusions. Firstly, Britain 
would ask America to summon a Pacific conference to discuss the future of the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance and assess the position of the Dominions. Before the 
conference Britain should inform Japan and other powers that Britain had ‘no intention 
of dropping the Alliance’. Secondly, the alliance should be renewed for less than ten 
years and be consistent with the Covenant of the League of Nations. Special attention 
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was to be paid to ‘American susceptibilities’, and Britain was to enter into close 
communication with her and China about the renewal of the alliance.
858
 This was ‘the 
Churchill-Curzon compromise’.859 It was Balfour who proposed this solution to the 
Cabinet, whose decision became the basis of British policy on the alliance. 
Before the Imperial Conference, which was scheduled for June 1921, there was one 
further factor to be considered: the establishment of a naval base in Singapore. As Lord 
Lee argued in the Cabinet, the post-war naval situation in the Pacific was too important 
to be ignored. Balfour and his Cabinet colleagues took a gloomy view of Britain’s naval 
position there. After the war only three naval powers, Britain, America and Japan, could 
affect the international order in the Pacific region. However, Britain’s relative position 
rapidly declined.
860
 On 26 February 1921, Churchill warned Balfour that Britain was 
‘in danger of sinking to the position not only of second but of third naval power in a few 
years’ time’.861 Balfour shared Churchill’s concerns and feared that such a decline 
would ‘get us into great trouble politically, and seriously damage our reputation at home, 
and our influence with the Dominions’. Owing to financial stringency, however, it was 
not practicable for Britain to compete with the other two countries. Balfour thus 
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concluded:        
 
I do not, of course, mean that we are either to plan or to publish a ship-building 
programme of a kind which will inevitably suggest an eternal competition in 
armaments with the U.S.A.; but there is something between this and a continued 
acquiescence in a policy which would put us in the third place among Naval 
Powers.
862
 
 
Balfour’s solution was to establish a naval base in Singapore. Although the Foreign 
Office and the Admiralty had already realised the necessity of a naval base there, this 
was ‘a Cabinet question’ and could not be settled by them alone.863 In practice, this 
meant that the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) had to deal with the issue.
864
 
After a hiatus in its activities during the war, the CID had resumed its activity on 29 
June 1920. As its de facto chairman, Balfour took the initiative in the discussion of 
British policy regarding a naval base in the East.   
On receiving memoranda from the Admiralty and War Office in May 1921, Balfour 
began to discuss the merits of Hong Kong and Singapore as naval bases. Given its 
geographic proximity to Japan, Balfour insisted, it would be impossible for Britain to 
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protect Hong Kong against a sudden Japanese attack.
865
 On the other hand, Singapore 
was ‘the gateway from the Indian Ocean to the Far East’, making it an ideal place for 
the initial concentration of British naval forces. Singapore thus occupied ‘to the British 
Empire in the East a corresponding position to Gibraltar in the West’.866 Singapore’s 
strategic significance was not confined to the Pacific region. Indeed, Balfour confessed 
that he had always regarded Singapore as ‘belonging rather to the Indian Ocean than to 
the Pacific’.867 This meant that India should be consulted on the question of the 
proposed naval base.   
Balfour carried out further detailed analysis of Singapore’s potential as a naval base 
in the sub-committee of the CID in June 1921. After the war, for the security of British 
interests in the Pacific, Britain could no longer rely on the Anglo-Japanese alliance, 
which ‘could be terminated at far shorter notice than the period necessary for providing 
adequate defences’. A naval base in Singapore, which was ‘the keystone of Imperial 
defence in the East’, would offer reinsurance for the anticipated demise of the 
alliance.
868
 Even if the alliance continued, it would also be necessary for Britain to 
build an oil store for the refuelling and operation of her fleets in the Far East. Whether 
                                                   
865 Memo. by Balfour, 3 May 1921, CAB 34/1/2. 
866 Memo. by the Oversea Defence Committee, 7 Jun. 1921, CAB 5/4/143C.  
867 “Memorandum of a Conversation Held at Mr Hughes’ Private House”, 8 Dec. 1921, CAB 
30/27/14. 
868 Minutes of 140
th
 Meeting, 10 Jun. 1921, CAB 2/3/140. 
312 
 
the alliance was renewed or not, a Singapore naval base should be constructed from a 
strategic point of view. In addition, Britain had to show her intention of maintaining 
naval supremacy in order to secure the consent of the Dominions, in particular Australia 
and New Zealand. A naval base in Singapore would be proof of her firm commitment to 
these countries. These imperial considerations made a first-class naval base at Singapore 
imperative.          
However, Balfour could not ignore Britain’s financial problems. Under the 
conditions of post-war austerity, it would be difficult to spend money on building a large 
naval base in Asia. Any decision to do so would create ‘a storm of protest’ in public. 
Balfour and the sub-committee therefore requested that the Dominions bore ‘their fair 
share of the burden of Imperial defence’.869 In this manner the sub-committee set out a 
line of policy on a Singapore naval base for the forthcoming Imperial Conference.  
Balfour’s final conclusion on Singapore was: 
 
(a) His Majesty’s Government fully recognise that the basis of any system of 
Imperial defence against attack from over the sea, whether upon the United 
Kingdom Australasia or elsewhere, must be, as it has always been, the 
maintenance of our sea power;    
(b) The most pressing question in this connection at the present time is that of the 
measures to be taken for the protection of Empire interests in the Pacific; 
(c) His Majesty’s Government are advised that for this purpose it is essential that 
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Singapore should be available as a base of concentration, repair, and supply 
for the British fleet; and they are accordingly prepared to take the lead in 
developing that port as a naval base; 
(d) Owing to existing financial conditions it will not be practicable to incur a 
large expenditure for this purpose in the immediate future; but it is the 
intention of His Majesty’s Government to develop the port as funds become 
available, and the greater the assistance that can be rendered by the oversea 
Governments in this connection the quicker will the necessary programme be 
completed.
870
      
 
Balfour thus combined strategic, imperial and financial considerations. No reference to 
Japan in this conclusion meant that the Singapore naval base was a case of forward 
planning to deal with the Pacific without any Japan’s help. He also emphasised the 
usefulness of the contribution of the Dominions and India to the establishment of the 
base. This indicated that Balfour realised that they could affect Britain’s commitment to 
Asia.                                        
There was no guarantee that the Dominions and India would accept Britain’s request. 
In particular, India was strongly dissatisfied with Britain’s demand for a greater 
contribution towards the defence of the British Empire; she had originally had to take 
care of her own army to protect her long land frontiers and deal with internal disorder.
871
 
After the war, India’s army had assumed the additional responsibility of enforcing the 
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terms of the Peace Treaty.
872
 Furthermore, in the post-war world India faced ‘the 
greater vulnerability of the Empire on land in the Middle East’ and the threat of a 
Russo-German combination against India and Afghanistan.
873
 Nevertheless, Britain was 
trying to extract more human and financial resources from her. Criticising London’s 
attitude, Montagu insisted:        
 
[i]n short, we must definitely get out of our heads the vague idea too often 
entertained, that India is an inexhaustible reservoir from which men and money 
can be drawn towards the support of Imperial resources or in pursuance of 
Imperial strategy.
874
    
 
Although the construction of a naval base in Singapore was linked to India’s defence, 
India, the most important source of finance for imperial defence, was unlikely to be 
willing to offer assistance for this project.      
The last item for discussion by the sub-committee was the renewal of the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance in connection with the establishment of a naval base in 
Singapore. This was scarcely surprising. The CID after all had ‘considered the last 
renewal of the Alliance which took place in 1911’.875 If the alliance were terminated in 
1921 as scheduled, a naval base at Singapore would become ‘a matter of urgency’. 
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Given Britain’s financial constraints, however, it was not possible to complete the 
development of the Singapore base quickly. Therefore, unless some reliable 
understanding with America on a common defence in the Pacific was reached, Britain 
would have, ‘from a strategic point of view, everything to lose and nothing to gain by 
the determination, at the present time, of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance’.876 The renewal 
of the alliance would render the possibility of war with Japan more remote and give 
Britain the necessary time to complete the construction of the Singapore naval base. On 
17 June 1921, the committee approved this pro-alliance policy and Balfour followed 
this line in discussions at the Imperial Conference.
877
     
   The Imperial Conference, attended by the Dominion Prime Ministers and 
Representatives of India and the British Cabinet, began on 20 June 1921. After the 
opening speeches the conference entered into a general review of British foreign policy 
and a detailed discussion of the fate of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Curzon opened by 
reiterating the opinion put forward at the Cabinet meeting of 30 May.
878
 Balfour, who 
supported Curzon’s argument and conclusions, attended the Imperial Conference ‘on 
behalf of the League of Nations and the Committee of Imperial Defence’.879 As 
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chairman of the sub-committee of the CID, moreover, he emphasised Britain’s 
diminished naval position in the Pacific: 
 
America is steadily putting ships in the Pacific, I understand, and although I am 
not in the least way conceiving a war with America as a possibility, yet if you 
look at the thing from a purely strategic point of view, and omit politics and 
sentiment and look at it with an open mind, undoubtedly it is a fact that if we had 
not Japan on our side we should be second or third Power in the Pacific after a 
considerable number of years.
880
  
 
As Britain could not build up her fleet immediately, ‘so long as our relatively 
unprepared condition lasts, it is, from a strategic point of view, of very great importance 
that the Japanese Alliance should be maintained’. He believed that an alliance was 
neither a permanent safeguard nor an adequate substitute for material force. In addition, 
as a keen supporter of Anglo-American cooperation, Balfour regarded confronting 
America in the Pacific region as unrealistic. Nevertheless, reiterating the advantages 
Curzon had listed, he concluded that a renewal of the alliance with Japan was ‘a most 
desirable object’ from a strategic point of view. 
   Balfour also advocated linking the renewal of the alliance with the naval base at 
Singapore. Britain needed a place to refit and refuel if she was to operate her fleet in the 
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Pacific. He concluded that:  
 
one of the most pressing needs for Imperial defence is that Singapore should be 
made into a place where the British Fleet can concentrate for the defence of the 
Empire, of our interests in the East, our interests in India, our interests in 
Australia, our interests in New Zealand, our interests in the smaller Possessions 
there, and that for that purpose it is absolutely necessary to undertake works at 
Singapore.
881
   
 
This conclusion demonstrated that Balfour considered Singapore useful for the 
protection of British interests, not only in Australasia but also in India, from the 
viewpoint of imperial defence. However, it would take some years to complete the 
construction of a Singapore base, and until then Britain was ‘at a relative disadvantage 
undoubtedly in the Pacific’. Terminating the Anglo-Japanese alliance would create ‘two 
evil consequences at least’: Britain would no longer be able to count on Japanese 
assistance, and nor would she be able to control Japan’s policy in the Far East; in the 
worst case, Japan would change from ‘a faithful friend into a very formidable 
enemy’.882 Given her unpreparedness to meet any contingency in Asia, Britain could 
not afford to lose the alliance. 
   Balfour then dealt with the alliance question as the British representative of the 
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League of Nations. He suggested that the Anglo-Japanese alliance be made more 
compatible with the League of Nations. He considered not only the modification of the 
alliance but also amendments to the Covenant. Newly independent Czecho-Slovakia 
was deeply concerned about her security and sought an alliance with other countries 
such as Romania. As a result, she requested that the League of Nations should approve 
the combination of two or more countries if their purpose was defensive and peaceful. 
Balfour forecast that Czecho-Slovakia’s proposal would be accepted and could be 
applied to the Japanese alliance. Although the alliance was a combination of two powers, 
if its purpose and contents were defensive, it could survive under the auspices of the 
League. Balfour considered that it would not be difficult to revise the alliance so that it 
harmonised with the Covenant. 
Balfour also argued that the Anglo-Japanese alliance could coexist with 
Anglo-American cooperation under the League of Nations. Citing that the Covenant 
regarded the Monroe Doctrine as peaceful in Article 21, Balfour insisted that ‘[t]he 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, especially if America would join, would be the Monroe 
Doctrine applied to the Pacific’. 883  This indicated that Balfour thought of an 
Anglo-American-Japanese agreement, which would be compatible with the Covenant. It 
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was significant that Balfour did not regard such a tripartite arrangement as the end of 
the alliance. Rather, he deemed America’s accession to it a desirable development of the 
alliance. Whether the alliance was bilateral or tripartite, Balfour concluded that Britain 
should renew it.             
India understood the necessity of renewing of the alliance. Edwin Montagu, 
Secretary of State for India, emphasised Russia’s military threat to India and naval 
threat in the Pacific. He argued that ‘it looks as if the anxieties which Bolshevik Russia 
presents are becoming almost identical with those which Czarist Russia presented’.884 
By tackling the Russian threat and the possibility of its reinforcement through an 
alliance with Germany, the Anglo-Japanese alliance could be ‘the future salvation of the 
East’.885 With regard to Singapore, Montagu agreed with Balfour that its development 
was ‘of great interest not only to Australia and to New Zealand but also to India’.886 
This was because he was alarmed by the vulnerability of India on the Pacific coast.
887
 
Although there was still discord over India’s contribution to the construction of the 
proposed naval base, Britain and India both appreciated the value of the base and of the 
Japanese alliance. In the end the Indian representatives, the Maharao of Cutch and 
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Srinivasa-Sastri, approved the continuance of the alliance on condition that reference to 
India would be omitted in its preamble.
888
                  
   Reactions from the Dominions were divided. At the meeting of 29 June 1921, Arthur 
Meighen, Prime Minister of Canada, strongly opposed the renewal of the alliance.
889
 
His main concern was to preserve good relations with America, and he insisted that no 
matter what form the renewed alliance took America would not approve a bilateral 
combination of Britain and Japan. If the alliance was renewed without America, 
Anglo-American relations would deteriorate and Canada would suffer in consequence. 
In addition, emphasising the importance of China, Meighen considered that Japan’s 
policy towards China violated her territorial integrity and the Open Door principle. 
Renewing the alliance would be interpreted to mean that Britain supported Japan’s 
aggression in Asia. Given the opposition of America and China, he concluded, Britain 
should not renew the alliance. Although Curzon presented a counterargument, Meighen 
did not yield. Even Chamberlain’s concern that an isolated Japan might cooperate with a 
Russo-German combination did not appeal to him. Meighen’s stance was the same as 
that of the anti-renewal officials at the Foreign Office. However, in reply to Balfour, 
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Meighen admitted that he could accept a tripartite arrangement between Britain, 
America and Japan.
890
  
By contrast, Australia and New Zealand favoured renewing the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance.
891
 The circumstances of Australasia were different to those of Canada. 
Australia needed to strengthen her security in the face of America and Japan’s naval 
expansion. Although William Hughes, Australia’s Prime Minister, was ‘as resolute a 
champion of the Union of English-speaking people as any man’, he was sceptical about 
America’s permanent commitment to the Pacific. Unless America offered the assurance 
of security, he argued, Australia had to control Japan as an ally and prevent her from 
turning into actual threat to Britain for the sake of maintaining peace in the region. 
William Massey, Prime Minister of New Zealand, doubted America’s reliability and 
sided with Hughes: ‘[w]e are part of the British Empire and we look to the British 
Empire to protect us’. Unlike Canada, the danger of a Russo-German-Japanese 
collaboration was real for New Zealand. Massey admitted that Japan was ‘our loyal 
Ally’, citing her naval assistance in the Pacific during the war. He saw the speedy 
renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance as suiting not only New Zealand but also the 
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British Empire as a whole.
892
 Hughes and Massey shared Curzon’s pessimistic view of 
America’s involvement in international politics.      
   Balfour shared these security concerns about Australasia. During discussion of the 
naval problem in that region, Balfour asked Lord Beatty, First Sea Lord: 
 
May I ask if you would develop the possibility of maritime operations between 
Japan and America in the Pacific? It is relevant because Mr. Hughes has indicated 
to us that, after all, Australia must look after her safety, and if we cannot help her 
America can. She must turn to America; she would have to do it.
893
      
 
Balfour put this question plainly: ‘if Great Britain could not, or would not, do her work 
in the Pacific, the nations who were afraid of Japan in the Pacific would have to turn to 
America’. But he doubted that America could be substituted for ‘the British Empire 
with Singapore and Hong Kong’. Given the vast distances between the Far East and 
American islands such as Hawaii, Beatty agreed that America was ‘a Power which can 
put up a defence far less easily than we can’. This meant that if Australia and New 
Zealand relied on America, they could not be confident of their security. Balfour 
considered this ‘a very vital point’.894 Anglo-American cooperation was a significant 
principle of his diplomatic and defence policy, but if America did not have enough 
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power to protect part of the British Empire, Britain would have to undertake its defence 
by herself, even under conditions of severe financial difficulty. Balfour realised that the 
maintenance of good relations with America alone was not sufficient for the defence of 
the British Empire.        
Following the Imperial Conference, Lloyd George held a Cabinet meeting on 30 
June 1921. Curzon summarised the discussions at the conference, citing Canada’s 
opposition to and Australasia’s support for the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. 
However, he saw Geddes’ recent telegrams from Washington as more important. Geddes 
had modified his favourable view of the alliance and now advocated ‘a tripartite 
agreement between Britain, Japan and United States’ in light of America’s strong 
opposition to the alliance.
895
 Curzon therefore suggested that Britain should confirm 
America and Japan’s views on the renewal of the alliance. Lloyd George accepted this 
suggestion and raised three fundamental points: first, Britain could not quarrel with 
America; second, it was essential not to insult Japan; third, China had to be carried with 
Britain.
896
 This underlined Britain’s difficult position in Asia. It was not clear that any 
policy could achieve all these objectives. The Cabinet therefore agreed that the decision 
should be postponed until they knew the opinions of Japan and America.  
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   After this the main focus of the discussion at the Imperial Conference moved to a 
Pacific conference which Britain, Japan, America and China would attend to discuss the 
post-war international order in the Pacific with other powers interested in the region. 
The fate of the alliance was to be examined at this conference, which made it 
convenient for Britain to confirm Japan and America’s views on the renewal of the 
alliance. With the agreement of the Dominions and India, there was no objection to 
holding such a conference.   
   The division within the British Empire was exposed by one important question: 
what Britain should do if the Pacific conference did not produce results.  ‘Should the 
Conference fail to arrive at any new agreement’, Curzon proposed, ‘the existing 
[Anglo-Japanese] agreement as adapted to meet the requirements of the Covenant of the 
League goes on’. India, Australia and New Zealand agreed. In particular, Hughes was in 
favour of making ‘a plain, straightforward declaration of our intention to renew’ at the 
conference. On the other hand, Canada and South Africa opposed this. Meighen and Jan 
Christiaan Smuts, the representative for South Africa, feared that such a policy would 
restrict the flexibility of the British diplomacy. While Curzon bluntly defended his idea 
as ‘a truism’, Balfour tried to persuade Meighen and Smuts.897 Balfour proposed that 
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the alliance would ‘renew in some shape’ in the case of the failure of the conference, but 
Smuts did not withdraw his opposition.
898
 Even when Lloyd George stated that the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance ‘ought to be our policy’ if the Pacific conference failed, 
Meighen and Smuts strongly retaliated.
899
 This demonstrated the lack of consensus on 
the renewal of the alliance at the Imperial Conference.
900
 Balfour was more flexible 
than Curzon, but fundamentally they shared the same inclination to renew the alliance.   
   All was not well for Britain, however. Two international conferences were to be held 
that would affect the alliance and the politics of the Pacific region: a Pacific conference 
and a Disarmament conference. Having more interests in the Pacific than in 
disarmament, Britain hoped that the Pacific conference would be convened in London. 
Balfour assumed that Britain would be able to wield her influence in the creation of a 
new post-war international order by hosting at least one of the two international 
conferences.
901
 America and Japan, however, blocked her attempt to hold the Pacific 
conference in London. On 14 July 1921 the American President, Warren G. Harding, 
indicated that he thought that both the Pacific and the Disarmament conference should 
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be held in Washington.
902
 It was a blow to Britain when Japan accepted the American 
proposal that Washington should call the Pacific conference.
903
 In the end Britain had 
no choice but to accept that just one conference concerning both disarmament and 
problems in the Pacific would be held in Washington in November. ‘As long as we were 
acting in concert with Japan’, Lloyd George lamented, ‘I think we were in a position to 
insist upon the arrangements that best suited us’. However, Britain was now ‘in the 
position of trying quite alone to upset something which has been agreed to by every 
Power except ourselves’.904 This circumstance indicated some features of the relations 
between Britain, America and Japan after the war. Britain could no longer push her 
opinion through if America and Japan collaborated against her. America refusing to 
cooperate with Britain was not new, but Japan now showed more of a tendency to 
prioritise America over Britain. These features would arise again at the coming 
Washington conference and Balfour, as chief British delegate, would have to face them.             
 
III 
    
After agreeing to hold the conference in Washington, Britain had to choose the members 
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of her delegation. It was essential that the chief of the delegation should be a political 
heavyweight. At first, therefore, it was proposed that Lloyd George himself should 
assume this role. However, it was not certain that he would be able to go to Washington 
because of his bad health and heavy domestic load. On 27 September 1921 Lloyd 
George chose Balfour as the chief British representative at the conference.
905
 Given his 
high rank and expertise in diplomacy and defence policy, many senior policymakers 
regarded Balfour as an excellent choice. Although he was in Geneva with the British 
delegation to the League of Nations at the time, he wrote that ‘if there is an important 
reason for my going I am ready to go’.906            
   Maurice Hankey, secretary to the CID, was the other most important member of the 
British delegation. On 15 August 1921 the British Cabinet asked the CID for advice 
concerning their preparation for the conference.
907
 It was natural that Hankey should 
join the delegation. To Balfour, who played an essential role as Chairman of the CID, 
Hankey’s ‘extraordinary ability’ was irreplaceable. As in the CID, Balfour cooperated 
closely with Hankey and did ‘an amazing amount of preparatory work’.908 Hankey’s 
assistance was essential for Balfour to tackle the future of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.    
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The CID did not begin to prepare for the conference until October 1921 because 
Balfour, as its chairman, was still busy in Geneva at the League of Nations. On 5 
October the CID received two memoranda on disarmament from the Army and the 
Navy listing the many difficulties that the British Empire faced. The Army insisted that 
Britain’s armed forces were ‘no more than barely sufficient’ to fulfil their obligations.909 
Although it did not state this clearly, the Army wanted to avoid an arms limitation, but 
the Navy accepted some disarmament to reduce expenditure. Whilst it approved parity 
with America, the Navy advocated that both Britain and America should have ‘a margin 
over Japan of 3 to 2’. As for the Singapore naval base, this was to be ‘a purely defensive 
measure, of vital importance to India as well as to Australasia’, a line that Balfour had 
developed earlier.
910
                  
   In response the CID drafted a memorandum in preparation for the Washington 
conference on 24 October 1921. It followed the proposals of the Army and Navy and 
defined Britain’s aim at the conference as seeking ‘to achieve the largest possible 
reduction in expenditure on armaments’, subject to two fundamental considerations. The 
first was to safeguard the vital interests of the British Empire, which especially 
concerned the CID; the second was to avoid the untoward influence of ‘any 
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miscalculation of national or political elements concerned’ such as America’s refusal to 
ratify the Paris peace treaty.
911
 Although the second consideration was a political matter 
outside its purview, the CID pointed it out and required the British delegation’s attention. 
This indicated that the CID was cautious about America’s commitment to 
disarmament.
912
            
   The matter of the Anglo-Japanese alliance at the Washington conference was left to 
the Foreign Office. On 20 October 1921 Victor Wellesley produced a detailed 
memorandum on the political situation in the Pacific and the Far East. In it he 
developed the notion of a tripartite agreement between Britain, America and Japan to 
replace the Japanese alliance. He emphasised the impossibility of preserving the 
military clauses of the alliance in such an arrangement. According to Wellesley, 
America would not subscribe to ‘anything in the nature of an alliance’. Considering the 
difficulty of securing the ratification of the United States Senate, he concluded that it 
would be better for the new agreement to take a loose-form requiring no formal 
ratification.
913
  
On 22 October 1921, the Foreign Office prepared another memorandum on the 
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Anglo-Japanese alliance ‘for the information and guidance’ of the British delegation to 
the Washington conference. This memorandum also investigated the possibility of a 
tripartite agreement. It came to the same conclusion as Wellesley: it would be necessary 
to eliminate ‘military commitments such as are contained in articles 2 and 5 of the 
Anglo-Japanese Agreement’ from the new arrangement, otherwise America would never 
become party to the agreement. The memorandum emphasised that: 
                     
[s]tripped of military clauses, the Anglo-Japanese Agreement loses its character 
as an alliance and becomes merely a declaration of policy of a nature similar to 
that of the Takahira-Root or Ishii-Lansing Agreements. A formula for an 
agreement on a tripartite basis must necessarily be confined to general principles 
of policy and therefore be of a somewhat anodyne nature.
914
  
 
However, Curzon expressed his concern about the exclusion of military clauses and 
insisted that ‘we shall certainly be left worse off than before’. Although Japan’s military 
obligation was now obsolete, the Anglo-Japanese alliance allowed Britain a steadying 
influence on Japanese diplomacy. Curzon was not at all sure that the merits of the 
alliance would be compensated by ‘a temporary conquest of the beaux yeux of 
America’.915 It was clear that he had not changed his negative view of the practicability 
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of Anglo-American cooperation and his favourable attitude towards the alliance. Curzon 
and the Foreign Office officials were still divided even just before the Washington 
conference.       
Balfour examined the CID and Foreign Office memoranda as he sailed to 
Washington. He had returned to London from Geneva in October 1921 with little time 
to complete his preparations for the conference. But his experience in the CID, the 
British Cabinet and the Imperial Conference compensated for this to some extent. The 
Lloyd George administration had not given Balfour specific instructions, and as a result 
he enjoyed great flexibility which he did not hesitate to take advantage of.
916
  He left 
London on 2 November and arrived at Washington via Quebec in Canada on 10 
November. Fighting seasickness, he had devoted the whole of the transatlantic voyage 
to a close study of many Cabinet documents and diplomatic dispatches regarding the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance.
917
  
   During the voyage, Balfour gave consideration to the future of the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance. He thought that Britain should conclude two international treaties: a tripartite 
Anglo-American-Japanese treaty in defence of the territorial status quo in the Pacific, 
and a multinational treaty dealing with the many problems related to China. The former 
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would replace the existing Anglo-Japanese alliance, and Balfour drafted the outlines of 
such an arrangement:  
 
With the object of maintaining the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia 
and of protecting the existing territorial rights of the high contracting parties in 
the Islands of the Pacific Ocean and the territories bordering thereon: -It is 
agreed: 
 
I. 
That each of the high contracting parties shall respect such rights themselves, and 
shall consult fully and frankly with each other as to the best means of protecting 
them whenever in the opinion of any of them they are imperilled by the action of 
another Power. 
 
II. 
      If any two of the high contracting parties desire to bind themselves and assist 
each other in defending these rights by force of arms against the attacks by 
outside Powers, they shall be at liberty to do so, provided that 
(a) their military undertakings shall be strictly defensive in character; and  
(b) shall be fully and frankly communicated to the other party to this treaty. 
                        
         III. 
      This treaty shall supersede any treaty of earlier date dealing with the defence of 
territorial rights in the regions to which this treaty refers.
918
 
 
Balfour specified the purposes of the trilateral agreement as follows: 
 
Note – The object of this scheme is 
(a) to enable the Americans to be parties to a tripartite arrangement without 
committing themselves to military operations. 
        (b) to bring the Anglo-Japanese alliance in its original form to an end without 
hurting the feelings of our ally. 
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(c) to leave it open to us to renew a defensive alliance with Japan if she should 
again be threatened by Germany or Russia. 
(d) to frame a treaty which will reassure our Australasian dominions. 
(e) to make it impossible for American critics to suggest that our treaty with 
Japan would prevent us siding with them in the case of a rupture or threat 
of rupture.
919
 
  
The draft underlined the extent to which Balfour had shifted his stance on the renewal 
of the existing alliance. Although he accepted the idea of a tripartite agreement to 
maintain good relations with America, he did not simply adopt the Foreign Office’s 
proposal. Balfour wanted to introduce a clause (II, above), relating to military affairs. 
As item (c) showed, this clause meant that if necessary Britain could revive a bilateral 
alliance with Japan. Item (e) specified that condition (b) of clause II aimed to avoid the 
problem that the Anglo-Japanese alliance had faced with the deterioration of 
US-Japanese relations after the Russo-Japanese War. The insertion of clause II was an 
attempt to preserve the core of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in a new tripartite treaty. 
Item (d) justified Balfour’s scheme from the viewpoint of imperial defence. As item (b) 
underlined, Balfour agreed to terminate the ‘original form’ of the Japanese alliance, but 
he had no intention of abandoning it altogether.
920
           
   On his arrival in Washington, Balfour sent Lloyd George the draft agreement. 
Although he had modified some of the wording of clause II and items (b) and (e), the 
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draft remained unchanged in substance. He attached a detailed explanation of the 
objectives of his draft to his telegram to Lloyd George. First, he realised that ‘adherence 
to the Alliance in its present form’ was unpopular in America and that this would make 
it extremely difficult to conclude a satisfactory arrangement on arms limitation. 
However, Japan was ‘an ally who has loyally stood by his engagements and rendered us 
valuable support in the late war’, and Britain should therefore not alienate her. Balfour 
also argued that although the threats of Russia and Germany had disappeared for the 
time being, it would not be prudent to assume that this peaceful situation would 
continue forever. Finally, Britain had to give the utmost weight to the desire of Australia 
and New Zealand to maintain the Anglo-Japanese alliance ‘in some shape or form’.921 
Balfour’s draft was the fruit of much labour to meet all these contradictory 
considerations. Although it was often judged that Canada’s opinion against the alliance 
was critical, Balfour did not underestimate Australasia’s hope of renewing it.922 His 
trilateral arrangement was different to that of the Foreign Office, which was equal to a 
declaration or general principles of policy.   
   However, whether America and Japan would share Balfour’s idea of the tripartite 
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agreement was another matter. Before the conference opened Balfour met Charles 
Evans Hughes, the United States Secretary of State, on 11 November 1921 to learn 
America’s opinion. Balfour handed Hughes a copy of his draft, which, he explained, 
was ‘unofficial and merely the result of his personal cogitations in the intervals of 
seasickness on the voyage’.923 Balfour described the advantages and disadvantages of 
the Anglo-Japanese alliance as follows: 
 
      a.  American sentiment 
disadvantage – con.  
   b.  Japanese sense of dignity –  
Control of Japanese action –  
Sense of Security of Dominions 
pro
924
 
 
This indicated concisely that Anglo-American cooperation and imperial defence were 
not compatible under the present alliance. The aim of Balfour’s tripartite arrangement 
was that both factors would stand together. Yet, Balfour’s balanced argument did not 
impress Hughes, who received Balfour’s draft but only commented that the use of the 
word ‘treaty’ would cause great difficulty because the United States was not in favour of 
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discussing treaties with foreign countries. Although Balfour at once altered this to 
‘arrangement’, it was clear that Hughes was not inclined to cooperate with Balfour. 
Hughes also expressed ‘considerable disquietude’ at Balfour’s request to show the draft 
to the Japanese delegation. Furthermore, with regard to the procedure of the conference, 
Hughes refused to tell Balfour about the statement that he would deliver on the opening 
day.
925
 Unlike Britain, America was not willing to hold a detailed preliminary 
discussion with Britain in order not to affect the result of the conference.      
   Hughes’ speech at the opening of the Washington Conference on 12 November 1921 
surprised Balfour. His main point was the ratios of Britain, America and Japan’s capital 
ships. He advocated that the ratio of the ships of America: Britain: Japan should be 5: 5: 
3.
926
 After the session Balfour discussed this with the British delegation. Given that the 
Navy had insisted before the Conference that Britain should accept parity with America 
with a margin over Japan of 3 to 2, the American proposal was not unacceptable.
927
 
Receiving Lord Beatty’s concurrence with the 5: 5: 3 ratio, Balfour decided to give ‘a 
warm welcome in principle to American proposals’.928 He was able to deal with 
America’s sudden proposal appropriately, but Hughes’ speech on the limitation of naval 
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armaments ‘somewhat overshadowed’ the question of the Pacific, namely the future of 
the Anglo-Japanese alliance.
929
                        
    Balfour launched a preliminary discussion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance with the 
Japanese representative immediately after the opening meeting.
930
 Prince Iesato 
Tokugawa, the principal Japanese delegate, paid a visit to Balfour at 4 p.m. on 12 
November 1921. In the course of the conversation, Balfour began to talk about the 
alliance. Given Hughes’ reluctance to share the draft tripartite agreement, Balfour could 
not ‘communicate or refer to the draft Tripartite Agreement’. Instead, he suggested that 
‘it might be desirable, in present circumstances, to substitute a Tripartite Agreement 
while retaining the power to renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance if circumstances should 
render this necessary’.931 Prince Tokugawa agreed. Although there was no concrete 
discussion between them, Balfour thought that he could inform Japan of the general line 
of his draft and concluded that ‘[t]he results, though not definite, are not 
unsatisfactory’.932 While America’s uncooperative attitude restricted his negotiations 
with Japan, Balfour still tried to keep the military clause to revive the bilateral alliance 
in the tripartite agreement.     
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   Not showing the draft of the tripartite agreement to Japan, however, later caused 
Japan to suspect Anglo-American collusion. During the visit to the State Department, 
Sadao Saburi, the Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy, knew that Britain had shown her 
draft to America. Kijuro Shidehara, who served as the Japanese Ambassador in 
Washington, decided to confirm Britain’s intentions. He was sick in bed, so he ordered 
Saburi to see Balfour on his behalf. According to Shidehara’s account, although Balfour 
told Saburi that he had already talked about the trilateral arrangement and sent the draft 
to Prince Tokugawa, it was revealed that Hankey happened to have forgotten to 
despatch the draft to the Japanese delegate.
933
 In fact, as mentioned above, Balfour and 
Hankey had not delivered the draft to Prince Tokugawa intentionally because they 
realised that America did not want to notify the Japanese of the draft. Moreover, it was 
not Balfour but Hankey who had had a conversation with Saburi. Balfour authorised 
Hankey to respond to Saburi and gave him general directions as to the discussion with 
Saburi, but did not meet Saburi himself.
934
  
   In his conversation with Saburi on 18 November 1921 Hankey repeated Balfour’s 
idea of a tripartite agreement. First, Saburi read Shidehara’s statement on Japan’s 
attitude to the effect that, while Japan desired the renewal of the alliance, she was also 
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ready to accept its extension to an Anglo-American-Japanese tripartite agreement. 
Hankey replied ‘[i]n accordance with the general instructions’ that Balfour had given 
him. Although Britain regarded the Japanese alliance as ‘an historic fact of great 
importance’, its original grounds had been lost with the removal of Russia and Germany 
from the Far East. The replacement of the alliance with the trilateral arrangement was 
desirable, but it was impossible to assume that Russia and Germany would not reappear 
in some form as Pacific powers. Thus, Hankey concluded, it seemed worth considering 
whether the tripartite agreement ought to include ‘some formula which would retain the 
power of re-constituting the Alliance in case the old circumstances should recur’.935 
Saburi was satisfied with this. The next step was a meeting between Balfour and 
Shidehara, who was charged with political and diplomatic business at the Washington 
conference.
936
  
Shidehara, however, had not recovered from his illness and Balfour could not meet 
him. Eventually, on 23 November 1921, Tomosaburo Kato, Minister for the Navy, who 
led on arms limitation, called on Balfour to discuss the alliance. Recalling the 
circumstances in which it had been concluded and indicating its advantages, Balfour 
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frankly stated that: 
 
The collapse of Russia and the disappearance of Germany from the Pacific had 
altered the conditions to meet which the Alliance had been formed. I pointed out, 
however, that no one could venture to say that these conditions would never recur, 
and my own view therefore was that we should retain the power, within the terms 
of a tripartite arrangement, to renew the Alliance if and when circumstances 
should demand, subject, in the event of such renewal, to full communication of 
its terms to the United States of America, and to the provisions of article 18 of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations.
937
  
 
Then Balfour finally handed his draft agreement to the Japanese delegate, emphasising 
that it was personal and confidential. Balfour thought that Kato seemed satisfied with 
the draft, and Prince Tokugawa later expressed his satisfaction to Hankey.
938
   
   Although Kato and Tokugawa shared Balfour’s view, Shidehara’s reaction was 
different. On receiving Balfour’s draft, Shidehara realised that it was, ‘in short, an 
Anglo-American-Japanese military alliance’ and feared that America would never 
accept such an alliance.
939
 In fact, though Hughes had already obtained Balfour’s draft, 
America did not respond to it at all. According to Shidehara, the Japanese government 
had told him that if the participating nations at the Washington conference wanted to 
amend some clauses of the Anglo-Japanese alliance or change its form, he could 
                                                   
937 Balfour to Lloyd George, 24 Nov. 1921, CAB 30/5/W.D.C.47. 
938 Ibid. 
939 Shidehara, Gaikou Gojunen, p. 64. 
341 
 
approve this. In addition, even if they wanted to abrogate the alliance this would not be 
disadvantageous to Japan.
940
 Therefore, Shidehara decided to revise Balfour’s draft to 
enable America to accept it. Shidehara’s revised draft suggested ‘a consultative pact’, 
which stipulated that countries of that agreement would consult each other in the event 
of serious crises. Shidehara expected that America, which abhorred a binding alliance, 
would accept such a loose arrangement.
941
 Saburi later told Hankey that he attached 
more importance ‘to the agreement being tripartite, than to what it actually 
contained’.942 For Shidehara, cooperation with America was more important than the 
existence of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.      
   Shidehara’s draft was delivered to Balfour on 26 November 1921. Balfour corrected 
some of its words because ‘it was first shown to me informally’.943 As a result, the draft 
ran as follows:     
 
                                 I. 
In regard to the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the Pacific 
Ocean and the Far East, it is agreed that if these are threatened by the aggressive 
action of any third Power, the High Contracting Parties shall communicate with 
one another fully and frankly, in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most 
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efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the 
particular situation. 
 
II. 
The High Contracting Parties further engage to respect these rights as between 
themselves and if there should develop between any two of them, controversies 
on any matter in the aforementioned regions which are likely to affect the 
relations of harmonious accord now happily subsisting between them, they agree 
to invite the Other Contracting Party to a joint conference, to which the whole 
subject matter will be referred for consideration and adjustment. 
 
III. 
The present Agreement shall supersede the Agreement of Alliance hitherto in 
force between Japan and Great Britain.
944
 
 
   Shidehara’s draft, with Balfour’s corrections, was then brought to Hughes on that 
same day. Shidehara wrote in his autobiography that Balfour praised his draft and 
withdrew his own. Then Balfour asked Saburi to hand Shidehara’s draft to Hughes as ‘a 
proposal which Balfour approved’.945 However, according to Hankey’s notes, just 
before the meeting with Hughes, Saburi asked Balfour if he could show Hughes a copy 
of Shidehara’s draft with Balfour’s corrections. Balfour gave his permission on the 
understanding that Saburi would explain to Hughes that Balfour ‘had only had the draft 
before him a very short time and that these were only some rough suggestions’. After 
                                                   
944 “Baron Shidehara’s Tentative Draft on An Outline of A Tripartite Arrangement among Japan, 
The British Empire and The United States of America. As Amended by Mr. Balfour”, CAB 
30/27/S.W.6. 
945 Shidehara, Gaikou Gojunen, p. 65; Professor Nish followed Shidehara’s account. See Nish, 
Alliance in Decline, pp. 372-373. 
343 
 
sending Shidehara’s draft to Hughes, Saburi called on Hankey at 5. 30 p.m. and 
confirmed that he had carefully explained to Hughes ‘the circumstances in which Mr. 
Balfour had made these corrections’. 946  This episode demonstrated that, unlike 
Shidehara’s account, Balfour was cautious about Shidehara’s plan and did not support it 
fully; at least, it was unlikely that Balfour had decided to withdraw his draft at once 
after checking Shidehara’s. At this stage, it became clear that Balfour favoured the 
tripartite agreement with the military clause more than Shidehara. This was the collapse 
of Balfour’s assumption that Japan wanted to retain the alliance and accept Balfour’s 
tripartite agreement draft.               
   The important factor was America’s reaction. Senator Henry Lodge and Elihu Root, 
former United States Secretary of State, visited Balfour on 26 November 1921. They 
discussed the question of the alliance with him at length. Balfour ‘took advantage of this 
opportunity’ to hand them a copy of Shidehara’s revised draft.947 Lodge and Root were 
so satisfied with it that they preferred it to their own draft, which they showed to 
Balfour.
948
 Moreover, Hughes also called on Balfour and had a long conversation with 
him on 28 November. With regard to the Japanese alliance, Hughes, ‘like Senator Lodge 
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and Mr. Root’, expressed his satisfaction with Shidehara’s draft. Indeed, Hughes was 
‘particularly anxious’ to replace the Anglo-Japanese alliance with Shidehara’s tripartite 
arrangement ‘at the earliest possible moment’ 949  Unlike Balfour, the American 
politicians had no hesitation in accepting Shidehara’s idea. Balfour was now the only 
delegate attempting to retain the military clause in the tripartite agreement. 
  Following his conversation with American politicians, Balfour wrote to Curzon on 
this matter. He explained that Shidehara’s draft omitted ‘all reference to articles in my 
draft providing for possible renewal of the alliance’, and added ‘[t]his we regard as very 
satisfactory’.950 It was not clear what made Balfour give up the idea of reviving the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance. He may have realised that as long as America and Japan 
agreed to leave out the military clauses, Britain could no longer push her opinion 
through alone. Furthermore, Shidehara’s consultative pact was compatible with the 
nature of the tripartite agreement which the Foreign Office had proposed just before the 
Washington conference.
951
 It was not surprising that Balfour, who was a practical 
statesman, advocated accepting Shidehara’s draft as the second best option.                 
   America’s approval of Shidehara’s draft was not unconditional, however. At the 
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meeting with Balfour, Hughes insisted that the tripartite agreement should include 
France. Hughes frankly admitted that some people in the United States were hostile to 
Britain and the Senate could not ignore this anti-British feeling in the public. It would 
be easier for the Senate to ratify a four-power agreement including France than any 
arrangement confined to the British Empire and Japan. Although he understood Japan’s 
concern about ‘any further dilution of the tripartite arrangement’, Hughes was optimistic 
that she would agree with this extension if the choice of the new member was confined 
to France.
952
     
Balfour was not in favour of extending the tripartite agreement to France for two 
reasons. First, he worried that, if France joined it, the Netherlands and Italy might also 
demand accession. Hughes replied that the four-power treaty could be confined to 
powers that were both concerned about the limitation of naval armaments and had 
territory in the Pacific. The Netherlands was not subject to the naval disarmament and 
Italy had no territory in the Pacific. Therefore, Hughes concluded, their exclusion from 
the quadruple arrangement could be justified. But Balfour was not convinced by Hughes 
argument.
953
 Second, Balfour also assumed that Japan’s opposition to including France 
was stronger than Hughes expected. After submitting Shidehara’s draft to Hughes, 
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Saburi met Hankey and told him privately that Japan was anxious ‘to avoid the 
association of other Powers’ in the trilateral arrangement.954 As a result, Balfour 
believed that the Japanese delegation would regard France joining as an excessive and 
unacceptable dilution of the agreement.
955
    
However, it was impossible for Balfour to resist the extension of the tripartite 
agreement. Britain could not confront America on securing the trilateral arrangement. 
As Balfour had forecast, Italy required membership of the tripartite agreement, if France 
joined it. Replying to Marquis Visconti Venosta, Secretary-General to the Italian 
delegation, Hankey described Britain’s dilemma between the Anglo-Japanese alliance 
and cooperation with America: 
 
I recalled that we and Japan were quite satisfied with our alliance. But it was not 
popular in America and in our intense desire to be friends with America, with 
whom we had ties of language and common origin, and in the interests of the 
great issues at stake in this Conference, we had come to the conclusion that if 
necessary we must extend the arrangement.
956
 
 
Noting the informal nature of Hankey’s conversation with Venosta, Balfour reported it 
to the Cabinet. Not concealing his dissatisfaction with the admission of France and Italy, 
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Balfour argued that ‘the more powers are included the less satisfactory a substitute to 
alliance will any arrangement become’.957 The British Cabinet agreed that the inclusion 
of Italy would so dilute the tripartite arrangement as to make it unsatisfactory to Japan, 
but concluded that although it would diminish the value of the trilateral agreement, 
admitting France was ‘tolerable’ to secure ‘the adhesion of America’. 958  This 
highlighted how Britain’s acknowledgement of France’s membership was a concession 
to America.
959
       
   In addition, it was important that, contrary to Balfour’s concern, Japan accepted this 
extension of the tripartite agreement to France. Balfour was worried about Japan’s view 
of France’s participation and sent Hankey to sound out Saburi.960  Following the 
conversation with Japanese delegation, Balfour had the impression that their reaction to 
the American proposal of the four-power treaty was ‘very favourable’.961 His judgment 
was correct. On 2 December he met Hughes and Kato to discuss naval disarmament and 
the fate of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. At the meeting Hughes asked Kato whether 
Japan would approve the quadruple agreement. Although Kato was without official 
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instructions, he replied that the Japanese delegation in Washington accepted France’s 
participation in the tripartite agreement.
962
 In the end, the Japanese government agreed 
to the extension of the tripartite arrangement.
963
 Balfour again faced US-Japanese 
collaboration in opposition to his idea. He no longer used Japan’s dissatisfaction for the 
purpose of opposing the quadruple arrangement             
   After Japan acceded to the now quadruple agreement, Balfour began discussing its 
terms with the delegations of America, Japan and France. Hughes had prepared a draft 
of its clauses founded on Shidehara’s draft of the tripartite arrangement, to which 
Balfour made some corrections. Of its four clauses, he paid most attention to article IV, 
which stipulated that upon conclusion of the new agreement the 1911 Anglo-Japanese 
alliance ‘shall terminate’.964 He regarded it as ‘ingenious’ and considered that it placed 
on the Senate the ‘onus of approving this new arrangement’ if they wanted to terminate 
the alliance.
965
 The important question was what would happen if the Senate did not 
approve the four-power treaty. Given the fact that it had refused to ratify the Treaty of 
Versailles just two years earlier, this eventuality was not out of the question. Balfour’s 
answer was that if the Senate rejected the quadruple agreement, ‘the Anglo-Japanese 
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Treaty would continue’.966 Balfour still considered that there was a possibility of 
renewing the Anglo-Japanese alliance if America overturned the result of the 
Washington Conference. He retained his favourable attitude to the renewal of the 
alliance even to the end of the negotiations.   
The fourth plenary session of the conference, held on 10 December 1921, was the 
final stage of discussions on the four-power treaty. Hughes served as chairman at this 
session and Senator Lodge presented the clauses of the quadruple agreement. Neither 
Britain, America, Japan nor France raised any objections. As the British representative, 
Balfour made a speech about British policy on the four-power treaty and the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance. He began by referring to clause IV and insisting that the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance would be terminated with the ratification of the quadruple 
agreement. He then pointed out the unpopularity of the alliance in America. As one of 
‘the original framers of the treaty between Japan and Great Britain’, he was surprised at 
the change in American opinion, which had originally been favourable to the alliance. 
Given the disappearance of the Russian and German threats, it was no longer possible to 
justify it in its original form. It was not ‘a treaty that had to be renewed’.967 
   Balfour nonetheless emphasised the fact that the alliance had lasted for nearly 
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twenty years and survived two major wars:    
 
When two nations have been united in that fiery ordeal, they cannot at the end of 
it take off their hats one to the other and politely part as two strangers part who 
travel together for a few hours in a railway train. Something more, something 
closer, unites them than the mere words of the treaty, ...
968
  
 
Britain now faced a dilemma: retention of the alliance would cause misunderstandings 
with America, but dropping it would do the same with Japan. The only possible solution 
was that ‘we should annul, merge, destroy, as it were, this ancient and outworn and 
unnecessary agreement, and to replace it by something new, something effective, which 
should embrace all the Powers concerned in the vast area of the Pacific’.969 This was a 
balanced argument that took both America and Japan into consideration. Balfour 
concluded his speech by expressing his satisfaction at the four-power treaty replacing 
the alliance.  
   In fact, Balfour was never enthusiastic about the four-power treaty. Even after the 
session, Italy did not abandon her hope of joining the quadruple agreement. On 27 
December 1921, Signor Schanzer, a member of the Italian delegation, visited Balfour 
and insisted that Italy should be included despite the fact that she had no territory in the 
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Pacific. Balfour gave a negative reply:      
 
I replied generally in the sense suggested observing also that the four power 
treaty was not treaty between four principal allied and associated powers as such, 
but merely between four of them which happened to have territorial possessions 
in the Pacific. I said confidentially that I had regretted decision to include France, 
but that France was in much the same position as the other three, being both a 
great naval power and having territorial possessions.
970
 
 
To Balfour’s mind the four-power treaty was not an alliance but a general 
declaration of policy. His negative attitude towards France’s participation had not 
changed. Already the inclusion of France weakened the quadruple arrangement as a 
substitute for the Anglo-Japanese alliance and it was thus impossible for him to approve 
the inclusion of yet further powers. 
Balfour resisted America’s bid to dilute the four-power treaty further. Originally 
Hughes had insisted that the quadruple agreement was confined to powers that were 
both concerned about the limitation of naval armaments and had territory in the Pacific. 
This justified the exclusion of Italy and the Netherlands from the quadruple arrangement. 
However, when he visited Balfour on 3 January 1922, he withdrew this objection and 
suggested to Balfour that Italy should join the four-power treaty. Reminding Hughes 
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that the original form of the quadruple agreement was tripartite, Balfour insisted that: 
 
it was with great reluctance that I had seen France included in it, although that 
country, unlike Italy, had large insular interests in the Pacific Ocean. Every new 
Power added to the signatories of the Treaty decreased its value from the 
Japanese point of view, and increased the difficulty of practically working it. 
Three powers could arrange difficult controversies more quickly than four; four 
Powers could arrange difficult controversies more quickly than five; and 
evidently if Italy were included we could not stop there.
971
       
 
   This was the reminiscent of his argument that ‘the more powers are included the less 
satisfactory a substitute to alliance will any arrangement become’ before the fourth 
plenary session.
972
 Although defending the four-power treaty from further dilution, 
Balfour still preferred the effectiveness of the tripartite agreement.    
   On 6 February 1922, the Washington Conference disbanded following some other 
achievements, for example the Naval Disarmament Treaty and the Nine-Power Treaty 
on China. The last remaining problem was the ratification of the four-power treaty. 
Although cautious about the changeable mood of the Senate, Balfour had the impression 
that it would pass the four-power treaty.
973
 Indeed, the Senate approved the ratification 
more smoothly than expected. Unexpectedly, it took more than a year for France to 
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ratify it because she was dissatisfied with the naval disarmament.
974
 Eventually the 
four-power treaty came into effect on 17 August 1923. This day also represented the 
official termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.         
 
                               IV 
 
Balfour took part in three conferences after the Great War and played an important role 
in the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. At the Paris Peace Conference, he 
dealt with three significant issues relating to Japan. The Shantung question required him 
to manage Anglo-American-Japanese relations. He tried to utilise the League of Nations’ 
mandates system in the Middle East and the Pacific for the defence of India and the 
Dominions. The racial equality clause threatened relations between Japan and America 
and the Dominions, so Balfour made every effort to get Japan to withdraw it without 
compromising her honour. This demonstrated that he tackled these matters from the 
viewpoint of not only Anglo-Japanese relations but also Anglo-American cooperation 
and imperial defence.                    
   At the 1921 Imperial Conference in London Balfour had to tackle the issue of the 
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Anglo-Japanese alliance. Its future was so important that it had already been discussed 
before the conference opened. Balfour, who was informed by Curzon and Hardinge 
about the discussion in the Foreign Office, served as Chairman of the CID and 
investigated Britain’s need for a naval base in Singapore, which was a form of 
reinsurance in the event of the collapse of the alliance. Irrespective of the existence of 
the alliance, Balfour saw the Singapore base as essential to the defence of British 
interests in India and Australasia. The renewal of the alliance would prevent Japan’s 
outright hostility against Britain and buy time to construct the Singapore naval base 
under financial stringency. In addition, as British delegate to the League of Nations, 
Balfour considered that it would not be difficult to adapt the alliance to the League’s 
Covenant. Arguing that America’s accession to the alliance was desirable, Balfour 
concluded that Britain should renew the alliance in some shape.               
   Finally, at the Washington Conference Balfour advocated an 
Anglo-American-Japanese tripartite agreement without precluding the renewal of a 
bilateral defensive alliance. To maintain favourable relations with America, she should 
be included in the Anglo-Japanese alliance. On the other hand, the military clause 
should be preserved to avert Japan’s public hostility and defend the Dominions. This 
was Balfour’s attempt to preserve the core of the alliance in a new trilateral agreement 
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to achieve both Anglo-American cooperation and imperial defence simultaneously. In 
this, however, he did not succeed. Although unenthusiastic about the quadruple 
arrangement he had no choice but to accept it because neither America nor Japan 
wanted to see the Japanese alliance renewed. Even before the Washington Conference, 
the Foreign Office had suggested to Balfour that he accept a tripartite arrangement 
without military clauses. Therefore, the four-power treaty was acceptable to Balfour and 
not unexpected. However, it was not what he had aimed for and the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance, which he had tried to preserve in some form, disappeared completely.      
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Conclusion 
 
The period from 1894 to 1923 saw unprecedented changes in international politics. 
Three significant wars began within this thirty-year period: the Sino-Japanese War of 
1894-1895, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and the Great War of 1914-1918. Not 
only the Far East but also the rest of the world was influenced by the fundamental 
changes caused by these wars. The existing international order became unstable and 
finally collapsed without a new order to take its place. As a global empire, Britain was 
affected more seriously by instability in different parts of the world than any other 
power. Faced with intensifying rivalry among the great powers, many British 
policy-makers sought a suitable ally for the defence of the British Empire. After 
considering various candidates, Britain signed an alliance with Japan in 1902. The 
Anglo-Japanese alliance was an essential element of British foreign policy until its 
termination in 1923.      
   Arthur Balfour played a crucial role in British policy regarding the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance. He dealt with the signing of the alliance as First Lord of the Treasury and 
Leader of the House of Commons, and as Prime Minister at the time of the 
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Russo-Japanese War, he carried out its revision and renewal in 1905. He tackled the 
problem of Japanese naval and military assistance to Britain and the Siberian 
intervention as Foreign Secretary during the Great War, and coped with the end of the 
alliance as head of the British delegation to the Washington Conference. He was the 
only British statesman involved in all of these three important turning points in the 
alliance.     
However, although Balfour played a significant role in the Anglo-Japanese alliance 
from its signing to termination, there are three gaps in the historiography of Balfour and 
the alliance. The first gap is related to Balfour and the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1905; 
while he was not willing to support its conclusion, it is not clear why he changed his 
lukewarm attitude and took the initiative in revising it in 1905. The second gap, relating 
to Balfour and the Great War, is that there are no details of Balfour’s thinking and policy 
regarding Japan’s assistance and the Siberian intervention which had an influence on the 
alliance. The third gap is on Balfour and the Washington Conference; it is necessary to 
reinvestigate how he negotiated with his counterparts of other powers and why he 
accepted the termination of the alliance at the Washington Conference. Each chapter of 
this thesis intends to fill these three gaps one after another by analysing private papers, 
official documents, academic books and articles relating to Balfour and the 
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Anglo-Japanese alliance. 
Balfour’s policy on the Anglo-Japanese alliance revolved around two vital principles, 
namely imperial defence and Anglo-American cooperation. First of all, it was necessary 
to investigate his attitude towards the alliance in the context of imperial defence which 
was not restricted into the Far East. As a founder of the CID, Balfour had a strong 
interest in defending the whole of the British Empire. To him, British interests in the Far 
East were not vital to the Empire and their value was relative to other British interests 
around the globe. This did not mean that he was lukewarm about defending Britain’s 
interests in China. Indeed, facing Russia’s increasing pressure he approved the lease of 
Wei-hai-Wei and opposed withdrawing from northern China.
975
 But Balfour was also 
ready to use British interests in China as a bargaining chip in negotiations with other 
great powers, including Japan. During the Great War, he considered that Britain should 
not hesitate to offer her interests in China as the price for further Japanese naval and 
military assistance.
976
 Although the Anglo-Japanese alliance was originally a regional 
agreement that applied only to the Far East, Balfour did not judge its value only on its 
usefulness in defending British interests in the Far East.      
The defence of India and Australasia was much more important to Balfour. India 
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was the pivot of the British Empire, and unlike China, it was impossible for him to 
employ Britain’s interests in India as a bargaining chip. He emphasised the need to 
defend India from all actual and potential threats. Unless the Anglo-Japanese alliance 
was useful in the defence of India, Balfour could not support it, even though it would 
protect Britain’s interests in the Far East. Therefore, he was in favour of an 
Anglo-German alliance, which he thought could deter Russia from invading India.
977
 
After the Japanese alliance was signed, he remained sceptical about its value. Indeed, 
not being shaken by the opposition within the Cabinet, he decided to maintain strict 
neutrality in the Russo-Japanese War even though Japan might be defeated by Russia. 
This was because he expected that Russia’s attention and resources would be fixed to 
the Far East during and after the war, and as a result her threat to India would be 
weakening.
978
 This reflected that the defence of India was given priority over the 
defence of Britain’s interests in the Far East in Balfour’s mind. 
The change of Balfour’s lukewarm attitude towards the Anglo-Japanese alliance 
should be considered in the context of the defence of India. It was Foreign Secretary 
Lansdowne that proposed to strengthen the relations with Japan by renewing the 
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alliance after Japan’s unexpected victory over Russia.979 On the contrary, although 
Japan’s position would become strong in the Far East, Balfour did not support the 
simple renewal of the alliance.
980
 The reason why he took the initiative in revising the 
alliance was the necessity for dealing with the deterioration of Anglo-Afghan relations 
caused by the defeat of Russia. The value of Japanese military assistance for the Indian 
frontier increased under this situation, so Balfour was enthusiastic about the extension 
of the Anglo-Japanese alliance into India.
981
 Therefore, it is difficult to accept Jason 
Tomes’ argument that Balfour wanted to renew the alliance to strengthen Japan’s 
position and counter Germany’s attempt to intervene in the Far East after the 
Russo-Japanese War.
982
 Balfour came to regard Japan as the more significant factor not 
because she won the war against Russia but because the Anglo-Japanese alliance 
became useful for the defence of India. The careful consideration of Balfour and 
imperial defence has filled the first gap on Balfour and the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 
1905. 
However, the military cooperation with Japan was never easy to carry out. The 
defence of Australia and New Zealand became important with the rise of Japan’s power 
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in Asia after the Russo-Japanese War. Moreover, the Government of India raised doubts 
about the utility of the Japanese military help. Balfour realised that London no longer 
ignored their opinions on Japan when it discussed its own policy towards the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance. As her naval and military assistance was increasingly valuable 
to the Allies, Japan became too crucial to be ignored in Balfour’s policy during the 
Great War. Just before asking Japan to dispatch more naval vessels to Europe in 1917, 
he consulted the governments of Australia and New Zealand and secured their consent 
to guarantee Japan the right to Shantung and the Pacific Islands.
983
 With regard to 
Japanese military assistance, although Balfour considered it desirable for Britain to use 
Japanese troops on the Mesopotamia front in the Great War, he had to abandon this idea 
due to the strong opposition of the India Office and the Government of India, which 
were wary of Japan’s growing influence on India.984 The detailed research on Balfour 
and Japanese assistance during the Great War not only helped to fill the part of second 
gap regarding Balfour and the Great War but also shed the light on a paradox that 
previous historians have missed: Balfour came to support the Anglo-Japanese alliance 
because its military aid would contribute to the imperial defence. But the very existence 
of the British Empire made it difficult to strengthen the military collaboration between 
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Britain and Japan.           
   Another significant principle was Britain’s cooperation with America. Balfour was a 
staunch advocate of Anglo-Saxon solidarity backed by Anglo-American global naval 
supremacy. When he realised the need for an ally, therefore, he preferred an alliance 
with America to one with any of the other powers, including Japan.
985
 Although his 
attempted close collaboration with America failed due to her isolationism, he did not 
give up hope of extracting America from her commitment to maintaining international 
order. He welcomed America’s proposal of an arbitration treaty with Britain in 1911, 
seeing it a sign of her active role in international politics.
986
 The League of Nations was 
a useful tool for Balfour to achieve Anglo-American cooperation for the purpose of 
keeping the Versailles settlement.
987
 America’s isolationism was so strong that her 
accession to these schemes was not realised, but this demonstrated his unchangeable 
preference for the close Anglo-American cooperation.      
   Balfour’s pursuit of the Anglo-American cooperation had influenced on his policy 
towards the Anglo-Japanese alliance since its signing. The idea of America joining the 
alliance was not strange to Balfour. Opposing the simple renewal of the Japanese 
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alliance during the Russo-Japanese War, he argued that it was desirable that the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance became part of an Anglo-American agreement.
988
 Even after 
realising the value of the extended alliance, he did not abandon his hope for a trilateral 
arrangement. His proposal of an Anglo-American-Japanese naval agreement in 1917 
was his attempt to combine the Anglo-Japanese alliance with his favoured 
Anglo-American defensive alliance.
989
 He saw such a trilateral agreement as a logical 
development of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.            
   Balfour, therefore, could not tolerate the possibility that the Anglo-Japanese alliance 
would wreck Anglo-American cooperation. The first revision of the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance in 1905 created the potential scenario in which Britain would fight America in 
support of Japan. Deteriorating US-Japanese relations after the Russo-Japanese War 
deepened concern that Britain might be dragged into a US-Japanese conflict. Although 
he did not believe that Japan would wage war against America over racial issues such as 
Japanese immigration, Balfour supported the second revision of the alliance in 1911 to 
ensure that Britain would never have to side with Japan in a US-Japanese war.
990
 While 
both America and Japan had joined the Allies, Balfour made every effort to maintain 
good relations between them. One of his main achievements at the Paris Peace 
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Conference was his mediation in the Anglo-American-Japanese complication over 
China. The growing rivalry between America and Japan required him to manage the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance with extreme caution.         
   The problem was that these two principles began to clash within the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance. This was appearing in the Siberian intervention, so unlike Ian Nish’s insistence, 
the alliance was at stake in the discussion of the Siberian intervention.
991
 Regarding the 
Allied intervention in Siberia as the Japanese military help, Balfour attempted to deploy 
Japanese troops from Eastern Siberia to the Ural Mountains. The aim of this major 
military campaign was not only to prevent Bolshevik Russia from taking control of 
Siberia but also to address the Russo-German threat to India and its adjacent regions. 
Balfour realised the need for America’s assent to Japan joining the Allied intervention, 
otherwise America’s suspicion of Japan would increase and Anglo-American relations 
would be damaged.
992
 However, her indifference to the defence of India made it 
difficult to persuade America to accept Japan’s advancement into Central Asia. While 
Balfour managed to secure American approval and succeeded in carrying out the Allied 
intervention in Siberia, this demonstrated how military collaboration with Japan, which 
was useful in the security for British imperial interests, threatened the relations between 
                                                   
991 I. Nish, Alliance in Decline: A study in Anglo-Japanese relations 1908-23 (London, 1972), pp. 
237-241.  
992 Memo. by Balfour, 29 May 1918, CAB 21/45. 
365 
 
Britain and America. This survey on the Siberian intervention has completely filled the 
second gap on Balfour and the Great War, revealing the difficulty in coexisting both 
imperial defence and Anglo-American cooperation within the Anglo-Japanese alliance.              
   After the Great War this dilemma became clearer and Balfour had to tackle it. As 
Balfour realised, Japan became a significant actor which could affect the post-war 
international order in the Pacific. Being suspicious about Japan’s behaviour during the 
war and fearing the growing rivalry between America and Japan, many British foreign 
officials and diplomats insisted that there was no longer any necessity for renewing the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance. Instead, they favoured Anglo-American cooperation in the Far 
East. Although this was not contradictory to Balfour’s Anglo-Saxon solidarity, it would 
not be sufficient to defend Britain’s other interests around the globe, in particular India 
and Australasia. If the alliance were terminated, Japan might join the Russo-German 
collaboration and engage in hostile action against Britain.
993
 On the other hand, Balfour 
concluded that Britain could not rely on America for assistance in defending the 
Empire.
994
 The Singapore naval base was essential to protect India and the Dominions 
unilaterally, but Britain needed to maintain the status quo in the Pacific until its 
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completion because she could not afford to deal with the contingency.
995
 Balfour 
considered that the Anglo-Japanese alliance would serve to prevent outright hostility 
from Japan and keep the international situation in Asia calm. While it might damage 
Anglo-American cooperation, the Anglo-Japanese alliance was still useful for imperial 
defence. Balfour had to pursue a compromise between these contradicting factors. 
Balfour’s solution was to preserve the core of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in the 
new form of a political arrangement. Contrary to arguments advanced by Erik Goldstein, 
Balfour did not approve the Foreign Office’s proposal that the alliance should be 
replaced with a declaration of general policy between Britain, American and Japan.
996
 
Instead, he prepared his own draft of an Anglo-American-Japanese tripartite agreement, 
with a military clause, at the Washington Conference.
997
 There was a fundamental 
difference between Foreign Office’s proposal and Balfour’s draft. The Foreign Office 
had no intention to preserving the alliance. On the other hand, Balfour tried to keep the 
possibility of reviving the bilateral alliance, maintaining cooperation with America by 
incorporating her in the alliance. This trilateral arrangement was not different from his 
favourite development of the Anglo-Japanese alliance before and during the Great War.  
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However, Balfour’s idea was not realised due to both American and Japanese 
opposition. Contrary to Balfour’s calculation, Japan did not support his idea, proposing 
the removal of any military clauses from the trilateral arrangement.
998
 It was clear that 
Japan concluded that the cooperation with America took precedence over the 
maintenance of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Approving of Japan’s draft, America 
insisted the inclusion of France in the tripartite agreement.
999
 Although Balfour was not 
enthusiastic about America’s requirement, the British government accepted France 
joining the arrangement in order to avoid the collision with America. As a result, 
Balfour’s Anglo-American-Japanese agreement with the possibility in reviving the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance was replaced with four-power treaty among Britain, America, 
Japan and France without any military clauses. The nature of this quadruple 
arrangement was the same as that of the Foreign Office’s declaration of general policy. 
Given the fact that Balfour was a chief British delegation, however, the four-power 
treaty was not, as Phillips Payson O’Brien has argued, ‘extremely close to what the 
British delegation had hoped to achieve’.1000 Balfour had no choice but to accept the 
                                                   
998 “Baron Shidehara’s Tentative Draft on An Outline of A Tripartite Arrangement among Japan, 
The British Empire and The United States of America. As Amended by Mr. Balfour”, CAB 
30/27/S.W.6. 
999 “Note of a Conversation between Mr. Balfour and Mr. Hughes on Monday, 28
th
 November, 1921 
At 3.0 p.m.”, 28 Nov. 1921, CAB 30/27/S.W.7. 
1000 P.P. O’Brien, ‘Britain and the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance’ in P.P. O’Brien, (ed.) The 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1922 (London, 2004), p. 281. 
368 
 
four-power treaty, realising that Britain could no longer push through her opinion if 
America and Japan collaborated against her. In the end, the Anglo-Japanese alliance, 
which Balfour had tried to preserve in some shape, was completely terminated in 1923. 
The third gap on Balfour and the Washington Conference has finally been filled by 
reinvestigating private and official papers.            
   It is ironic that Balfour, who had initially opposed signing the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance, made every effort to retain it at its last stage. Just before his death, he said to 
his niece Blanche Dugdale, ‘When I look back, I think that my opinions have hardly 
ever changed at all about anything’.1001 But this was not applied to his policy towards 
the Anglo-Japanese alliance. He had not been ‘an advocate of close relations between 
Great Britain and Japan’ for the whole period of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.1002 
During the Russo-Japanese War he was not sympathised with Japan, rejecting Britain’s 
support for her. Balfour’s negative opinion towards the alliance clearly turned into 
positive one just before its 1905 revision. His policy on the alliance was enough flexible 
to adjust to unstable international environment from 1894. 
On the other hand, the principles of his policy regarding the Anglo-Japanese alliance 
had not changed since the end of the nineteenth century. He always saw its usefulness 
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on the basis of its links to the imperial defence and Anglo-American cooperation. His 
policy did not always fit rise and fall of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Unlike Lansdowne, 
Balfour did not support the signing and renewing of the rising Anglo-Japanese alliance. 
Unlike the Foreign Office officials and diplomats, Balfour hesitated to accept the 
complete termination of the declining Anglo-Japanese alliance. This may appear strange 
from the viewpoint of the Far Eastern politics. Moreover, with the benefit of hindsight 
such a view might be confirmed. In the end, Balfour failed to achieve his alternative 
policy, for example an Anglo-American or Anglo-German alliance instead of the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 and an Anglo-American-Japanese tripartite agreement 
with a military clause for reviving a defensive alliance, which was different from the 
four-power treaty without any military commitment of 1923. However, his policy on the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance was logical from the viewpoint of imperial defence and 
Anglo-American cooperation, which were valued by the statesman who had assumed 
responsibility for the survival of the global empire under the changing international 
circumstances from 1894 to 1923.     
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